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RÉSUMÉ
Dans cette thèse, nous construisons un modèle épidémiologique de la dissémina-
tion de normes juridiques. L’objectif est d’expliquer la transmission de normes ju-
ridiques américaines régissant les tests  de dépistages pour drogues au travail vers  le 
Canada ainsi que la propagation subséquente de ces normes à travers la jurispru-
dence canadienne.
La propagation des  normes régissant les tests de dépistages pour drogues 
au travail sert donc à la fois de point de départ pour une réflexion théorique sur la 
transmission de normes juridiques et pour une étude de cas empirique.
Nous partons de la prémisse que les explications du changement juridique, 
telles  celle de la transplantation et celle de l’harmonisation, sont essentiellement 
métaphoriques. Ces métaphores explicatives fonctionnent en invitant des com-
paraisons entre les  domaines connus et inconnus. Quand ce processus  de com-
paraison est systématisé, la métaphore devient un modèle.
Dans la thèse, nous  appliquons cette procédure de systématisation afin de 
transformer la métaphore de la propagation virale en modèle épidémiologique. 
Après une revue de la littérature sur les épidémies sociales, nous décrivons les 
éléments pertinents  de la théorie épidémiologique pour, ensuite, les transposer au 
domaine juridique. Le modèle est alors opérationnalisé en l’appliquant à une base 
de données composée de la jurisprudence pertinente (n=187).
v
Les résultats  soutiennent les hypothèses du modèle. 90!% des décisions  qui 
citent les sources américaines sont infectées selon les  critères  du modèle, alors que 
seulement 64! % des  décisions qui ne citent pas  de sources  américaines sont in-
fectées. Cela soutient l’hypothèse d’une épidémie dite de «! réservoir commun!». 
Nous avons également démontré une corrélation positive entre la référence à ces 
décisions et l’état d’infection! : 87! % des décisions qui citent des décisions qui 
réfèrent aux sources américaines sont infectées, alors que le taux d’infection parmi 
la population restante est de seulement 53!%. Les résultats  semblables ont été ob-
tenus pour les décisions  de troisième génération. Cela soutient l’hypothèse selon 
laquelle il y a eu propagation à travers la jurisprudence suite aux contacts initiaux 
avec le réservoir commun. Des corrélations positives ont aussi été démontrées en-
tre l’état d’infection et l’appartenance à l’une ou l’autre de sous-populations par-
ticulières qui seraient, par hypothèse, des points d’infection.
En conclusion de la thèse, nous avançons que c’est seulement après avoir 
construit un modèle et d’avoir constaté ses  limites  que nous pouvons vraiment 
comprendre le rôle des métaphores et des modèles dans l’explication de phé-
nomènes juridiques. 
MOTS CLÉS! : méthodologie juridique, théorie du droit, épidémiologie, virus, 
droit du travail, dépistage de drogues, droits de la personne, droit à la vie privée.
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ABSTRACT
In this thesis, I construct an epidemiological model to explain the transmission of 
legal norms governing drug testing in the workplace from the United States to 
Canada and their subsequent spread across the jurisprudence.  Employment drug 
testing norms thus serve as both the starting point for a reflection on how norms 
spread and a case study for the empirical testing of  a theoretical model.
I begin with the premise that many explanations of legal change – such as 
transplant and harmonization – are grounded in metaphors, and then argue that 
such metaphors work by inviting the hearer to make comparisons between the fa-
miliar and the unfamiliar.  When this  process of comparison is systematized, the 
metaphor becomes a model.  
This  process  of systematization is applied; extending a viral metaphor into 
an epidemiological model.  After reviewing the literature on social epidemics, I set 
out those aspects of epidemiological theory that may be profitably transposed to 
the domain of law.  I then operationalize the model by applying it to a data set 
composed of  tribunal decisions (n=187) using computer assisted text analysis.
The results support the hypotheses generated by the model.  90% of deci-
sions that cited American sources met the model’s criteria for infection, compared 
to only 64% of those that didn’t cite American sources.  This supports the hy-
pothesis of a common reservoir epidemic.  Citation to those infected decisions was 
also positively correlated to infection: 87% of the citing population was infected, 
vii
compared to only 53% of the remaining population that cited neither an Ameri-
can source nor one of the infected decisions that cited an American source.  Simi-
lar results were obtained for third generation decisions.  This supports the hy-
pothesis of a serial-transfer epidemic subsequent to contact with the reservoir. 
Positive correlation to infection was also demonstrated for particular sub-
populations hypothesized to be act as points of infection and to a hypothesized 
vector. 
In the conclusion, I argue that it is only after we have gone through the 
process of constructing a model and seen the strengths and limits  of its applica-
tion, that we have access to the full scope of the insights into the role of metaphors 
and models in the explanation of  legal phenomena.
KEYWORDS: legal theory, epidemiology, virus, memetics, discourse analysis, 
qualitative research methods,labour law, drug testing, human rights, right to pri-
vacy.
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PREFACE
The genesis of this thesis can be found in a series of practical problems that 
I faced while working on a file that was eventually to clarify the law on 
employment drug testing in Quebec.1
My research on the caselaw quickly led me to discover that, in Canada, the 
tendency is to balance an employer’s legitimate interest in having a workforce un-
impaired by drugs and an employee’s rights both to privacy and to equal treat-
ment.  The balance tips away from privacy rights and towards testing in work-
places where safety depends on alert personnel to make split second decisions and 
where impairment could thus have catastrophic consequences.  
This  seemed to me to be a fairly straightforward bit of reasoning – until I 
discovered that nowhere was there any evidence that urine screening for drugs had 
the slightest relationship to workplace impairment nor to accident rates.  Indeed, 
some of the jurisprudence was quite clear on the fact that it was  not possible to 
determine impairment from a urine test.
I thought that there had been some mistake.  Surely our legal system 
wouldn’t countenance forcing hundreds of thousands of Canadians  to  undergo 
the stress and embarassment of peeing in a cup for their bosses without good rea-
xxiii
1 SCEP s.l. 143 et Goodyear Canada Inc. (April 12, 2005, Arbitrator D. Tremblay, unreported) aff ’d Section 
locale 143 du Syndicat canadien des communications, de l’énergie et du papier c. Tremblay, 2006 QCCS 2128, 
[2006] R.J.D.T. 617, D.T.E. 2006T-449, quashed in part on appeal:  Section locale 143 du Syndicat canadien 
des communications, de l’énergie et du papier c. Goodyear Canada Inc., 2007 QCCA 1686.
son?  I set out to find the reason, and so began my adventures down the rabbit 
hole.
I quickly discovered that the Canadian norms governing workplace testing 
were grounded neither in good science nor in Canadian law.  Rather, all of the 
indicia pointed South: our rules, apparently, came from the United States.  This 
discovery led me to try to understand how exactly the norms governing 
employment drug testing came to Canada.
I thus found myself  rather far from the practical problems involved in con-
structing an argument for litigation and I became increasingly frustrated with the 
impossibility of exploring these issues in the fora available to a practicing lawyer. 
Clients – quite rightly I should add – want results  and not theories.  And while 
judges and arbitrators are willing to sit through a brief introductory statement 
about the origins of a legal rule, they quickly get impatient to get to the dispute 
before them.  With good reason, adjudicators generally prefer adjudicative facts to 
legislative facts.
I thus began my doctoral studies with a good idea of my research topic.  Of 
course, it grew more detailed and somewhat broader in scope.  The case of the 
spread of employment drug testing norms from the United States to Canada be-
came merely one concrete example of the more general phenomenon of legal 
norm transmission.  My disatisfaction with existing accounts of transmission led to 
the viral metaphor, which I wanted to render as rigorous as possible – hence the 
work on an epidemiological model.
xxiv
In its final form, this thesis may appear to be very far from the original 
problems I wanted to explore.  Nevertheless, to me it is a direct extension of the 
early work I did contesting employer policies in arbitration and before the courts.
xxv
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INTRODUCTION
Canadian law came into contact with U.S. norms governing drug testing in the 
workplace and those norms then spread across the jurisprudence like a virus. 
This  simple assertion is the core of this  thesis, which integrates three different re-
search projects.
First, the thesis seeks to explain how the Canadian jurisprudence governing 
workplace drug testing came to be as it is.  The interaction between principles of 
labour law, human rights  law and the common and civil law protection of privacy 
rights could support a range of responses  to the question of whether an employer 
may require workers to submit to drug testing on pain of discipline.  Tracing the 
actual responses to their origins in the United States provides an explanation that 
a purely doctrinal exposition of the positive law could not.  In part, it explains why 
this set of norms applies, rather than any of the other sets of norms that would be 
equally consistent with the applicable legislation and ius commune principles.
Second, the thesis is  a reflection on –!and an exercise in!– research meth-
odology.  I start from the premise that many of our explanations of legal phenom-
ena, and in particular of legal change, are grounded in metaphors.  But how do 
metaphors such as transplant and harmonization actually do the work of explain-
ing?  I argue that these explanatory metaphors are best understood as performa-
tive speech acts and that we should attend more to what they do than what they 
mean.  What they do is to invite the hearer to make comparisons between the famil-
iar and the unfamiliar.  When this process of comparison is  systematized, the 
metaphor becomes a model.  Much of the work of this thesis is just such a process 
of  systematization: extending a viral metaphor into an epidemiological model.
Constructing and testing an epidemiological model of legal norm transmis-
sion is  thus the third aspect of this thesis.  I start from the intuition that some legal 
norms spread virally.  After reviewing the literature on social epidemics, I set out 
those aspects  of epidemiological theory that may be profitably transposed to the 
domain of law.  The characterization of each concept of epidemiology and the 
mapping of that concept onto a legal phenomenon involves choices and each of 
these choices is  defended.  I then operationalize the model by applying it to a data 
set using computer assisted text analysis.
The results  strongly support the initial intuitions as refined into testable hy-
potheses by the model, providing novel insights into exactly how U.S. drug testing 
norms spread to Canada.  Aside from their application to the particular case study, 
the positive results confirm the utility of both the modelling process in general and 
the epidemiological model in particular.
Chapter 1 sets  out the norm transmission problem in terms of the spread 
of employment drug testing norms from the U.S. to Canada.  The overview and 
history of the jurisprudence set out in Chapter 1 form the basis  of the case study 
that is used to construct and test the epidemiological model.
2
In Chapter 2, I discuss the norm transmission problem more generally.  I 
explain how the norm transmission described in Chapter 1 cannot be accounted 
for by the metaphors  of transplant and harmonization.  Instead, I propose the 
metaphor that some legal norms spread virally.  This  leads me to a discussion on 
the role of  metaphors and of  models in legal theory.
Chapters 3 and 4 are devoted to the construction of the epidemiological 
model of legal norm transmission.  In Chapter 3, I provide an introduction to the 
salient elements of epidemiology and epidemic theory.  In Chapter 4, I map those 
elements onto the legal field.
The application of the model to the case comprises the next two chapters. 
In Chapter 5, I operationalize the mapping set out in Chapter 4 in order to consti-
tute a data set and interrogate it.  Chapter 6 is  concerned with testing the hypothe-
ses  generated by the model, in particular by measuring the impact of direct con-
tact with American sources and citation to decisions  that themselves refer to 
American sources.
I conclude with the argument that going through the process  of model con-
struction gives us insights into the role played by metaphors in legal theory and in 
interdisciplinary research in particular. 
3
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Introduction
In this chapter, I set out the problem that leads me to propose an epidemiological 
model of norm transmission.  In its most basic form, the problem can be de-
scribed as follows: the legal norms governing employment drug testing in Canada 
clearly have their origins in the United States, but the legislative history shows that 
the intentional efforts to effect their transmission from the United States  to 
Canada were abandoned. 
I begin this  chapter by describing the development of drug testing in the 
United States  generally and of the norms governing employment drug testing in 
particular.  I then relate the Canadian government’s unsuccessful attempts to im-
port the U.S. drug testing norms and demonstrate how they came into contact 
with the Canadian jurisprudence despite the failed attempt to  transplant them. 
This  leads me to a more detailed description of the so-called “Canadian model” of 
drug testing, pointing out its similarity to the American regime.  In particular, I 
concentrate on the role of workplace safety in the justification of mandatory 
employment drug testing.  This justification is articulated as a balancing of the 
privacy interests of individual employees with the general interest in a safe work-
place, particularly for those occupying so-called “safety-sensitive” positions.  From 
this description, it will be apparent that: (1) the terminology and justification struc-
ture of the American model of drug testing and the Canadian model are too simi-
lar for their resemblance to be a simple coincidence, and (2) the Canadian model 
is rooted in precisely those industries  that came into contact with the U.S. drug 
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testing norms, which leads me to the conclusion that (3) the American norms were 
transmitted to Canada.
1. Development of  Drug Testing in the United States
The advent of employment drug testing in Canada cannot be understood without 
reference to its prior implementation in the United States.  In this section, I pro-
vide a brief overview of the history of drug testing in U.S.  I then examine the 
stated reasons for the broad scale implementation of employment drug testing, 
with particular reference to President Reagan’s Executive Order 12564, which 
mandated drug testing across the federal civil service.  This order, and the regula-
tions, policies, and procedures that it engendered, became the template for 
employment drug testing across the U.S., including in the private sector.
1.1. The “Pre-history” of  Employment Drug Testing in the U.S.
The idea of urine examination as a diagnostic tool can be traced back to 
Hippocrates.1   However, the earliest drug testing in the U.S. was based on blood 
and breath.  In the 1920s, blood and breath samples were used to identify drunk 
drivers; with the first “war on drugs” came the first use of biological screening for 
drugs.2   It was  only in the 1950s  that techniques were developed that allowed for 
large-scale urinalysis screening for drugs.  Until the late 1960s, this technique was 
8
1  Meryl H. Haber, “Pisse Prophecy: A Brief History of Urinalysis” (1988) 8:3 Clin. Lab. Med. 415, 
cited in Deborah L. Ackerman, “A History of Drug Testing” in Robert H. Coombs & Louis Jolyon 
West eds., Drug Testing: Issues and Options (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) 3 at 6.  See also 
John Gilliom, Surveillance, Privacy, and the Law: Employee Drug Testing and the Politics of Social Control (Ann 
Arbor: University of  Michigan Press, 1994) at 5.
2 Ackerman, ibid. at 8.
limited to medical uses, for instance in hospital emergency rooms and psychiatric 
outpatient clinics.3
Among the first populations to be subjected to mass urinalysis screening was 
that of veterans returning from the Vietnam war.4  These tests  were implemented 
due to the concern that many soldiers were returning from Vietnam addicted to 
opium or heroin.  Consequently, morphine (the metabolite excreted in urine sub-
sequent to opiate use) was the only drug for which testing was implemented.5  
The returning Vietnam veterans programme was eventually extended to 
the entire military, which was the first state institution to perform testing on all of 
its  members.6  In early 1982, the U.S. Navy became the first branch of the armed 
services to put into practice a comprehensive, mandatory, mass-screening pro-
9
3 Ibid. at 11.
4 Olympic athletes became subject to testing at about the same time: the first testing occurred on a pre-
liminary basis at the 1968 Olympics in Mexico City and the first comprehensive testing was  done at the 
1972 Olympics in Munich.  See Eric D. Zemper, “Drug Testing in Athletics” in Coombs & West, supra 
note 1, 113 at 114.
5 Ackerman, supra note 1 at 11.
6 Ibid. at 12.  Prisons began testing at about the same time.  This is telling, since the military and prisons 
were identified by Foucault as two “disciplinary” institutions par excellence,  arguing that they functioned 
based on a power logic of surveillance.   See Michel Foucault, Surveiller et punir (Paris: Gallimard, 1975). 
The other two disciplinary institutions identified by Foucault are the workplace and schools.  In the 
1980s, at about the same time mass employment testing was  instituted, mass  testing of highschool stu-
dents began.  In Vernonia School District v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that 
mandatory testing for students who participate in extra-curricular activities does  not violate their rights 
under the 4th Amendment of  the U.S. Constitution.
gramme.  Safety was an oft-repeated justification,7 but the following quote from 
(then) Rear Admiral Paul Malloy, who initiated the programme, states  other rea-
sons:
In decisions with the CNO [Chief of Naval Opera-
tions], I recommended that “war” be declared on 
drugs with all that the phrase clearly implied.  I be-
lieved that after Vietnam, sailors’ values were con-
fused about things such as right/wrong; legal/illegal; 
traditional beliefs in God, family and country; and 
the Navy’s customs and traditions.  Historically, all 
these things promoted pride, high morale, and sound 
discipline.  We believed drug usage in the Navy re-
flected not only a societal malady but also an erosion 
of  our traditional values…8
This  concern with “traditional values” was a key stated reason for the “War on 
Drugs” initiated by President Reagan in the 1980s.  It is this mobilization of the 
rhetoric of  values as a reason for employment testing to which we will now turn.
1.2. The “War on Drugs” and the Committee on Organized Crime
The concern that drug use was both a symptom and a cause of the decline of 
“traditional values” was an important stated reason guiding U.S. drug policy dur-
ing the Reagan presidency.  On October 2, 1982, Reagan declared “War on 
10
7 An aircraft crash that killed 14 people on the carrier U.S.S. Nimitz is  often cited as  the event that trig-
gered the decision for the Navy to implement mass-screening, implying that safety was a primary rea-
son (see e.g. Dennis  J. Crouch et al., “A Critical Evaluation of the Utah Power and Light Company’s 
Substance Abuse Management Program: Absenteeism, Accidents and Costs” in Steven W. Gust, J. Mi-
chael Walsh & NIDA eds., Drugs in the Workplace: Research and Evaluation Data (Rockville, Md. : [Washing-
ton, D.C. : U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Alcohol, Drug Abuse, 
and Mental Health Administration, National Institute on Drug Abuse ; Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O., 
distributor], 1989) 169 at 178.  However, according to those who actually made the decision, the deci-
sion to test was made several months before the crash (Paul J. Mulloy, “Winning the War on Drugs  in the 
Military” in Coombs & West, supra note 1, 92 at 93-94).
8 Mulloy, ibid. at 95.
Drugs” in his  weekly radio address  to the nation.9   In the address, drug use is 
characterized as an “epidemic” that has a deleterious effect on families.  Reagan 
cites  “stories  of families where lying replaces  trust, hate replaces love; stories of 
children stealing from their mothers' purses…”10
The War on Drugs was  part of a larger anti-crime and “law and order” 
initiative of the U.S. government under Reagan.11   In mid-1983, as  part of this 
initiative, Reagan issued an executive order establishing the President’s  Commis-
sion on Organized Crime.12  The Commission’s mandate was to make a “full and 
complete… analysis of organized crime” including “the sources and amounts of 
organized crime's income.”13  It was then to report its findings to the President and 
the Attorney-General and “…make recommendations concerning appropriate 
11
9 Reagan, Ronald. “Radio Address to the Nation on Federal Drug Policy, October 2,  1982” in Ronald 
Reagan Presidential Library, ed., The Public Papers of President Ronald W. Reagan, online: 
<http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/> [Reagan, “Radio Address on Federal Drug Policy”].   “War” had 
actually already been declared almost ten years  earlier by then President Richard Nixon.  In an address 
to Congress regarding the establishment of the Drug Enforcement Agency, Nixon stated: “Drug abuse 
is  one of the most vicious and corrosive forces attacking the foundations  of American society today. It is 
a major cause of crime and a merciless destroyer of human lives. We must fight it with all of the re-
sources  at our command. This Administration has declared all-out,  global war on the drug menace…” 
“Message to the Congress Transmitting Reorganization Plan 2 of 1973 Establishing the Drug En-
forcement Administration, March 28th,  1973” in John T. Woolley & Gerhard Peters, eds.,  The American 
Presidency Project, online: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu>.
10 Reagan, “Radio Address  on Federal Drug Policy”, ibid.  For other examples of Reagan’s citation of 
the relationship between traditional values (or “family values”) and drug use as a reason for drug policy 
see “Radio Address to the Nation on Teenage Drug Abuse, January 16,  1988”; “Address  Before a Joint 
Session of Congress  on the State of the Union January 25, 1988; “Remarks Upon Arrival in Palos 
Hills, Illinois, November 4, 1988” (all in The Public Papers of  President Ronald W. Reagan, ibid.).
11 On the the relationship between the law and order agenda, the drug war, and employment drug test-
ing, see Gilliom, supra note 1 at 31-33.
12 Executive Order 12435, 48 Fed. Reg. 34723 (August 1, 1983).
13 Ibid. at s. 2 (a).
administrative and legislative improvements and improvements  in the administra-
tion of  justice.”14
The Commission came to the conclusion that the primary source of in-
come for organized crime was drug trafficking; its final report was entitled America's 
Habit: Drug Abuse, Drug Trafficking, and Organized Crime.15   An important finding of 
the Commission was that, historically, U.S. drug policy had been oriented towards 
reducing the supply of drugs, notably by attempting to stop their entry into the 
U.S. and by the domestic repression of drug cultivation, manufacture and distribu-
tion.  The Commission came to the conclusion that this focus  on supply was ineffi-
cient and largely ineffective in reducing “the drug problem”.16   Instead, the Fed-
eral government should refocus its efforts on demand reduction.17
As part of this demand reduction strategy, the Commission suggested that 
the workplace was a useful site of intervention.  Oddly enough, it is here, in a sec-
tion that deals  with demand reduction in a document that deals  with organized 
crime, and not workplace safety, that we find one of the initial sources  of the no-
12
14 Ibid.
15 United States President's Commission on Organized Crime, America's Habit: Drug Abuse, Drug Traffick-
ing, and Organized Crime: Report to the President and the Attorney General (Washington, D.C.: Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986) [America’s Habit].
16 Ibid. at 429.
17 Ibid., at 187-88, 204.  Interestingly, this is the same position Reagan held, even prior to declaring the 
“War on Drugs”.  Two months into his presidency, at the first press conference in which he was asked 
whether he intended to have a White House drug strategy, he said: “It is my belief,  firm belief, that the 
answer to the drug problem comes through winning over the users to the point that we take the cus-
tomers away from the drugs... [I]t's  far more effective if you take the customers away than if you try to 
take the drugs  away from those who want to be customers (“The President’s News Conference, March 
6, 1981” in The Public Papers of  President Ronald W. Reagan, supra note 9).
tion “safety sensitive position”, as  it was  later to be articulated.  The Commission 
stated:
Efforts to combat drug abuse can also be successful in 
the workplace… Drug testing in certain “critical posi-
tions,” such as in the transportation industry, law en-
forcement, and education is particularly important.18
In the citation, the use of quotes  around “critical positions” is  ambiguous, and 
there are no references in the report that elucidate what this phrase refers  to.  It is 
clearly not intended to refer solely to workplace safety, however, given the refer-
ence to education workers.19
Whatever the intended scope of “critical positions” in the Commission’s 
report, its  recommendations unambiguously advocate employment drug testing as 
part of the preferred strategy of demand reduction.  In the section “Reducing 
Demand for Drugs”, three recommendations stand out:
3.  The President should direct the heads of all Fed-
eral agencies to formulate immediately clear policy 
statements, with implementing guidelines, including 
suitable drug testing programs, expressing the utter unac-
ceptability of drug abuse by Federal employees… 
Government contracts should not be awarded to 
companies that fail to implement drug programs, in-
cluding suitable drug testing...
…
13
18 America’s Habit, supra note 15 at 461, n. 3.
19  But see Ibid. at 331, n. 3 (referring to abuse of cocaine by “individuals with whom we trust our 
health, welfare, and safety” including “physicians, airline pilots, nuclear plant operators,  military per-
sonnel, railroad switchmen, school bus drivers, prison guards, and police officers”).
7.  Every employer, public and private, and public 
education institutions of all levels  should have clearly-
stated policies prohibiting drug use, possession of 
drugs, or being under the influence of drugs on their 
premises.  The consequences of violating these pro-
hibitions should be clearly explained.
8.  Government and private sector employer who do not  already 
require drug testing of job applicants and current  employees 
should consider the appropriateness of  such a testing program.20
The Commission’s report is  not at all clear on exactly how drug testing is supposed 
to reduce demand for drugs, other than as part of a general policy of intolerance 
towards drug use.  Perhaps  they believed that the relationship was so obvious that 
it need not be stated.  One commentator on drug testing describes it as follows:
Testing threatens  millions of Americans with the 
speedy, inexpensive infliction of a sanction – unem-
ployment – that has far more string than the criminal 
penalties  usually imposed for casual drug use.  As a 
deterrent, employment testing can be extremely effec-
tive, regardless of  its relation to on-the-job 
performance.21
1.3. The Beginnings of  a Safety Discourse
During the three years that the President’s  Commission was doing its work, 
employment drug testing had begun to appear in American industry, both private 
and public.  By 1985, at least some major corporations were conducting pre-
14
20 Ibid. at 483-5 [emphasis added].
21 Stephen J. Schulhofer, “On the Fourth Amendment Rights of the Law-Abiding Public” (1989) Sup. 
Ct. Rev. 87 at 129, cited in Gilliom, supra note 1 at 33.
employment screening “with the stated motive of promoting occupational 
safety.”22
During the same period, the exact phrase “safety-sensitive positions” made 
its  first appearance.  In July of 1983, the U.S. Department of Transport Federal 
Railroad Administration (the “FRA”) issued a notice setting out its intention to 
adopt regulations pertaining to alcohol and drugs  in the railroad industry.23   In 
August of 1985, after a series of consultations with industry and employee repre-
sentatives, the FRA promulgated a new set of regulations entitled Control of Alcohol 
and Drug Use in Railroad Operations.24  The reasons for adopting the regulations were 
that, in the view of the FRA, “alcohol and drug use result in safety risks and con-
sequences  that are unacceptable.”25  Consequently, the FRA announced that “[t]
he time has  come for the issuance of a clear Federal prohibition on the job-related 
use or possession of alcohol and other drugs by employees engaged in safety-
sensitive functions.”26
The Railroad Regulations operate on the principle that authority for 
mandatory drug testing  is based on “reasonable cause to question the fitness of an 
15
22 Jacques  Normand, Richard O. Lempert,  & Charles P. O'Brien, Under the Influence? Drugs and the Ameri-
can Work Force (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1994) at 175.  See also J. Michael Walsh & 
Jeanne G. Trumble, “The Politics of  Drug Testing” in Coombs & West, supra note 1, 22 at 30-31.
23 48 Fed. Reg. 30723 (July 5, 1983).
24 50 Fed. Reg. 31508 (August 2, 1985) [Railroad Regulations].
25 Ibid. at 31515.
26 Ibid. at 31534.
employee engaged in a safety-sensitive function.”27  Reasonable cause, within the 
meaning of the regulations, comprises  not only reasonable suspicion that the em-
ployee is  in fact impaired, but the occurrence of an accident whether other evi-
dence of employee impairment is present or not.28   The regulations also provide 
for the mandatory pre-employment screen of all retained job applicants  destined 
to be engaged in safety-sensitive functions.29  In 1988, the Railroad Regulations were 
amended to provide for random testing of all persons occupying safety-sensitive 
positions.30
Though the phrases “safety-sensitive position” and “safety-sensitive func-
tion” occur repeatedly in the voluminous material preceding the actual provisions 
of the regulations, they do not appear in the regulations themselves.  Thus, in or-
der to define “safety-sensitive”, one must look to the population of employees cov-
ered by the regulations  (which, recall, are predicated on the idea that they only 
apply to those occupying such positions or engaged in such functions).  This is 
found in the regulations’ definition of “covered employee”, which refers to em-
ployees “subject to the Hours of Service Act.”31  The Hours of Service Act, as it read at 
the time the regulations were adopted, defined such employees as individuals “en-
16
27 Ibid. at 31552.
28 Provided for at 49 CFR § 219.301 (referenced in the Railroad Regulations, ibid. at 31573).
29 49 C.F.R. § 219.501 (referenced in the Railroad Regulations, ibid. at 31577).
30 Random Drug Testing; Amendments to Alcohol/Drug Regulations, 53 Fed. Reg. 47102 (November 21, 1988).
31 49 C.F.R. § 219.5(d) (referenced in the Railroad Regulations, supra note 24 at 31569).
gaged in or connected with the movement of any train, including hostlers.”32 
Thus, “safety-sensitive” as it was first used cast a very wide net indeed.
It is perhaps unsurprising that the first large-scale civilian employment 
drug testing regime should appear in the railroad industry, as the railroads have a 
long history of regulating drug and alcohol consumption by their employees.   In 
the 19th century, the railroads adopted “Rule G”33 – which provided for immediate 
discharge of engineers, firemen and brakemen found to be drunk on duty or sub-
ject to duty – in response to prevalent and persistent drunkenness among 
employees.34   A version of Rule G (still so-called) was enforced by the railroads 
prior to the adoption of the Railroad Regulations and indeed was relied upon by 
some railroads to justify drug testing as early as 1984.35
After the FRA passed the Railroad Regulations, other Department of Trans-
port agencies followed, including the Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal 
Highway Administration, the Coast Guard, and the Urban Mass Transportation 
Administration.  These regulations all include the notion of “safety-sensitive posi-
tion” and they all provide for mandatory pre-employment testing, testing on a pe-
17
32 45 U.S.C. § 61 (3)(2).  A “hostler” is  someone who moves  locomotives  while in a yard but not on the 
main line.
33 So-called because it was the seventh item in an alphabetical list of  rules.
34  Rudolph Daniels, Trains across the Continent: North American Railroad History, 2nd ed. (Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press, 2001) at 71.  See also Ramon F. Adams, The Language of the Railroader (Nor-
man: University of Oklahoma Press, 1977) s.v. “Rule G” (describing Rule G as  “…a club used by the 
railroad companies  to make railroads safer”).  A mythologized version of the story behind Rule G’s 
adoption is told in the silent film Rule G (USA: Blazon Film Producing Company, 1915).  For the Cana-
dian version of  Rule G, see note 91 infra.
35 Marion Crain,  “Expanded Employee Drug-Detection Programs and the Public Good: Big Brother at 
the Bargaining Table” (1989) 64 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1286 at 1315, n. 177.
riodic basis, on reasonable suspicion, after a serious accident, and randomly.36 
These regulations were eventually entrenched by legislation in 1991.37
1.4. Executive Order 12564
Soon after the Commission on Organized Crime tabled its report in March of 
1986, Ronald and Nancy38  Reagan addressed the nation on live television to an-
nounce a “national crusade against drug abuse”.39  In the address, the President 
reiterated the relationship between traditional values and drug use, stating that 
“[d]rugs are menacing our society. They're threatening our values and undercut-
ting our institutions. They're killing our children.”  Evoking the United States as 
the land of freedom and a safe haven for those who escaped starvation, disease 
and persecution, Reagan said: “What an insult it will be to what we are and 
whence we came if we do not rise up together in defiance against this cancer of 
drugs.”
This  television address was the first occasion on which Reagan made refer-
ence to a relationship between drug use and accidents, saying that “everyone's 
safety is at stake when drugs and excessive alcohol are used by people on the 
highways or by those transporting our citizens or operating industrial 
18
36 G. John Tysse & Garen E. Dodge, Winning the War on Drugs: The Role of Workplace Testing  (Washington, 
D.C.: National Foundation for the Study of  Employment Policy, 1989).
37 By the Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act of  1991, Pub. L. No. 102-143, 105 Stat. 953.
38  On Nancy Reagan’s role on the drug war, see Gilliom,  supra note 1 at 29-30 (arguing that Nancy 
Reagan was advised by White House staff to adopt “the drug problem” as an issue in order to bolster 
her waning popularity, resulting in the “Just say no” campaign).
39  “Address  to the Nation on the Campaign Against Drug Abuse, September 14, 1986” in The Public 
Papers of  President Ronald W. Reagan, supra note 9.
equipment.”40  The next day, Reagan signed Executive Order 12564 – Drug-Free 
Federal Workplace,41  thereby subjecting over a million federal employees to ran-
dom urinalysis drug testing.42
The theme of drugs being responsible for social breakdown can be seen in 
the preamble of Executive Order 12564, where it is stated that “[t]he profits from 
illegal drugs provide the single greatest source of income for organized crime, fuel 
violent street crime, and otherwise contribute to the breakdown of our society”. 
However, the relationship to workplace safety also makes an appearance, with the 
statement that “[t]he use of illegal drugs, on or off  duty, by Federal employees… 
can pose a serious health and safety threat to members of the public and to other 
Federal employees.”   The remainder of the Order is premised on the position that 
“[p]ersons who use illegal drugs are not suitable for Federal employment.”43   It 
mandates the head of each executive agency to develop a programme to eradicate 
drugs from the workplace, including through the use of  drug testing.44
19
40  This was to become an increasingly explicit theme.  See e.g. “Remarks at a Seminar on Substance 
Abuse in the Workplace in Durham, North Carolina, February 8, 1988” and “Remarks at the National 
Conference on Corporate Initiatives for a Drug Free Workplace, June 9, 1988” (both in The Public Papers 
of  President Ronald W. Reagan, supra note 9).
41 51 F.R. 32889, 3 C.F.R., 1986 Comp. 224.
42 The figure cited in Gilliom, supra note 1 at 30 is 1.2 million.  In Robert M. Tobias, “You're in Gov-
ernment? Urine Trouble” in  Bureau of National Affairs,  ed., Employee Testing (Washington, D.C.: Bu-
reau of  National Affairs, 1988) IV-93, the figure cited is 1.1 million.
43 Executive Order 12564, supra note 41, s. 1 (c).
44 Ibid., s. 2.
In addition to authorizing mandatory screening for applicants to the Fed-
eral civil service,45  the order authorizes mandatory testing where: (1) there is a 
reasonable suspicion that an employee uses illegal drugs, (2) it is conducted in the 
course of an investigation into an “accident or unsafe practice”, or (3) it is  part of 
a counselling or rehabilitation programme related to employment (i.e. an Em-
ployee Assistance Programme).46
Whereas in the above cases the agency head is authorized to implement test-
ing, there is  one section of the Order that requires a testing programme.  Section 
3(a) of  the Order states:
(a) The head of each Executive agency shall establish 
a program to test for the use of illegal drugs by em-
ployees in sensitive positions…
After the appearance of “critical positions” in the Report of the President’s 
Commission on Organized Crime, we now see “sensitive positions” in the Execu-
tive Order that implements the Commission’s recommendations.  There appears, 
however, only to be a loose connection to the notion of “safety-sensitive position” 
adopted by the Federal Railroad Administration.  The definition of “sensitive po-
sitions” is found in Section 7 (d) of  the Order, which states:
(d) For purposes of this  Order, the term "employee in 
a sensitive position" refers to: 
(1) An employee in a position that an agency 
head designates Special Sensitive, Critical-
Sensitive, or Noncritical-Sensitive under Chap-
20
45 Ibid., s. 3 (d).
46 Ibid., s. 3 (c).
ter 731 of the Federal Personnel Manual or an 
employee in a position that an agency head des-
ignates as sensitive in accordance with Executive 
Order 10450, as amended; 
(2) An employee who has been granted access to 
classified information or may be granted access 
to classified information pursuant to a determi-
nation of trustworthiness by an agency head 
under Section 4 of  Executive Order 12356; 
(3) Individuals  serving under Presidential ap-
pointments; 
(4) Law enforcement officers as defined in 5 
U.S.C. 8331(20); and
(5) Other positions  that the agency head deter-
mines involve law enforcement, national secu-
rity, the protection of life and property, public 
health or safety, or other functions requiring a 
high degree of  trust and confidence. 
The notion of “sensitive” deployed here is broad; vast even.  Positions are sensitive 
if they have the potential for “inestimable”, “exceptionally grave”, “serious”, or 
“moderate” adverse impact on the efficiency of the agency or service.47  Positions 
are sensitive if their occupants could bring about “… a material adverse effect on 
the national security”.48  Positions held under Presidential appointment, in law en-
forcement or that require access  to classified documents are also sensitive.  Note 
21
47  These are the definitions of “Special-Sensitive”, “Critical-Sensitive”, and “Non-Critical Sensitive” 
that appear in Chapter 731 of the Federal Personnel Manual, referred to in s. 7(d)(1).  See United 
States Civil Service Commission & United States Office of Personnel Management, Federal Personnel 
Manual  (Washington: Office of Personnel Management [Supt.  of Docs., U.S. G.P.O], 1956) at 731-7 
and 731-8.
48 This is the definition of “sensitive position” found at s. 4 (b) of Executive Order 10450 of Apr. 27, 
1953, 18 F.R. 2489, 3 C.F.R.,1949-1953 Comp. 936, which is  referred to in s.  7(d)(1) of Executive Or-
der 12564 supra note 41.  Drug use was  already prohibited for occupants  of these positions, along with 
“...criminal, infamous, dishonest,  immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct, …[or] sexual perversion 
(s.  8(a)(1)(iii) of Executive Order 10450).  For the implementation guidelines of Executive Order 10450, 
see Chapter 732 of  the Federal Personnel Manual, ibid..
that s. 7(d)(5) appears  to be a catch-all category that covers  positions that might 
have been missed by the previous four subsections.  The order does reference 
safety, though it is not in terms of  workplace safety, but rather public safety.
The adoption of workplace safety as a primary justification for generalized 
drug testing is clear in the administrative guidelines  that implemented Executive 
Order 12564.  
1.5. Federal Personnel Manual Letter 792-16
A little over two months after President Reagan signed Executive Order 12564, 
the U.S. Office of Personnel Management circulated Federal Personnel Manual  Letter 
792-16,49 as directed by the President.50  Such letters are supplements  to be added 
to the loose leaf Federal Personnel Manual (“FPM”), which is  a series of guidelines 
that are in the nature of employer policies, rather than the result of a delegated 
22
49 Federal Personnel Manual Letter 792-16 (issued by the Office of Personnel Management, November 28, 
1986) reprinted in Craig M. Cornish, Drugs and Alcohol in the Workplace: Testing and Privacy (Wilmette, Ill.: 
Callaghan, 1988) at 272 [FPM Letter 792-16].  Note that there is no citation to an official publication, as 
this letter was not officially published (see infra note 51).
50  Executive Order 12564, supra note 41, stipulates at s. 6(a)(1) that the Office of Personnel Manage-
ment (the successor agency to the U.S. Civil Service Commission) shall “[i]ssue government-wide guid-
ance to agencies on the implementation of  the terms of  this Order.”  
power of regulation.51   The Office of Personnel Management describes such let-
ters as follows:
FPM Letters  generally are advisory guidance for su-
pervisors and personnel specialists to use as  manage-
ment tools and ordinarily would not be published un-
der formal rulemaking procedures.52
In the introduction to FPM Letter 792-16, which – it should be noted – purports to 
interpret and implement, but not add to, Executive Order 12564, the justification 
for drug testing contains the following passage:
Employees who use illegal drugs have three to four 
times more accidents while at work.  Federal workers 
have the right to a safe and secure workplace, and all 
American citizens, who daily depend on the work of 
the Federal government for their health, safety and 
security, have the right to a reliable and productive 
civil service.  Federal agencies must take action for the 
protection of individual drug users, their co-workers, 
and the society at large.  In recognition of this, Presi-
dent Reagan, in Executive Order 12564, set forth the 
23
51 This was not lost on unions who contested FPM Letter 792-16 on the grounds that it did not meet the 
notice and comment requirements of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act,  5 U.S.C. § 553.  In National 
Treasury Employees Union v. Reagan 685 F. Supp. 1346 at 1355 (E.D. La. 1988),  the U.S. District Court 
found that “FPM Letter 792-16… guides agencies on implementation of the Executive Order and is  a 
binding legislative rule.  The Federal Personnel Manual Letter was not issued in accordance with the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act and is  invalid.”  When the union sought to have the implementation of FPM Letter 
792-16 halted until the notice and comment requirements had been met, the Court (per Collins,  J.) 
refused, citing that “...due to the strong interests promoted by drug testing of sensitive public employ-
ees… it would be unnecessarily disruptive to enjoin implementation of the plans while the agencies 
comply with the APA procedures” 1988 U.S. Dist.  LEXIS 11556; Civil Action No. 86-4058 (E.D. La. 
Oct 13, 1988) at 2.  Instead,  the Court simply ordered the Office of Personnel Management to notify 
the plaintiff  union and accept its comments.
52 Federal Personnel Manual Letter 792-19, (1989) 54 F.R. 47324-01.
policy of the United States Government to eliminate 
drug use from the Federal workplace.53
Here we can clearly see how the initial stated reasons for the implementation of 
mass drug testing in the Federal civil service gave way to a different justification.  
1.6. From Moral Crusade to “Safety-Sensitive Positions”
In the initial programme in the military, the report of the Commission on Organ-
ized Crime, and Reagan’s public statements on the drug war, values were an or-
ganizing principle.  Drugs were an “epidemic” or “societal malady” that ravaged 
“families” by “eroding traditional values” and sustaining organized crime.    Drug 
testing was proposed as one way to combat the “drug problem” as a component of 
a general demand reduction strategy implemented in a particularly effective site of 
regulation – the workplace.  In so far as safety was an issue, it was primarily lim-
ited to the transportation sector.
Executive Order 12564 symbolically marks the shift from a relatively local-
ized phenomenon concerned primarily with public safety in particular sectors, to a 
massively generalized norm applicable to vast swaths of the population.54  On the 
other hand, the context of its adoption and later interpretation demonstrate the 
24
53 FPM Letter 792-16, supra note 49, s. 1(b).  The figure of “three to four times more accidents  while at 
work” has been traced to a “study” allegedly done at Firestone Tire and Rubber Company in 1973. 
Researchers  have conclusively demonstrated that this “study” was  in fact never done, and that the fig-
ure was simply made up.  For the story behind this  fictional data and its use by the U.S. government, 
see John P. Morgan, “The ‘Scientific’ Justification for Urine Drug Testing” (1988) 36 U. Kan. L. Rev. 
683 at 683-85; American Civil Liberties Union, Drug Testing: A Bad Investment by Loren Siegel (New 
York: ACLU Department of  Public Education, 1999).  See also Gilliom, supra note 1, at 40-43.
54 Note that on the same day Reagan signed Executive Order 12564 he transmitted to Congress a draft 
bill,  the Drug-Free America Act.  It would evolve into the Drug Free Workplace Act, 41 U.S.C. 701 (1988), 
which requires those contracting with the Federal government to adopt a series  of anti-drug measures 
targeting their employees.
complex interplay between the rhetoric of morality and values, mobilized as a rea-
son for introducing testing and safety, which justifies it.55  In the order, the theme 
of morality coexists with a certain number of references to safety, though gener-
ally in the context of public safety rather than occupational safety.  With FPM Let-
ter 792-16, safety (along with productivity) becomes a central justification for drug 
testing.
I do not mean to say that safety was simply an afterthought cynically mobi-
lized for propaganda purposes.  Clearly, the relationship between drug use and 
safety was a primary concern in the formulation of the Railroad Regulations, though 
a surprisingly candid representative of the Department of Transportation would 
later admit that “… we do not have any hard data to show that there is  a safety 
problem with respect to drugs.”56   The same relationship was considered, albeit 
peripherally, by the President’s Commission on Organized Crime.57   What I do 
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55 On drug testing as an exercise in symbolism, see Steven Wisotsky, “The Ideology of Drug Testing” 
(1987) 11 Nova L. Rev. 763.
56 The comment was  made by Mr. Neil Eisner, Assistant General Counsel for the U.S. Department of 
Transportation in his testimony before the Canadian House of Commons Standing Committee on 
Transportation, see infra note 77.
57 America’s Habit, supra note 15 at 331, n. 3.
want to claim is that the discourse of values was  a condition of possibility58 for a 
discourse of  safety.  
During the early period of the “drug war”, there was a significant and sus-
tained production of knowledge around drugs that was organized around the con-
cept of the harm that drugs cause.  Starting from the principle that drugs are both 
a cause of and a consequence of a general corruption of society, researchers 
sought to discover, catalogue and organize understanding of the particular harms 
that drugs cause.59   Workplace accidents were one of the harms that became a 
possible object of  study once the moral discourse had posed these parameters. 
! The strength and pervasiveness  of the category of “harm” is  attested to by 
the fact that it organized debate around drug policy across  the spectrum.  Those 
who argued against prohibition as a method of regulating “the drug problem” 
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58  Other conditions include the technology to test (for without testing, the production of knowledge 
about use is  severely limited), which was predicated on the existence of a drug testing industry with 
economic incentives to develop not only the “solution” of drug testing, but the “problem” of drugs in 
the workplace.  On these factors, see Lynn Zimmer & James B. Jacobs, “The Business of Drug Testing: 
Technological Innovation and Social Control” (1992) 19 Contemp. Drug Probs. 1; Kenneth D. Tun-
nell, K. D., Pissing on Demand: Workplace Drug Testing and the Rise of the Detox Industry (New York: NYU 
Press, 2004).  This nexus between technology, knowledge,  economic incentives and institutional goals 
offers  the possibility of theorizing drug testing in terms of what Michel Foucault called a dispositif (“dis-
positive”).  On dispositive analysis, see Laurence Olivier, “La question du pouvoir chez Foucault: es-
pace, stratégie et dispositif ” (1988) 21(1) Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de 
science politique 83, esp. at 92-93; See also Girogio Agamben,"Qu’est-ce qu’un dispositif ? (Paris: Rivages, 
2007).
59 A parallel can be seen with the temperance movement of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.   The 
conception of alcohol as a moral disorder (both of individuals  and of society generally) led to a signifi-
cant production of knowledge around the mechanisms by which it caused harm.  For examples of this 
research, see e.g. William Hargreaves, Alcohol and Science, or, Alcohol: What it is and What it Does (New York: 
National Temperance Society and Publication House, 1882); Alonzo B. Palmer & Mary A.R. Liver-
more, The Temperance Teachings of Science: Adapted to the use of teachers and pupils in the public schools (Boston: 
D. C. Heath, 1886).  For a discussion on the similarities between the Canadian temperance movement 
and the drug war in the 1980s, see Anton R.F. Schweighofer, “The Canadian Temperance Movement: 
Contemporary Parallels” (1988)  3 C.J.L.S.  175.  On the role of social research in policy formation in 
Canada, see Patricia G. Erickson,  “Neglected and Rejected: A Case Study of the Impact of Social Re-
search on Canadian Drug Policy” (1998)  23:2-3 Can. J. Sociology 263.
called for its  redefinition in terms of “a public health” issue rather than a moral 
one.  The common appellation of  this position is a “harm reduction strategy”.60
This  production of knowledge about drug harms was (and remains) an ex-
plicit policy of the U.S. government.  It was largely accomplished through the Na-
tional Institute on Drug Abuse (“NIDA”), which was established in 1972 as a 
branch of the U.S. Health Department.61  Workplace drug use became a subject of 
interest for the NIDA in the 1980s:
…[NIDA] played an important role in shaping em-
ployers’ beliefs regarding both these issues [that em-
ployee drug use was a problem and that drug testing 
offered a solution].  Throughout the 1980s  NIDA 
provided funding to researchers studying the work-
place drug problem, and by 1990 it had sponsored 
four national conferences  on the topic.  Even before 
President Reagan ordered the testing of federal 
workers, NIDA had funded the development of new 
drug-testing technologies  and had urged public and 
private employers to adopt testing programs.62
Former NIDA  scientists have said that it was made clear to funding applicants 
that only research into harms, and not benefits, of  drugs would receive grants.63
This  research programme produced a certain number of “truths” about 
the relationship between drug use and safety.  It also allowed safety to become a 
central justification for drug testing.  If drug use causes  accidents, then eliminating 
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60 See e.g. the anti-prohibition U.S. Drug Policy Alliance, online: <"http://www.drugpolicy.org">.
61 Helen Pearson, “Science and the War on Drugs: A Hard Habit to Break” (2004)  430 Nature 394 at 
394.
62 Zimmer & Jacobs, supra note 58 at 16 [references omitted].
63  Pearson, supra note 61 at 395.  This comment was regarding drug research generally,  and not the 
question of  drugs in the workplace per se.
drug users from positions in which accidents can have catastrophic consequences 
appears justified.  This is the central position that came to structure the disparate 
notions of  “critical positions”, “sensitive positions” and “safety-sensitive positions”.
That drug testing is a method to promote safety – in particular by reducing 
the risk of accidents that cause harm to the public or to workers – became the 
gold standard of justifications.  Defence of drug testing on these grounds was in-
variably accompanied by claims that “scientific” studies  demonstrate a causal rela-
tionship between drug testing and reduced accident rates.  The following passage 
from Winning the War on Drugs: The Role of  Workplace Testing is typical:
[T]he overwhelming evidence establishes that work-
place drug testing, as part of an anti-drug abuse pro-
gram, does in fact deter illegal drug use both on and 
off the job.  Drug testing has  been shown to be effec-
tive in preventing the negative consequences of 
workplace drug abuse, including those situations 
where drug-induced impairment threatens the life of 
the employee, fellow workers, or the public at large.64
In fact, there was very little peer-reviewed research clearly relating drug testing to 
accidents.  What little research there was in the early 1980s was either so method-
28
64 Supra note 36 at 14.
ologically unsound as to be totally useless, or inconclusive.65   But the scientific 
validity of claims relating drug testing to accidents  was to become a somewhat 
moot point.  For the reasoning that drug use causes accidents and that therefore 
drug tests  will prevent them became legally true when the U.S. Supreme Court 
cited safety as the princial justification for allowing mass drug testing in 
employment.
1.7. The Triumph of  Safety at the United States Supreme Court
The safety justification was finally endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Skinner 
v. Railway Labor Executives Association.66  It was  in this  case that the Court upheld the 
Federal Railroad Administration regulations requiring testing of those in safety-
sensitive positions.  The Court found that urine tests  constitute searches within the 
meaning of the 4th Amendment of the Constitution.67  Relying upon the “special 
needs doctrine”, which allows searches  without a warrant even in the absence of 
individualized suspicion, the Court proceeded to balance the government interest 
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65 See Crouch, supra note 7; Morgan,  supra note 53.  More recent research has found a very weak corre-
lation or none at all.   See, e.g. Jacques Normand, S. D. Salyards & John. J. Mahoney. “An Evaluation of 
Preemployment Drug Testing” (1990) 75:6 J. Applied Psych. 629 at 635 (finding that “no statistically 
significant relationship was detected between drug-test results and number of injuries”);  Rebecca S. 
Spicer, Ted R. Millter & Gordon S. Smith. “Worker Substance Use, Workplace Problems and the Risk 
of Occupational Injury: A Matched Case-Control Study” (2003) 64 J. Stud. Alcohol 570 at 575 (find-
ing that there appeared to be a correlation but that “[b]oth substance users and risk-takers were more 
likely to be injured.   However only risk taking was a significant predictor of injury when substance use 
was controlled for.”].   See also Cheryl J.  Cherpitel, “Substance Use, Injury, and Risk-Taking Disposi-
tion in the General Population” (1999) 23:1 Alcoholism: Clin. & Exp. Research 121 (finding that risk-
taking and impulsivity are better indicators of  injury than substance use).
66 489 U.S. 602 (1989) [Skinner].
67 Ibid. at 617.
in testing against the privacy interest of employees.  Justice Kennedy, for the ma-
jority, concluded that:
The Government interest in testing without a show-
ing of individualized suspicion is compelling. Em-
ployees subject to the tests  discharge duties fraught 
with such risks  of injury to others  that even a mo-
mentary lapse of attention can have disastrous 
consequences.68
Shortly thereafter, the Court rendered its decision in National Treasury Employees Un-
ion et al. v. Von Raab,69  in which it confirmed the constitutionality of  mandatory 
testing for customs agents.  The Court found that the tests were justified because 
the “Customs Service is  our Nation's first line of defense against one of the great-
est problems affecting the health and welfare of our population,”70 and because 
customs agents carry firearms, which raise significant safety concerns.71
It was  this reasoning, linking drug testing to safety, that guided the adoption 
of drug testing programmes  in Canada subsequent to the U.S. experience.  As we 
shall see in the following section, the Canadian model is in fact a direct descendent 
of  the legal framework governing drug testing in the U.S.
2. The Canadian Model
The designation of the generally accepted legal principles governing drug testing 
in Canada as the Canadian model is recent.  This “model” is  portrayed as the 
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68 Ibid. at 628.
69 489 U.S. 656 (1989) [Von Raab].
70 Ibid. at 668.
71 Ibid. at 670, 672.
natural consequence of jurisprudential accumulation resulting in the crystalliza-
tion of a stable set of rules according to an inherent logic.  In this section, I will 
argue that this origin story is misleading, if not outright false.  Instead, I claim that 
the Canadian jurisprudence is, and was from the very beginning, a derivative of 
the U.S. model.  
2.1. Description of  the Model
The existence of the Canadian model, and its  characterization, was recently de-
scribed in a lengthy arbitration decision by arbitrator M. G. Picher.  Picher de-
scribes the “development” of  the model as follows:
[98] It is fair to say that over time the arbitral juris-
prudence in Canada has developed relatively clear 
lines as to what constitutes an acceptable drug and 
alcohol testing policy in a safety sensitive workplace 
which is governed by a collective bargaining re-
gime… 
[99] The… jurisprudence has come to be viewed as 
tantamount to a Canadian code for drug testing in a 
safety sensitive workplace governed by collective bar-
gaining, the regime by which terms and conditions of 
employment must be negotiated between employers 
and unions. They have become widely accepted and 
applied. Indeed, the drug testing policies and limita-
tions fashioned within that jurisprudence came to be 
recognized as the Canadian model as adopted in the 
construction industry in Alberta.
[100] At the risk of oversimplification, the Canadian 
model for alcohol or drug testing in a safety sensitive 
workplace as developed in the arbitral jurisprudence 
generally contains  a number of elements as summa-
rized below:
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• No employee can be subjected to random, un-
announced alcohol or drug testing, save as  part 
of  an agreed rehabilitative program.
• An employer may require alcohol or drug test-
ing of an individual where the facts  give the 
employer reasonable cause to do so.
• It is within the prerogatives of management's 
rights under a collective agreement to also re-
quire alcohol or drug testing following a signifi-
cant incident, accident or near miss, where it 
may be important to identify the root cause of 
what occurred.
• Drug and alcohol testing is a legitimate part of 
continuing contracts of employment for indi-
viduals found to have a problem of alcohol or 
drug use… This  is  the only exceptional circum-
stance in which the otherwise protected em-
ployee interest in privacy and dignity of the per-
son must yield to the interests  of safety and re-
habilitation, to allow for random and unan-
nounced alcohol or drug testing.
• The cases generally recognize that an em-
ployee's refusal or failure to undergo an alcohol 
or drug test in the three circumstances  described 
above may properly be viewed as a serious viola-
tion of the employer's drug and alcohol policy, 
and may itself be grounds  for serious 
discipline.72
Though this description of the model is  accurate, it obscures its provenance by 
characterizing it as a simple jurisprudential evolution.  In fact, the model can be 
traced to the U.S., and it is not so much a development of Canadian law as it is a 
set of norms that were transmitted and subsequently ratified by the jurisprudence. 
I have identified two primary points of contact.  First, the various transportation 
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72 Re Imperial Oil and C.E.P. Local 900,  (2006) 157 L.A.C. (4th) 225, 88 C.L.A.S. 273 (Quicklaw), (M.G. 
Picher) (Ont. Labour Arbitration) [Imperial Oil cited to C.L.A.S.] [references omitted].
guidelines adopted by the U.S. Department of Transportation began to filter 
through to the Canadian transportation industry, from whence they spread to 
other industries.  Second, U.S.-based companies with Canadian operations applied 
their drug testing policies to their Canadian employees.
2.2. Transmission to Canada
Drug testing was well underway in the U.S. before it became a major issue in 
Canada.  Despite then Prime Minister Mulroney’s announcement – the day after 
Reagan signed Executive Order 12564"– that Canada was afflicted with a “drug 
epidemic”,73  employment drug testing was not the immediate response.  “On the 
whole, the Canadian business community and professional groups were reluctant 
to follow the American lead on the testing issue.”74  One notable exception was  the 
transportation industry, to which we now turn. 
2.2.1. Norms on Rails: Drug Testing and the Canadian Railroad Industry
The transportation industry generally and the railroad industry in particular 
played a pivotal role in the transmission of the U.S. drug testing norms to Canada. 
Two aspects  of this role are of particular interest for my purposes.  First, the 
norms were transmitted despite the failure of an attempt by Canadian legislators 
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73 Eric L. Jensen & Jurg Gerber. “State Efforts to Construct a Social Problem: The 1986 War on Drugs 
in Canada” (1993) 18:4 Can. J. Sociology 453 at 454.   See also Lennart E. Henriksson, “The Uncon-
vincing Case for Drug Testing” (1991) XVII:2 Canadian Public Policy - Analyse de Politiques 183 at 
185.  Henriksson reports that Mulroney later claimed the timing was purely coincidental.
74 Henricksson, ibid. at 184.   See also Government of Canada,  National Drug Strategy: Action on Drug Abuse 
(Ottawa:  Queen's Printer, 1987) (drug-testing not part of the national drug strategy) and Canada 
(House of Commons  Standing Committee on National Health and Welfare),  Booze, Pills & Dope: Reduc-
ing Substance Abuse in Canada: Report of the Standing Committee, by Bruce Halliday (Ottawa:  Queen's Printer, 
1987) (conceding that reasonable cause testing may be desirable in some circumstances, but that ran-
dom testing was to be proscribed).
to transplant them.  Second, the caselaw generated by the railway industry ap-
pears  to be a crucial point of contact that allowed the norms to spread across the 
Canadian jurisprudence.
2.2.1.1. The Rejected Transplant: Canada’s Failure to Legislate
In 1987, then Canadian Minister of Transportation, John Crosbie struck the Task 
Force on the Control of Drug and Alcohol Abuse in the Railway Industry.  The 
Task Force was struck following the 1986 head-on collision between a CN freight 
train and a VIA rail passenger train near Hinton, Alberta, despite the fact that the 
Commission of Inquiry into that accident found that none of the employees in-
volved were impaired by alcohol or drugs.75  The Task Force collected data on the 
prevalence of drug and alcohol use among personnel occupying “positions critical 
to railway safety”76  and recommended to the House of Commons Standing 
Committee on Transport that drug testing be implemented; the Committee 
agreed, referring the matter to Transport Canada.77 
At the same time, Canada was under considerable pressure to bring its  leg-
islation into line with the drug testing regime in the U.S. transportation sector. 
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75 Canada, Commission of Inquiry, Hinton Train Collision. Report of the Commissioner,  by the Honorable 
Mr. Justice Rene P. Foisy. (Ottawa: Minister of  Supply and Services, 1986).
76 Canada, Task Force on the Control of Drug and Alcohol Abuse in the Railway Industry, Final Report: 
Survey of Persons Employed in Positions Critical to Railway Safety (Ottawa: Task Force on the Control of Drug 
and Alcohol Abuse in the Railway Industry, 1987) [Task Force Report].  Health Canada, which was part 
of the Task Force, issued a separate report:  Canada (Minister of National Health and Welfare) & Niag-
ara Institute, Report of the National Consultation on Substance Abuse and the Workplace (Ottawa: Ministry of 
Supply and Services Canada [cat. H21-101/1988], 1988).
77  Transport Canada, Information: Report on Mandatory Testing of Rail Works Made Public (Ottawa: Trans-
port Canada, 1988),  cited in Lynne M. McInally, A Study of the Development, Evolution, and Demise of Trans-
port Canada’s Strategy on Substance Use in Safety-Sensitive Positions in Canadian Transportation (M.A.  Thesis, Si-
mon Fraser University School of  Criminology, 1995) at 35.  
The stated intent of the American Department of Transportation was to apply its 
drug testing requirements  to foreign companies domiciled outside the United 
States.  This was  to go further than subjecting Canadian employees to testing on 
U.S. soil while engaged in cross-border transport.  Rather, Canadian companies 
who wished to engage in cross-border transport would have to subject their em-
ployees to testing in Canada that conformed to the U.S. rules  in order for those em-
ployees to be allowed into the United States.  Canada was given a temporary ex-
emption in order to make the legislative and regulatory changes deemed necessary 
to comply.78
Transport Canada began to formulate policy on drug testing.  In the mean-
time, the adoption of the 1988 Railway Safety Act provided an opportunity to put in 
place the legislative framework for such policy.  Section 18 of this statute intro-
duces the notion of “positions critical to safe railway operations” and provides  that 
Cabinet may make regulations  governing the “control of the use of… drugs” by 
those persons.  The relevant subsections are reproduced below.79
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78 The initial deadline given by the United States was January 1, 1990, but this was extended multiple 
times (see McInally, supra note 76 at 26-28;  see also Re Provincial-American Truck Transporters and Teamsters, 
Local 880 (1991) 18 L.A.C. (4th) 412 (Brent) [Provincial-American Transport]).   The U.S. regulations were 
not extended to Canadian truckers until 1996 (see Canada, Library of Parliament, “Current Issue Re-
view. Drug Testing:  Legal Implications” (Ottawa: Library of Parliament [catalogue no.  YM32-1/90-1-
1999-11-IN], 1999) [“Drug Testing: Legal Implications”].  Curiously, the Americans did not target the 
railway industry until 2001; when the final rule was adopted in 2004, it contained several exceptions for 
foreign railway workers.  See Control of Alcohol and Drug Use: Expanded Application of FRA Alcohol and Drug 
Rules to Foreign Railroad Foreign-Based Employees Who Perform Train or Dispatching  Service in the United States, 69 
Fed. Reg. 19270 (April 12, 2004), 49 C.F.R. § 219.
79 R.S.C. 1985, c. 32 (4th Supp.) [emphasis added].
18. (1) The Governor in Council may make regula-
tions 
…
(b) declaring positions in railway companies to be critical  to 
safe railway operations; 
(c) respecting the following matters, in so far as they 
relate to safe railway operations, in relation to per-
sons employed in positions referred to in para-
graph (b):
(i) the training of those persons, both before 
and after appointment to those positions,
(ii) hours of work and rest periods to be ob-
served by those persons, 
(iii) minimum medical, including audiometric 
and optometric, standards to be met by 
those persons,
(iv) the control  or prohibition of the consumption of 
alcoholic beverages and the use of drugs by those 
persons, and 
(v) the establishment of support programs for 
those persons  and standards applicable to 
such programs…
Section 19 allows the Minister of Transport to delegate the authority to make 
rules  regarding the matters set out in s. 18 to railway companies.80  Thus, a part of 
the framework was in place that would allow for the introduction of regulations 
requiring widespread testing in the railway industry.
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80 This forms  the basis  for the authority of the Canadian Rail Operating Rules, including “Rule G”.  See 
supra note 34, and infra note 91.
In 1990, Transport Canada issued a policy document entitled the Strategy on 
Substance Use in Safety-sensitive Positions in Canadian Transportation.81   The Strategy on 
Substance Use went further than the Task Force Report, envisaging “…mandatory test-
ing after an accident, as part of a required medical examination, as a condition of 
confirming a new or transferred employee in a safety-sensitive position and “for 
cause” and under a program having a random element in the workplace [for all 
employees in safety-sensitive positions].”82  Though the notion of “positions criti-
cal to  safe rail operations” was left undefined in the Railway Safety Act,83 Transport 
Canada proposed “…an expanded definition of what constitutes a safety-sensitive 
position...” that would cover “railway operation/maintenance employees”.84
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81  Transport Canada, Strategy on Substance Use in Safety-sensitive Positions in Canadian Transport (Ottawa: 
Transport Canada Doc. No. TP10201, 1990) [Strrategy on Substance Use].  The Strategy on Substance Use 
was tabled in the House of  Commons by then Transport Minister Doug Lewis on March 16, 1990.
82 Ibid. at 9.
83 When the Railway Association of Canada eventually adopted rules under the authority granted to it 
by ss. 18(1)(b), 19 & 20 of the Railway Safety Act, supra note 79, the definition was “any railway position 
directly engaged in operation of trains in main track or yard service.. and any railway position engaged 
in rail traffic control…”  See Railway Rules Governing Safety Critical Positions, TC No. O-17-A (R.18), 2000 
at s. 3. The Task Force on the Control of Drug and Alcohol Abuse in the Railway Industry considered 
“positions critical to railway safety” to comprise conductors, yardmen, dispatchers,  track maintainers, 
signal maintainers and operators.  Equipment maintenance employees were omitted “[b]ecause of a 
disagreement between CN and CP” about their inclusion in the definition.  See Task Force Report, supra 
note 76 at 5.
84 Strategy on Substance Use, supra note 81 at 10 and Appendix 1.  The criteria used to arrive at this defini-
tion was positions that “…have a direct impact on either the health, safety or security of the public or 
of persons who work in the transportation industry, where there is a potential risk of loss  of life, injury 
or property damage.  Direct impact was considered to mean engagement in the operation, navigation, 
repair or inspection of vehicles,  and security control.”  Commenting this definition, the House of 
Commons  Standing Committee on Transport noted that “...who is included and who is  not is a crucial 
preliminary question.  Therefore, it is  important to try to be as [sic.] fair,  reasonable and accurate in 
defining what is  a safety-sensitive position and who should be included.”  The Committee went on to 
mention that representatives from the transport sector expressed concern about the definition being too 
broad or too narrow.  Canada, House of Commons, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing 
Committee on Transport 34th Parl. 2nd"sess., No. 46 (May & June 1990) [Standing Committee Report] at 12.
During the hearings  that the House of Commons Standing Committee on 
Transport held on the Strategy on Substance Use, it was clear that Transport Canada’s 
intention was to copy the U.S. drug testing regulations.  Committee members were 
concerned that the policy proposed by Transport Canada was “…nothing more 
than an attempt to appease the Americans and harmonize the two regimes...” and 
that this would amount to little more than a wholesale importation of the U.S. 
rules.85  Ultimately the Committee recommended that Transport Canada adopt a 
“made in Canada solution”, including legislatively mandated alcohol and drug 
testing of applicants for safety-sensitive positions as well as after an accident and as 
part of periodic medical testing, but without a random testing component.86  The 
Minister of  Transport agreed with these recommendations.87
Though drafted, the legislation and accompanying regulations were never 
adopted:
Between 1990 and 1994… little progress was made 
with respect to the proposed Strategy, and it became 
stalled in the political process.  A new Liberal gov-
ernment was elected in the fall of 1993, usurping the 
Mulroney legislative agenda.  By the fall of 1994 the 
Chretien government had distanced itself from the 
Strategy.  Subsequently in late December of that year, 
the Minister of Transport, Douglas  Young, declared 
that the government would not proceed with enabling 
legislation…88
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85 McInally, supra note 77 at 44-45, citing the Standing Committee Report, supra note 84.  See also McInally, 
ibid. at 100-104.
86 Standing Committee Report, supra note 84.   See especially the list of recommendations in the executive 
summary at 17-19.
87 Transport Canada, Substance Use in Safety-sensitive Positions in Canadian Transportation: Government Response 
to the Third Report of the Standing  Committee on Transport (Ottawa: Transport Canada Doc.  No. TP10694, 
1990). 
88 McInally, supra note 77 at 2.  See also Mel F. Belich & Michael J. Schewchuk, “Drug Testing in the 
Transportation Sector: An Employer Perspective” (1994) 2:3 C.L.E.L.J. 516.
One of the reasons for this retreat from the previous government’s position was 
the unpopularity of testing, which was opposed by virtually all of the provinces, by 
national and provincial trucking associations, by trade unions, and by the Federal 
Privacy Commission.89  Another possible reason is that – other than appeasing the 
United States90 – there was simply no need; for as we shall see below, the jurispru-
dence had adopted virtually all of the American norms except random testing, a 
position that coincided precisely with the government strategy.
2.2.1.2. Transmission to Canadian Jurisprudence
As with its American counterpart, the Canadian railway industry may have been 
particularly amenable to the proposition that alcohol and drug consumption was a 
safety concern and that drug testing provided a means  of reducing workplace ac-
cidents.  Indeed, the rules governing Canadian railroads include Rule G, which – 
at the time when the U.S. Railroad Regulations were enacted – provided that “[t]he 
use of intoxicants or narcotics by employees subject to duty, or their possession or 
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89  McInally, ibid. at 53-55.  See also Canada, Privacy Commission, Drug Testing and Privacy (Ottawa: 
Minister of  Supply and Services, 1990).
90 McInally argues that “…there is considerable evidence to suggest that pressure from the American 
government was the central impetus  behind the creation of the federal initiative in 1990…” and “… 
the true stimulus for the development of the Strategy is found in the passage of U.S. drug testing rules.” 
McInally, ibid. at 173.
use while on duty is prohibited.”91  It is thus unsurprising that Canadian railways 
began subjecting their employees to drug testing prior to the publication of the 
Task Force Report calling for a testing regime.
! Not only had testing already begun in the railway industry, but the testing 
in the railway industry led to the very first arbitration cases dealing with drug test-
ing in Canada.  At the same time as the Task Force rendered its  final report, the 
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91 Rule G of the Uniform Code of Operating Rules, which is  a body of rules applying to the movement of 
trains promulgated by the Canadian Transport Commission since 1976, exercising the authority 
granted to it by s. 227 of the Railway Act,  R.S.C. 1970, c. R‑2.  The rules originated as  regulations pre-
scribed by the Canadian Board of Transport Commissioners by General Order #873, dated Novem-
ber 15, 1961 (effective October 28, 1962).  The current rules  – the Canadian Rail Operating Rules, TC O-
0-93, 2008 –  were adopted and amended from time to by the Railway Association of Canada (an in-
dustry group) and then approved by the Minister of Transport exercising the authority granted by ss. 
18(1)(c)(iv), 19 & 20 of  The Railway Safety Act, supra note 79.  The current Rule G provides that: 
(i)  The use of intoxicants or narcotics by employees subject to duty, or their possession or use 
while on duty, is prohibited. 
(ii) The use of mood altering agents  by employees subject to duty,  or their possession or use 
while on duty, is prohibited except as prescribed by a doctor.  
(iii) The use of drugs,  medication or mood altering agents,  including those prescribed by a doc-
tor,  which, in any way, will adversely affect their ability to work safely, by employees subject 
to duty, or on duty, is prohibited. 
(iv) Employees must know and understand the possible effects  of drugs, medication or mood 
altering agents, including those prescribed by a doctor, which, in any way, will adversely af-
fect their ability to work safely. 
Canadian Railway Office of Arbitration & Dispute Resolution (the “CROA”92) 
rendered the first two decisions in Canada on drug testing.93 
In the Hutchinson case, the grievor was a train conductor who had been 
charged with the cultivation of a substantial quantity of marijuana – a charge that 
was subsequently stayed for reasons unrelated to the strength of the Crown’s case. 
His employer, Canadian Pacific, ordered him to submit to urinalysis screening, 
which he refused.  Though there was no evidence that he had ever been impaired 
at work, the company terminated his employment on the grounds that participa-
tion in “the drug culture” was incompatible with his employment.  With regard to 
the relationship between off-duty drug use and employment, Arbitrator Picher 
stated:
This  case raises, in vivid terms, the issue of the obli-
gations of a railroad in respect of the involvement of 
its  employees in the production, trafficking, possession 
or use of illegal drugs. There was a time, in the 
1960’s, when a substantial body of opinion held that 
“soft” drugs, and marijuana in particular, were rela-
tively benign substances whose use posed no substan-
tial threat. Those days are gone. Two decades of experi-
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92 The CROA is a consensual arbitration tribunal established by memorandum of agreement in 1965, 
under the Canada Labour Code.  Both major railways in Canada,  the Canadian National Railway (CN) 
and the Canada Pacific Railway (CP), and their various unions are parties to the memorandum.  The 
original memorandum of agreement, as well as all CROA decisions are available at the CROA web site 
at <"http://www.croa.com">.  For a detailed description of the CROA and how it differs from ad hoc 
labour arbitration, see Michel G. Picher “The Canadian Railway Office of Arbitration: Keeping 
Grievance Hearings  on the Rails” (1991) 1 Labour Arbitration Yearbook 37.  See also Dennis  W. 
Coughlin,  “By Land and by Air:  Two Models of Expedited Grievance Resolution” in Joyce M. Najita, 
ed.,  Arbitration 1997 – the Next Fifty Years: Proceedings of the Fiftieth Annual Meeting of the National Academy of 
Arbitrators (Edison, NJ: BNA Books, 1999) 110.
93 Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. U.T.U. (Hutchinson grievance) (1987) 31 L.A.C. (3d) 179; [1988] C.L.A.D. No. 61, 
CROA Case No. 1703 (M.G. Picher) [Hutchinson cited to CROA] and Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. U.T.U. (Keal 
grievance) (1987) 7 C.L.A.S. 44, CROA Case No. 1704  (M.G. Picher) [Keal cited to CROA].  Hutchinson 
and and Keal were both released on October 15, 1987.  The Task Force Report, supra note 76 is dated Oc-
tober 1987.
ence with accidents, both industrial  and non-industrial, some-
times tragic in their proportions, caused by the use of prohibited 
drugs, have gradually affirmed the conclusion that involvement 
with illegal drugs, including marijuana, poses a dangerous 
threat to health and safety.94
Though Mr. Hutchinson’s refusal to submit to a drug test was not invoked as  a rea-
son for termination per se, Arbitrator Picher discussed the issue in his  award.  He 
claimed that “[t]he policing of drug use among the employees of public carriers is 
one area in which drug testing has gained increasing acceptance,”95  and then 
backed up this  claim with reference to exclusively American sources.  He reviewed 
the state of the law in the United States, with particular reference to the Railroad 
Regulations, noting that “[t]he American regulation seeks, insofar as  possible, to 
balance the interest of the railway to ensure safe operations with the interest of  the 
employee not to be unduly deprived of rights  of personal dignity and privacy.”96 
He recognized that there are no comparable regulations in Canada nor any re-
ported decision on the issue of  drug testing.  He then went on to state that:
Where, as in the instant case, the employer is a public 
carrier, and the employee’s duties are inherently 
safety sensitive, any reasonable grounds to believe 
that an employee may be impaired by drugs while on 
duty or subject to duty must be seen as justifying a 
requirement that the employee undergo a drug test. 
Given contemporary realities and the imperative of 
safety, that condition must be seen as implicit in the 
contract of employment, absent any express provision 
to the contrary…
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94 Hutchinson, ibid. at 2-3 [emphasis added].
95 Ibid. at 3.
96 Ibid. at 4.
What guidance do the foregoing considerations pro-
vide in the instant case? It appears to the Arbitrator 
that a number of useful principles emerge. The first is 
that as an employer charged with the safe operation 
of a railroad, the Company has a particular obliga-
tion to ensure that those employees responsible for 
the movement of trains perform their duties unim-
paired by the effects of drugs. To that end the Com-
pany must exert vigilance and may, where reasonable 
justification is demonstrated, require an employee to 
submit to a drug test… The refusal by an employee to 
submit to such a test, in circumstances where the em-
ployer has  reasonable and probable grounds to sus-
pect drug use and a risk of impairment, may leave 
the employee liable to removal from service. It is  sim-
ply incompatible with the obligations of a public car-
rier to its customers, employees and the public at 
large, to place any responsibility for the movement of 
trains in the hands of an employee whom it has 
reasonable grounds to suspect is  either drug-
dependent or drug-impaired… On the other hand, it 
is not within the legitimate business purposes of an 
employer, including a railroad, to encroach on the 
privacy and dignity of its employees by subjecting 
them to random and speculative drug testing…97
Three important features  of this passage bear discussing.  First, safety is  unequivo-
cally the justification for drug testing.  The notion of safety-sensitive positions  is 
mobilized (for the first time in Canadian jurisprudence)98 and appears to have the 
same scope as in the U.S. Railroad Regulations, that is “employees who are responsi-
ble for the movement of trains”.  Second, the extent of permissible testing and the 
consequences for the employee mirror with almost perfect precision the U.S. Rail-
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97 Ibid. at 4-5.  I have heavily edited the quoted section for length, which inevitably excises some of the 
nuance.  However, I am confident that readers who consult the full text of the award will agree that I 
have not denatured its meaning.
98 But see Re Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Rail Canada Traffic Controllers (Sidoni grievance) (1981),  CROA Case No. 
946 (Weatherill) at 2, where it was found that a diagnosed alcoholic could not return to work after ab-
sence for treatment unless he was first certified as fit for duty by a doctor, since the duties of a rail traf-
fic controller “…impinge so directly upon the safety of  operations.”
road Regulations in force at the time of the award (recall, that the award was  ren-
dered in 1987, and the U.S. Railroad Regulations were not amended to allow for 
random testing until 1988).99  Finally, this passage contains the basic framework of 
the Canadian model as it was articulated almost twenty years later; a model that 
was described as having evolved over time.
# The same arbitrator rendered the Keal  decision on the same day as the 
Hutchinson  decision.  The award is  significantly shorter and simply relies on 
Hutchinson for its  authority.  Arbitrator Picher found that Mr. Keal occupied a 
safety-sensitive position and that his arrest for marijuana possession two hours 
prior to the beginning of his shift, coupled with his  refusal to submit to a drug test, 
justified his dismissal by Canadian Pacific.100
The Hutchinson  and Keal  decisions are illustrations of how the rules set out 
in the U.S. Railroad Regulations came to find application in Canada despite the fact 
– explicitly recognized by Arbitrator Picher – that no legislature had decided to 
import the U.S. norms.  First, the norms were transmitted by the railways  them-
selves, who implemented testing after relying on U.S. data to conclude that testing 
was necessary.  Second, the U.S. Regulations and jurisprudence provided the frame-
work within which Arbitrator Picher could conclude that drug testing was legiti-
mate.  He was aware of the American drug testing regime and accepted their un-
derlying premise that drug testing is  a means  of promoting workplace safety.  He 
even adopted the terminology of “safety-sensitive positions”.  Third, the immedi-
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99 See text accompanying note 30, supra.
100 Keal, supra note 93 at 2.
ate reliance on Hutchinson in Keal  without reference to the American norms demon-
strates that once the norms entered legal discourse, they were replicated across the 
jurisprudence. 
Such replication continued.  In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Hutchin-
son decision was routinely cited as the setting out the principles governing drug 
testing in Canada, though often without reference to its U.S. origins.101   As these 
principles spread beyond the railroad industry, so did the notion of “safety-
sensitive positions”.  From the initial justification of the risk of catastrophic train 
wrecks, any job with the possibility of injury began to be characterized as safety-
sensitive.  For instance, in the City of Winnipeg case the city sought to impose ran-
dom testing on a garbage collector who had been found smoking marijuana on the 
job.  The safety concerns related to garbage collection are described as follows:
The grievor works in assisting the loading of a collec-
tion vehicle… The helpers pick up refuse and load it 
into a rear collector, which has a compactor in the 
back of the hopper of the vehicle. A refuse helper 
must be certain that he and others are clear of this 
mechanism when the machine is being operated. Oc-
casionally, members of the public may be around 
when refuse is being thrown into the truck and must 
be kept away. Employees have been injured because 
of not being clear of the vehicle and injuries can be 
serious, such as a loss of a hand. The grievor is also 
required to guide the driver of the truck when back-
ing up.102
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101  See, e.g. Re Canadian National Railway Co. and U.T.U. (1989) 6 L.A.C. (4th) 381; 14 C.L.A.S. 74 
(CROA, M.G. Picher); Re Quintette Coal Ltd. and U.S.W.A., Local 9113 (Regensberger grievance) (1989) 14 
C.L.A.S. 2 (A. Hope);  Re Inco Ltd., Manitoba Division and U.S.W.A., Local 6166, [1989] C.L.A.S.J. 557689 
(Carr); Provincial-American Transport,  supra note 78; Re Winnipeg (City) and C.U.P.E., Loc. 500, (1991) 23 
L.A.C. (4th) 441 (Baizley) [City of Winnipeg]; Re Cominco Ltd. and U.S.W.A., Local 480, [1993] C.L.A.S.J. 
584223 (Williams).
102 City of  Winnipeg, ibid. at 443.
Citing Hutchinson, the arbitrator concluded that there was “a legitimate concern 
over safety”103 and that the city was justified in imposing the drug tests.
In addition to the transmission demonstrated by the Hutchinson decision and 
its  descendants, Canadian jurisprudence came into contact with the American 
norms through their direct application to Canadian employees.  Despite the delay 
in requiring Canadian companies engaged in cross-border traffic to comply with 
the U.S. Railroad Regulations,104  Canadian employees  were subject to testing while 
on U.S. soil.  Thus, the question arose as to whether a violation of U.S. regulations 
was just cause for discipline by a Canadian employer.  Again, this trend started 
with a CROA decision rendered by Arbitrator Picher in the railway industry.  In 
that decision,105 the grievor, Mr. Bernier, was required by U.S. officials  to undergo 
urinalysis  after he injured his hand replacing a light on a train.  The test was posi-
tive for marijuana metabolites and the company dismissed Mr. Bernier for “con-
duct incompatible with his duties.”  Arbitrator Picher found that the Railroad Regu-
lations could not be blindly applied to Canadian employees:
It should be noted that  there is no federal  regulation in Canada 
regarding the detection of drugs in the railway industry. Fur-
thermore, to date the Company has issued no inter-
nal regulation on this subject. The presumption of 
impairment, invoked in the American regulation by a 
positive urine test, has  no basis in logic or in science. 
It is admitted that this test demonstrates only the use 
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103 Ibid. at 446.
104 See supra note 78.
105  Re Canadian National Railway and U.T.U. (Bernier) (1990) 11 L.A.C. (4th) 364, CROA Case No. 2025 
(M.G. Picher) [Bernier cited to CROA].
of a drug during the sixty days prior to the taking of 
the sample. It provides no precise information con-
cerning when, where or in what quantity the drug 
was taken. Therefore, the presumption of impair-
ment is a legal construction decreed for the particular 
purposes of the American regulation. This same 
regulation also allows the employee to take advantage 
of a blood test to refute the presumption that he, or 
she, was working while under the influence of drugs. 
In sum, this  is a question of a very specialized and 
extraordinary regulation in the field of working con-
ditions.
There is nothing similar in the Company’s regula-
tions in Canada for the purposes of discipline in gen-
eral. In the Arbitrator’s view, in the absence of a regulation 
which explains clearly to employees who violate the American 
regulation that not only could they be forbidden to work in the 
United States but could also be discharged from the Company 
in Canada, it  is difficult to justify the dismissal of an employee 
for this reason alone.106
Mr. Bernier was re-instated, but under the condition that he “agree” to undergo 
period unannounced urine or blood testing.  He was also forbidden from working 
in the U.S. “unless  the American authorities  permit it and unless the company, at 
its sole discretion, allows him to do so.”107
Whereas the Hutchinson case notes the absence of transplant attempts, the 
Bernier case shows the failure of harmonization attempts as  a mechanism of norm 
transmission.  The Canadian railways attempted to harmonize their labour prac-
tices  with the U.S. Railroad Regulations, but apparently ran up against a Canadian 
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106 Ibid. at 3 [emphasis added].
107  Ibid. at 4.  See also Provincial-American Transport, supra note 78 (holding that the company could not 
rely on the requirements of the U.S.  regulations to ground authority to impose periodic drug testing on 
its drivers).  But see, Milazzo v. Autocar Connaisseur Inc., (2003) 47 C.H.R.R. 468, where the Canadian 
Human Rights Tribunal decided that the existence of the U.S. regulations justified imposing testing on 
Canadian bus drivers.
jurisprudence that was not amenable to such harmonization.  And yet these cases 
are both sites at which the U.S. norms took hold.  They are pivotal in the so-called 
“development of the Canadian model” by virtue of the approach that they adopt 
in deciding whether or not employers have the right to unilaterally impose drug 
testing policies.  As we shall see below,108 this approach came to structure the justi-
fication of drug testing in terms of the balancing of employers’ interests and the 
privacy rights  of their employees.  This “balancing of interests  test” became one of 
the cornerstones of  the reasoning behind Canadian model.
Before we look at the justification for testing under the Canadian model, 
we will take a brief look at the other way in which drug testing norms were trans-
mitted  from the U.S.: corporate personnel policies.
2.2.2. Transmission of  of  Drug Testing Norms by Corporate Policy
The transmission of drug testing norms via the transportation industry was rela-
tively direct.  The U.S. Railroad Regulations and the attendant concept of “safety-
sensitive positions” entered the Canadian legal landscape through reference to the 
U.S. jurisprudence (as in the Hutchinson and Keal decisions) or through their appli-
cation to Canadian-based transportation workers  (as in the Bernier and Provincial-
American Transport  decisions).  However, drug testing also came to Canada indirectly 
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108 See 3.2.1, below.
through personnel policies adopted by U.S. companies  and then applied to em-
ployees of  their Canadian operations.109  
Tracing this process is  more difficult than in the case of the Railroad Regula-
tions.  In the latter case, we are dealing with an explicit body of state law adopted, 
promulgated and published in such a way as  to allow for its easy identification and 
tracking.  Corporate policies are, on the other hand, generally adopted without 
public consultation and promulgated by employers in multiple ways.  They are 
rarely published; when they are, it is in a decentralized fashion lacking the citation 
and referencing apparatus of  state law.110
This  is not to say that corporate policies  are less  important or have fewer 
effects than state law.  Insofar as  the legitimacy and efficacy of laws are related to 
their ability to structure expectations, create obligations and implement sanctions, 
corporate drug policies are arguably more important than state law.111  Indeed, as  I 
argued above, this  was  one of the initial reasons that employment drug testing was 
envisioned in the United States in the first place; as a demand reduction strategy 
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109  See also GuyLaine Charles,  Mandatory Drug Testing in Employment (LL.M. Thesis, Dalhousie 
University, December 1999) at 29 claiming that “[i]n Canada, subsidiaries  of American companies 
have been requesting drug tests  from their employees for years.”; “Drug Testing: Legal Implications”, 
supra note 78 at 18,  stating that “[t]he influence of the American ‘war on drugs’ has also been felt by 
Canadian subsidiaries of American firms.” ; Tee L. Guidotti, et al., “Occupational medicine in Canada 
in 1996” (1997)  47(1) Occupational Medicine 45 at 50.
110 One way in which the norms that are expressed in corporate policies migrate across organizations is 
though the publication of “model policies” in the specialized human resources or management litera-
ture.  In the context of drug testing, see e.g. Barbara Butler, “Developing a Company Alcohol and Drug 
Policy” (1994)  2:3 C.L.E.L.J. 484.
111 On the idea that corporate personnel policies  relating to drug testing constitute a quasi-autonomous 
legal order see Andrée Lajoie, Pouvoir disciplinaire et tests de dépistage de drogues en milieu de travail: illégalité ou 
pluralisme (Cowansville : Yvon Blais, 1995).
more efficient than the criminal law.112   But the efficacy of corporate personnel 
policies in no way entails their visibility from an outside perspective.  Thus, what we 
can discover about such policies is  largely, though not exclusively, determined by 
the extent to which they come into contact with state law.  The vast majority of 
this contact is  through litigation instituted before adjudicative bodies  of the state. 
Ironically then, it is  through “standard” jurisprudence that we have access to the 
non-state normative orders that comprise corporate personnel policies.
While the scope of the transmission phenomenon is therefore difficult to 
establish, it is clear that many Canadian production facilities either had drug test-
ing policies imposed upon them by their American head offices or parent corpora-
tions, or were required by their U.S. counterparts  to formulate their own 
policies.113
2.3. Principles Regulating Testing Under the Model
The early Canadian cases  dealt virtually exclusively with individual grievances 
filed by employees who had been disciplined after either “failing” a drug test or 
refusing to submit to one.  To the extent that the legality of testing per se  was 
touched upon, it was as  an incidental question to the main issue before the board 
of arbitration.  The later cases cited in Imperial Oil  as constituting the Canadian 
model dealt directly with employers’ right to test in general.  This  appears to be 
the result of two interrelated processes.  First, faced with a jurisprudence that re-
50
112 See text accompanying note 21.
113 See e.g. Trimac Transportation Services - Bulk Systems and T.C.U. (Re) (1999) 88 L.A.C. (4th) 237.
quired drug testing to be done in accordance with explicit policies, employers who 
hadn’t already formalized their approach to drug testing did so by adopting de-
tailed policies.  Second, there was  a change in union litigation strategy; rather than 
challenge drug-related disciplinary action on a case-by-case basis, unions began to 
overtly challenge the legitimacy of drug testing in the workplace by filing collective 
grievances as soon as such policies were adopted.
2.3.1. Privacy Rights and the “Balancing of  Interests” Test
Though the primary basis of the initial policy challenges was an alleged violation 
of employees’ privacy rights, they were not grounded in human rights law.  In-
stead, unions framed their arguments in terms of traditional principles of labour 
law restricting employers’ authority to unilaterally promulgate personnel policies 
in workplaces governed by a collective agreement.114   The applicable labour law 
principles were derived from the 1965 KVP case115, which continues to be cited in 
drug testing decisions that apply the Canadian model.116  In KVP, Arbitrator Rob-
inson described the principles as follows:
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114 This  was due to the fact that it was already well-established that application of the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms is limited to government action and thus does not apply in private litigation.   The 
principle was  confirmed by the Supreme Court in RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, 
see especially ¶"26 and ff.  The Charter is not considered in Hutchinson, supra note 93, nor in Keal, supra 
note 93, nor in Bernier, supra note 105.  In Provincial-American Transport, supra note 78,  the arbitrator 
clearly states  that “[t]his is a case to which the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not 
apply.”  On the role of the Charter in drug testing cases see B. Hovius, S.  J. Usprich. & R.M. Solomon, 
“Employee Drug Testing and the Charter” (1994)  2:3 C.L.E.L.J. 345.
115 Re Lumber & Sawmill Workers' Union, Loc. 2537 and KVP Co. (1965), 16 L.A.C. 73 (Robinson) [KVP].
116  See e.g. Imperial Oil, supra note 72; Re Weyerhaeuser Company Ltd. and Communications, Energy and Paper-
workers Union, Local 447 (Roberto) (2006) 154 L.A.C. (4th) 3 (Sims); Re Bantrel Constructors Co. and U.A., Loc. 
488 (2007) 162 L.A.C. (4th) 122 (Smith).
A rule unilaterally introduced by the company, and 
not subsequently agreed to by the union, must satisfy 
the following requisites:
1. It must not be inconsistent with the collective 
agreement.
2. It must not be unreasonable.
3. It must be clear and unequivocal.
4. It must be brought to the attention of the employee 
affected before the company can act on it.
5. The employee concerned must have been notified 
that a breach of such rule could result in his dis-
charge if the rule is  used as a foundation for dis-
charge.
6. Such rule should have been consistently enforced 
by the company from the time it was introduced.117
The first drug testing case to explicitly apply KVP was rendered by Arbitrator 
Picher in the Bernier decision, in which he found that the fifth principle had been 
violated, namely that CN employees had not been informed that “violation of the 
American regulation could result in the termination of [their] services, not only in 
the United States but also in Canada.”118
But it is the second KVP criterion, that of reasonableness, which allowed for 
the privacy rights of employees to become a legally cognizable issue in the context 
of labour arbitration.  In Provincial-American Transport, Arbitrator Brent made the 
analogy between employee searches and drug testing, as follows:
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117 KVP, supra note 115.
118 Supra note 105 at 3.
There is no doubt that a carrier using the public 
highways must be very sensitive to safety, and that 
impaired drivers can jeopardize the lives and prop-
erty of many others… Canadian jurisdictions  have 
made clear policy statements indicating a desire to rid 
the roads of impaired drivers. Having said that, the 
public good does not necessarily require a wholesale 
disregard for personal liberty. Is there any reason then 
to treat the issue of drug and alcohol testing as being 
so different from searches to prevent employee theft – 
cases where the interests of the employer in safe-
guarding his property and the privacy interests of the 
employees have been balanced for years? We think 
not.119
He went on to determine that the policy of universal drug testing was unreason-
able “even accepting the obvious safety concerns”, since there was no evidence of 
a drug problem in the company nor that existing mechanisms for ensuring safety 
were unsatisfactory.120
Here we see an early reference to the structure of justification that would 
come to govern a key component of the Canadian model.  The reasonableness of 
drug testing policies depends on the balancing  of employees’ privacy interests with 
the interests  of the employer.  Absent evidence that the policy is required to fur-
ther the employer’s interests, the privacy interest of the employees prevails.  The 
unstated difference between employee searches  and drug testing is the employer 
interest that is at stake; in the first case it is “safeguarding his property” whereas in 
the second case it is promoting safety.
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119 Supra note 78 at 424.
120 Ibid. at 425.
This  characterization of the balancing of interests  test as weighing employ-
ees’ privacy against safety was clearly set out in the Esso Petroleum case, which cites 
Provincial-American Transport.121  Curiously, however, the larger part of the decision is 
guided by the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in Skinner122  and Von Raab.123 
In both of those cases, the Court’s  decision judged the permissibility of a practice 
by “balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests  against 
its  promotion of legitimate governmental interests”.124  Even more curiously, Arbi-
trator McAlpine’s reliance on the U.S. jurisprudence has been systematically 
evacuated from the conventional story of the development of the Canadian 
model.  McAlpine’s decision – and the balancing of interest test in particular – are 
commonly cited as key elements of  a uniquely Canadian jurisprudence.125  
Finally, we can see how the “balancing of interest” test arrived in Canada 
in  several different ways.  In addition to the explicit reference to the U.S. jurispru-
dence, Arbitrator McAlpine relies on the Hutchinson case (both directly, and by cit-
ing Provincial-American Transport, which in turn relies  on Hutchinson).  Recall, that in 
Hutchinson, which was rendered prior to the U.S. Supreme Court decisions, Arbi-
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121  Re Esso Petroleum Canada and Communications, Energy & Paperworkers Union, Local 614, [1994] 
B.C.C.A.A.A. No. 244, 56 L.A.C. (4th) 440 (McAlpine) [Esso Petroleum, cited to B.C.C.A.A.A.].  Note 
that Esso is a property of  Imperial Oil.
122 Supra note 66.
123 Supra note 69.
124 Skinner, supra note 66 at 619 [citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979)].
125 This can be at least partially explained by the fact that the case is  usually cited to a summary found 
in the ubiquitous L.A.C. (“Labour Arbitration Cases”) reporter rather than to the full text version that 
appears in B.C.C.A.A.A. (“British Columbia Collective Agreement Arbitration Awards” – a Quicklaw 
database).
trator Picher describes the American Railroad Regulations as  striking a balance be-
tween a railroad’s interest in safe operations and employee privacy rights.126
The outcome of  Esso Petroleum, with regard to drug testing was:
- Mandatory random testing prescribed for safety-
sensitive employees is acceptable in the context of 
rehabilitation but only for a reasonable period of 
time.
- Mandatory random testing prescribed for safety-
sensitive employees is otherwise unacceptable.
- Mandatory testing of all employees after a signifi-
cant work accident, incident or near miss is accept-
able.
- Mandatory testing of all employees on the basis of 
reasonable and probable grounds is acceptable.127
Note that these are precisely the four circumstances under which testing is  allowed 
in the Canadian model as it was described by Arbitrator Picher in the Imperial  Oil 
case.128  They are also virtually identical to the testing circumstances set out in the 
U.S. Railroad Regulations in 1987.
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126 See text accompanying note 96.
127 Esso Petroleum, supra note 121 at ¶"189.
128 Supra note 72.
The balancing of interest test and its consequences continue to apply rela-
tively unchanged.129
2.3.1.1. The Curious Case of  Privacy in Quebec
Quebec is  unique among the Canadian provinces in the protection that it affords 
privacy interests.  Unlike the various human rights codes in the other provinces,130 
Quebec’s Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms131  offers specific protection of the 
right to privacy.  The Quebec Charter provides:
4. Every person has a right to the safeguard of his 
dignity, honour and reputation.
5. Every person has  a right to the respect for his pri-
vate life… 
9. Every person has a right to non-disclosure of 
confidential information…
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129 Canadian National Railway Co. and C.A.W.-Canada (Re) (2000) 95 L.A.C. (4th) 341 (M.G. Picher) [CN & 
CAW] (balancing of interests  test justifies  reasonable cause and post-accident testing for risk-sensitive 
employees);  Re Fording Coal Ltd. and United Steelworkers of America, Local 7884 (Shypitka grievance), (2001) 94 
L.A.C. (4th) 354 (Hope) (balancing of interests test justifies subjecting an employee with a history of 
drug problems to random testing for a period of two years); Re Fording Coal Ltd. and United Steelworkers of 
America, Local 7884 (Cryderman grievance), (2003) 119 L.A.C. (4th) 165 (Devine) (balancing of interests test 
justifies post-incident testing for those in safety-sensitive positions, but only if an investigation has first 
ruled out mechanical or environmental causes); ADM Agri-Industries Ltd. v. National Automobile, Aerospace, 
Transportation and General Workers' Union of Canada (CAW-Canada), Local 195 (Substance Abuse Policy Grievance) 
[2004] C.L.A.D. No. 610 (Springate) (balancing of interest test justifies post-incident, reasonable cause, 
and post-rehabilitation testing).   See also the four awards listed by Arbitrator Picher in Imperial Oil, ibid. 
at ¶"100.  See also Donald J.M. Brown & David M. Beatty, Canadian Labour Arbitration, 4th ed. (Aurora 
Ont.: Canada Law Book, 2007) at 7:6152.
130 In British Columbia, see the Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c.  2;  in Alberta, see the Human Rights, 
Citizenship and Multiculturalism Act,  R.S.A. 1980, c. H‑14; in Saskatchewan, see the Human Rights Code, 
S.S. 1979, c. S-24.1; in Manitoba, see the Human Rights Code, S.M. 1987, c. H-175 (as amended);  in 
Ontario, see the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19; in New Brunswick, see the Human Rights Act, 
R.S.N.B. 1973, c. H-11; in Nova Scotia, see the Human Rights Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 214; in Prince Ed-
ward Island, see the Human Rights Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988 c.  H-12; in Newfoundland and Labrador, see the 
Human Rights Code, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. H-14 (as amended).
131 R.S.Q., c. C-12.
Furthermore, in addition to protecting privacy rights  with the same scope as the 
Quebec Charter,132 the Civil Code of Québec specifically provides that no person 
may be made to give a specimen without his  or her free and enlightened 
consent.133  Thus, unlike the common law provinces and the federal jurisdiction,134 
from which the majority of the arbitration jurisprudence dealing with drug and 
alcohol policies emanates, Quebec has a quasi-constitutional statutory scheme pro-
tecting the right to privacy.
Insofar as the Quebec Charter grants privacy rights and not common law 
privacy interests, it can be argued that the burden an employer in Quebec must 
meet in order to justify drug and alcohol testing is  stricter than that the “balancing 
of interests” test set out in the arbitral jurisprudence from the rest of Canada. 
The few cases on drug testing from Quebec, however, do not appear to diverge 
significantly from the Canadian model.135 
The Quebec Court of Appeal recently confirmed this  trend in the Goodyear 
case.  In that case, the union appealed a decision of the Superior Court refusing 
an application for judicial review of an arbitral award that confirmed the em-
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132 Arts. 10 & 11 C.C.Q.
133 Art. 3 C.C.Q.
134 The Privacy Act,  R.S.C.  1985, c.  P-21 only applies to government institutions.  As its  name suggests, 
the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c.  5 is primarily concerned with 
documents, and does not grant the kind of  privacy right as Quebec law does.
135  See e.g. Teamsters Québec, section locale 973 et Aliments Ultima inc., D.T.E. 2004T-1115 (T.A.); Syndicat ca-
nadien des communications, de l'énergie et du papier, section locale 143 et Goodyear Canada Inc. (April 12, 2005, Ar-
bitrator D. Tremblay, unreported) aff ’d Section locale 143 du Syndicat canadien des communications, de l'énergie 
et du papier c. Tremblay,  2006 QCCS 2128, [2006] R.J.D.T. 617, D.T.E. 2006T-449, quashed in part on 
appeal,  Section locale 143 du Syndicat canadien des communications, de l'énergie et du papier c. Goodyear Canada inc., 
2007 QCCA 1686 [Goodyear].  Full disclosure: I was one of the attorneys who acted for the union in the 
Goodyear case.
ployer’s  right to subject employees in “safety-sensitive positions”136 to random and 
unannounced drug tests.  Relying on previous decisions relating to the right to pri-
vacy,137 the Court applied the Oakes test138 and found that though such testing was 
adopted in the pursuit of a legitimate objective that there were less intrusive ways 
of  achieving this objective.139  Random testing was therefore not allowed.
In the final two paragraphs of the judgement, in what is  arguably an obiter 
remark, the Court cites the passages from Imperial  Oil  that refer to the “Canadian 
model”, stating that it provides an “interesting comparison”.140   This comparison 
is particularly odd, since the Court could have found ample grounds for applying 
something like the balancing of interests test using the current Quebec jurispru-
dence.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has specifically stated that when applying 
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136 In French, “postes à risque élevé” or literally “high risk positions”.
137  Notably, Syndicat des travailleuses et travailleurs de Bridgestone/Firestone de Joliette (C.S.N.) c. Trudeau, [1999] 
R.J.D.T. 1075 (C.A.), see ¶"17 of  Goodyear (appeal).
138 Goodyear, supra note 135 (appeal) at ¶"18.   The Oakes test is in reference to R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 
103 (setting how to determine the limits  that can be put on fundamental rights in a free and democratic 
society).  In using the Oakes test to determine the scope of legitimate violations of fundamental rights by 
private parties, rather than the state, the Court implicitly refused to apply the distinction set out by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Syndicat Northcrest v. Anselem [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 [Anselem] and Multani c. 
Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys,  [2006] S.C.R. 256 [Multani].  In those cases,  the Supreme Court 
distinguished the first and second paragraphs of s. 9.1. of the Québec Charter, supra note 131 and found 
that the Oakes test is not the applicable standard in cases  where the alleged violation of a fundamental 
right is not perpetrated by the state.
139 Goodyear, ibid. at ¶"19 and 23-32.  The Court skips  the part of the Oakes test in which it must be dem-
onstrated that there exists a rational connection between the objective (reducing workplace accidents) 
and the means employed (drug testing).  It appears, however, that the absence of such a connection is 
in fact the true basis for their decision (see especially ¶"25, where the Court states: “Bien que cette usine 
présente un mauvais dossier en matière d'accidents  du travail, aucun lien n'a été établi entre cette situa-
tion et la consommation d'alcool et de drogues.”)
140  Ibid. at ¶"33-34.  This passage is disconnected from the rest of the judgement and plays no explicit 
role in Court’s  reasoning.  This  absence of explanation leads me to believe that the sole purpose of the 
citation is  to demonstrate that, even if the reasoning applicable in Quebec is  somewhat different than 
elsewhere in Canada, the result is perfectly in stride with the “Canadian model”.
s."9.1 of the Quebec Charter in the context of a conflict between private parties, a 
court should seek to balance their rights.141
2.3.2. Discrimination Against the Addicted: Real and Perceived Handicaps
An important element of any drug testing regime is the consequences that flow 
from a positive test.  Early Canadian arbitration cases framed this question in 
terms of the general principles governing discipline in the workplace.  These prin-
ciples had already been applied to cases of employee consumption and/or im-
pairment at work, which existed prior to the implementation of  drug testing.142
With the advent of mass drug testing in the absence of reasonable suspi-
cion of consumption or impairment, however, concerns began to be raised that 
employers  were thereby discriminating against drug-dependent employees.  The 
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141 See Anselem and Multani, supra note 138.
142   See e.g. Re Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 911 and Windsor Utilities Commission (1958) 8 L.A.C. 
328 (Honrahan) (drinking during lunch break does not justify suspension if the employee was not im-
paired at work); Sudbury Mine Workers, Local 598 and Falconbridge Nickel Mines Ltd. (1962),  12 L.A.C. 270 
(Thompson) (discipline is only justified if the employee’s  impairment renders  him or her unable to per-
form duties in a satisfactory way); Re Dominion Stores Ltd. and Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union, 
Local 414 (1976) 16 L.A.C. (2d) 7 (Hinnegan) (possession of marijuana on company premises  justifies  a 
four-month suspension but not discharge);  Firestone Steel Products of Canada and United Automobile Workers, 
Local 27 (1977) 17 L.A.C. (2d) 185 (Rayner) (impairment by marijuana while at work justifies  dis-
charge); Re Indalloy, Division of Indal Ltd. and United Steelworkers, Local 2729 (1979) 22 L.A.C. (2d) 202 
(Kennedy) (possession of marijuana with the intent to consume it at work does not justify discharge but 
does  justify a five-month suspension);  Re Steel Company of Canada Ltd. and United Steelworkers (1979) 14 
L.A.C. (2d) 405 (Rayner) (marijuana consumption at work justifies discharge); Re Air Canada and Interna-
tional Assoc. of Machinists (1976) 10 L.A.C. (2d) 346 (Morin) (habitual off-duty marijuana use is  not 
grounds for discipline absent evidence of  impairment at work).
various human rights  commissions were apparently the first to raise this issue.143 
In Provincial-American Transport, Arbitrator Brent remarked:
This  is  a case to which the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms does not apply. Further, we were not cited 
any decisions of either the Canadian Human Rights 
Commission or the Ontario Human Rights Commis-
sion regarding drug testing.  Based on the policy papers 
from those bodies which were filed with us, it would appear that 
their view is that evidence of a particular problem would be 
required before drug and alcohol testing would be countenanced 
under existing human rights legislation.144
The application of anti-discrimination law to drug-testing policy was eventually 
decided by the Federal Court of Appeal in the 1998 TD Bank case145 and the On-
tario Court of Appeal in 2000 Entrop case.146   As we shall see, these cases deploy 
different reasoning to come to the same conclusions  as the arbitral jurisprudence. 
Unsurprisingly, the decisions were easily integrated in the Canadian model.
2.3.2.1. Human Rights Decisions by the Higher Courts
The TD Bank case arose after the Toronto Dominion Bank adopted a new drug 
testing policy in 1990.  In his decision, Roberston, J.A. describes the policy as fol-
lows:
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143  See e.g. Canadian Human Rights Commission, The Canadian Human Rights Commission Policy on 
Mandatory Drug Testing (Ottawa: CHRC Research & Policy Branch, 1987 [Policy 88-1]); Ontario Human 
Rights  Commission, Policy on Drug and Alcohol Testing (1996); Commission des droits de la personne et des 
droits de la jeunesse du Québec, La compatibilité avec la Charte québécoise des tests de dépistage de drogue en em-
ploi, by Claire Bernard (Québec: CDPDJ [Cat. 2.120.12.13], 1998).
144 Supra note 78 at 426.
145 Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Toronto-Dominion Bank,  1998 CanLII 8112 (F.C.A.), [1998] 4 F.C. 
205, 163 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 32 C.H.R.R. 261, 38 C.C.E.L. (2d) 8 [TD Bank].
146 Entrop v. Imperial Oil Limited, 2000 CanLII 16800 (On. C.A.), 50 O.R. (3d) 18, 189 D.L.R. (4th) 14, 2 
C.C.E.L. (3d) 19, 37 C.H.R.R. 481, 137 O.A.C. 15 [Entrop, cited to CanLII].
[The policy] requires all new and returning employ-
ees to submit to a urine drug test within 48 hours  of 
accepting an offer of employment. This  requirement 
is printed on the Bank's application for employment 
form which states that it is a condition of 
employment that a person undergo drug testing for 
“illegal substances”…
New or returning employees who refuse to submit to 
the drug test are dismissed for failing to comply with 
a condition of employment. Employees who test posi-
tive and are drug dependent, may lose their 
employment if  they refuse to take advantage of the 
rehabilitation services made available to them or if 
rehabilitation efforts prove unsuccessful. So-called 
casual users  of illicit substances, that is non-
dependent drug users, may also lose their 
employment if they persist in using such drugs after 
having tested positive on at least three occasions…147
The Canadian Civil Liberties Association (the “CCLA”) saw this as a violation of 
the Canadian Human Rights Act,148 which specifically prohibits employment discrimi-
nation on the grounds of “… previous or existing dependence on alcohol or a 
drug.”149  The CCLA filed a complaint with the Canadian Human Rights Com-
mission, which in turn seized the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal.  The case 
eventually made its way to the Federal Court of Appeal via a decision by a Federal 
Court motions judge on an application for judicial review of the Tribunal’s deci-
sion.
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147 TD Bank, supra note 144 at ¶"6-7.
148  R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6. The reason that federal legislation applies is that banks, including their 
employment relationships, fall under the federal jurisdiction by virtue of s. 91(15) of the Constitution Act, 
1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5.
149 Canada Human Rights Act, ibid. The definition of disability is found at s. 10.  Section 3(1) includes dis-
ability as a “prohibited ground” of discrimination, and s. 10 sets out the definition of a “discriminatory 
practice” in employment. 
! Robertson, J.A., found that the policy was discriminatory, since “[a]n 
employment policy aimed at ensuring a work environment free of illegal drug use 
must necessarily impact negatively on those who are drug dependent.”150   Fur-
thermore, the discrimination could not be justified because it was neither reasona-
bly necessary, nor rationally connected to job performance.151
McDonald, J.A., in his concurring opinion, found that the policy consti-
tuted indirect discrimination since the neutral rule (“employees  must be drug-
free”) had more serious consequences for a group that is protected under the Hu-
man Rights Act  (drug dependent employees).152   He continues, finding that such a 
policy could be truly neutral (i.e. not cause adverse effects  to a protected group) in 
some circumstances.  The circumstances he cites are cases where the policy is  im-
plemented in a “safety sensitive industry”.  He writes:
For instance, a policy aimed at achieving a drug and 
alcohol free work place can be neutral if it is con-
cerned with work performance and seeks to rehabili-
tate those whose work performance has been affected 
as a result of their drug dependency.  Indeed, drug test-
ing in safety sensitive industries is allowed and pursued. The 
concern, therefore, should be to ensure that  the policy is designed 
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150  TD Bnnk, supra note 144 at ¶"24.  Note that the judgement contains three different sets of reasons. 
Robertson, J.A., found that the policy was directly discriminatory and in the alternative that it consti-
tuted unjustified indirect discrimination; McDonald, J.A., found that the policy constituted unjustified 
indirect discrimination; Isaac, C.J., dissented, finding that if the policy were indirectly discriminatory it 
was justified on the grounds that being free from drugs is a bona fide occupational requirement.
151  The “reasonably necessary” and “rational connection” tests were, at the time of the judgement, 
distinct tests used to determine whether a practice that is prima facie discriminatory is nevertheless justi-
fied.  Since the Supreme Court abandoned the distinction between direct discrimination and indirect 
or “adverse effect” discrimination in British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. 
BCGSEU, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3 [Meiorin], there is now only one test.  
152 TD Bank, supra note 144 at ¶"4.
to meet  the requirements of the CHA [Canadian Human 
Rights Act] rather than with banning these policies altogether…
It is relatively easy to imagine a situation where a drug testing 
policy would likely be upheld: one is in a safety sensitive indus-
try that  has a policy of drug testing for cause (where an em-
ployee's work performance has been affected by 
drugs.) Having established this is a valid BFOR [bona 
fide occupational requirement] defence, there is no 
duty to accommodate: the disabled person can be 
dismissed.153
Thus, in a case involving discrimination, where the governing legal principles and 
applicable legislation are radically different from those applicable to privacy in the 
context of a collective bargaining relationship, the Federal Court of Appeal comes 
to precisely the same conclusion as the arbitration jurisprudence: drug testing is 
justified when it is  implemented in a safety sensitive industry, and then, only for 
cause.
A similar result was  arrived at in the Entrop case.154  In that case, Imperial 
Oil’s drug and alcohol policy was challenged by Mr. Entrop, who filed a complaint 
with the Ontario Human Rights  Commission.  The facts that led to the litigation 
were simple:
The respondent Martin Entrop suffered from alcohol 
abuse in the early 1980s.  Although he had not had a 
drink for over seven years, because he worked in what 
Imperial Oil classified as a safety-sensitive job, the 
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153 Ibid. at ¶"11-12, emphasis added.
154  Supra note 145.  The relationship between Entrop and TD Bank is complex.  The Ontario Human 
Rights  Commission Board of Inquiry had rendered an initial decision in Entrop by the time that the TD 
Bank decision was  rendered, and that decision is cited by the Federal Court of Appeal.   However, the 
procedural complexities  of Entrop (where the Board rendered eight distinct decisions) resulted in the 
appeal being heard after TD Bank was rendered.  So TD Bank is cited in the Ontario Court of Appeal’s 
decision in Entrop.
Policy required him to disclose his previous alcohol 
abuse problem to management.  When he disclosed 
it, he was automatically reassigned to another job.155
The Board of Inquiry appointed by the Ministry of Labour expanded the scope of 
its  inquiry to include all aspects  of the policy, ultimately deciding that policy’s pro-
visions for drug and alcohol testing were in violation of the Ontario Human Rights 
Code.156  By the time it had reached the Ontario Court of Appeal, the question of 
the legality of  testing had become the primary issue.
Though the Ontario Human Rights Code does not specifically reference addic-
tion in the way that the Canadian Human Rights Act does, the Court upheld the 
Board’s finding that substance abuse is a handicap.  Furthermore, the Ontario Hu-
man Rights Code, prohibits discrimination against anyone who “has  or  has  had,  or 
is believed to have or have had” a handicap.157  This caused the court to remark:
Thus, though the social drinker and casual drug user 
are not substance abusers  and, therefore, not handi-
capped, Imperial Oil believes them to be substance 
abusers for the purpose of the Policy.  In other words, 
Imperial Oil believes that any person testing positive 
on a pre-employment drug test or a random drug or 
alcohol test is  a substance abuser…  Imperial Oil ap-
plies sanctions to any person testing positive – either 
refusing to hire, disciplining or terminating the 
employment of that person – on the assumption that 
the  person is likely to be impaired at work currently 
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155 Ibid. at ¶"2.
156 R.S.O. 1990,  c. H.19, as amended.  Compare Alberta (Human Rights and Citizenship Commission) v. Kel-
logg Brown & Root (Canada) Company, 2007 ABCA 426 (CanLII), where the Alberta Court of Appeal 
refused to declare illegal a drug testing policy on the grounds that the individual complainant was not 
handicapped and that the Human Rights Panel was  not validly seized of a general complaint that al-
lowed for a decision on the general validity of  the impugned policy.
157 Ontario Human Rights Code, ibid. at ss. 5(1) and 10.
or in the future, and thus not “fit for duty.”  There-
fore, persons testing positive on an alcohol or drug 
test – perceived or actual substance abusers – are ad-
versely affected by the Policy.  The Policy provisions 
for pre-employment drug testing and for random al-
cohol and drug testing are, therefore, prima facie dis-
criminatory.  Imperial Oil bears the burden of show-
ing that they are bona fide occupational requirements.
The “bone fide occupational requirement” test to which the Court refers here had 
undergone some refinement since TD Bank, where two distinct tests (the “reasona-
bly necessary” test and “rational connection” test) were applied.158   These tests 
were premised on the distinction between direct and indirect (or adverse effect) 
discrimination, a distinction that was jettisoned.  Since 1999, the courts apply a 
“unified approach” that imposes a single test to determine whether a prima facie 
discriminatory employment standard is justified: 
An employer may justify the impugned standard by 
establishing on the balance of  probabilities:
(1) that the employer adopted the standard for a pur-
pose rationally connected to the performance of 
the job;
(2) that the employer adopted the particular standard 
in an honest and good faith belief that it was  nec-
essary to the fulfilment of that legitimate work-
related purpose; and
(3) that the standard is reasonably necessary to the 
accomplishment of that legitimate work-related 
purpose.  To show that the standard is  reasonably 
necessary, it must be demonstrated that it is impos-
sible to accommodate individual employees shar-
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158  Meiorin, supra note 150.  See also British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia 
(Council of  Human Rights), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 868, 181 D.L.R. (4th) 385.
ing the characteristics of the claimant without im-
posing undue hardship upon the employer.159
In Entrop, the Court found that the purpose of the policy was to promote work-
place safety and that reducing workplace impairment was rationally connected to 
that objective.  It also found that Imperial Oil honestly believed that its policy was 
necessary to meet this objective.  The real question for the Court was thus whether 
drug testing was reasonably necessary.
The Court found that random testing was not  reasonably necessary for the 
simple reason that urinalysis drug testing is  unable to detect current impairment. 
Since a positive test tells the employer nothing as to the employees capacity to do 
the job safely, testing cannot be reasonably necessary to promote workplace 
safety.160  Furthermore, termination of employment after a positive test is far more 
drastic than is necessary – Imperial Oil had not shown that it was impossible to 
adjust its sanctions in order to accommodate drug-dependent employees.161  Both 
of  these arguments were also applied by the Court to pre-employment testing.162 
The Court also endorsed the Board’s finding that testing based on 
reasonable suspicion and after an accident or incident (as part of a “larger assess-
ment”) were justified.163
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159 Meiorin, ibid. at ¶"54.
160 Entrop, supra note 145 at ¶"99.
161 Ibid. at ¶"100-102.
162 Ibid. at ¶"99.
163 Ibid. at ¶"114.
2.3.2.2. Integration in the Model by Arbitrators
The conclusion of TD Bank and Entrop is  ultimately that random drug testing and 
mass pre-employment screening are unjustified under anti-discrimination statutes. 
Both, however, allow testing for employees in safety-sensitive positions.  Entrop spe-
cifically sets out that such testing is allowable on the basis of reasonable suspicion 
and as part of a post-incident or accident investigation.  Once again, we see that 
testing is  allowed under the same conditions as the initial U.S. Railroad Regulations. 
It was  therefore easy for the “new” anti-discrimination reasoning governing drug 
testing to be integrated into the Canadian model, which itself is basically identical 
to the U.S. system. 
This  process of integration occurred rapidly in the years following TD Bank 
and Entrop.  In CN & CAW,164 Arbitrator Picher cites  TD Bank at length, as well as 
the lower tribunal rulings in Entrop.  Hearings in the case ended two days prior to 
the release of the Court of Appeal decision in Entrop.  By the time Arbitrator 
Picher rendered Imperial Oil, the reasoning on discrimination was clearly described 
as a key component of  the Canadian model.
3. Conclusions
In this  chapter, I have described how the core elements  of the so-called “Canadian 
model” of employment drug testing were transmitted from the United States.  I 
showed how the transportation sector – and in particular the railroad industry – 
played an important role in this transmission.  In that industry, several aspects  of 
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164 Supra note 129.
the U.S. norms came to be applied in Canada despite the abandonment of a gov-
ernment policy initiative that sought to import them directly.  Though systematic 
evidence is  harder to come by, it appears that corporate personnel policies also 
brought the American norms to Canada.
I also demonstrated that from these distinct points of contact the American 
norms spread.  Both the terminology and the justification in terms of safety were 
applied by human rights tribunals, labour arbitrators and courts in contexts  where 
there was no direct link with the United States.
In Chapter 2, I argue that these two features – the absence of (successful) 
intentional efforts to import the U.S. norms by legislation or regulations and the 
pattern of initial contact followed by later spread – cannot be explained by the 
transplant and harmonization accounts of legal norm transmission.  This  leads me 
to propose an epidemiological account of legal norm transmission, which I will 
systematize and then test in later chapters.
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Introduction
In Chapter 1, I gave what can be called an empirical or historical explanation of 
how the law governing employment drug testing in Canada came to be what it is. 
Such causal accounts  may jar with the kinds of explanations that are typically put 
forward by jurists, which tend to rely on justifications mobilized within the discur-
sive structure of the law itself.1  The story of the law governing employment drug 
testing in Canada is just such a case of conflicting explanations; the description I 
set out directly contradicts the account the jurisprudence gives of  itself.  
There is a sense, however, in which this description of the facts of transmis-
sion is not really an explanation at all.  This is  because not all empirical descrip-
tions – even causal ones – are explanations.  As Peter Lipton argues, what counts 
as an explanation will depend, in part, on what we want to know; that is, on our 
interest.
We may explain an event by giving some information 
about its causal history, but causal histories  are long 
and wide, and most causal information does not pro-
vide a good explanation.  The big bang is part of the 
causal history of every event, but explains only a few. 
The spark and the oxygen are both part of the causal 
history that led up to the fire, but only one of them 
explains it.  So what makes one piece of information 
about the causal history of an event explanatory and 
another not?  The short answer is that  the cause that  ex-
plains depends on our interests.2
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1 Many jurists appear to take seriously the quote (mis)attributed to Bismarck that laws are like sausages 
and the less we know about how they are made the better off we are.  Exceptions, of course, abound. 
See e.g. Michelle Giroux, Guy Rocher & Andrée Lajoie, “L’émergence de la Loi sur les services de santé et 
des services sociaux de 1991":"une chronologie des événements” (1999) 33 R.J.T. 153.
2 Peter Lipton, “Contrastive Explanation” in Dudley Knowles, ed.. Explanation and its Limits (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990) 247 at 249 [references omitted; emphasis added].
Another way of saying this is  that explaining is the act of answering “why-
questions”.3   We want our account not only to tell us what  happened (American 
norms came to Canada) but why it happened.  This doesn’t mean that we need to 
postulate the existence of universal laws instantiated by the particular events  under 
study as in a full-blown deductive nomological view of explanation.4 It is far from 
clear that this is  even possible in the social sciences.5   But something more than 
just a description is  needed.  A more satisfying explanation would give a general 
account of the ways in which legal norms are transmitted across  jurisdictions and 
situate the particular case of employment drug testing norms within that account. 
That is the objective of  this chapter.
In the first sections, I briefly describe the two most common accounts of 
legal norm transmission – legal transplant and legal harmonization – and then ar-
gue that they cannot adequately explain the phenomenon of the transmission and 
spread of employment drug testing norms that I described in Chapter 1.  Instead, 
I propose that a viral model better explains this  particular case.  I then review the 
literature on viral spread of social phenomena, with particular emphasis on the 
spread of legal norms.  This leads me to clarify some methodological issues, dis-
tinguishing between a metaphor and a model.  
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3 See e.g. Peter Achinstein, “What Is  an Explanation?” (1977) 14:1 American Philosophical Quarterly 1; 
Raimo Tuomela, “Explaining Explaining” (1980) 15 Erkenntnis 211.
4 Also called the “covering law model”.  See the the classic paper by Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppen-
heim. “Studies in the Logic of  Explanation” (1948) 15 Philosophy of  Science 135.
5 See e.g. David-Hillel Ruben, “Singular Explanation and the Social Sciences” in Knowles, supra note 2, 
95.
1. Situating Norm Transmission in Legal Theory
1.1. What is Norm Transmission?
So far, I have been referring to norm transmission as though it were an obvious 
and unproblematic concept.  Before delving further into theories that seek to ex-
plain it, I will briefly flesh out what exactly it is that I mean by “norm transmis-
sion”.  To transmit – from the Latin transmittere – is to cause something to move 
from one place to another.6  Thus we can say that a legal norm has been transmit-
ted when it has moved.
There is  nothing magical about the term “transmission”.  I could have just 
as easily chosen to discuss norm “migration” or “circulation”  (and indeed I have 
used this terminology in the past).7  Each of these terms is essentially metaphorical 
(a theme to which we will return below) and brings with it a series of connotations. 
I have chosen “transmission” simply because it appears  to me to be the least 
loaded.8  For now, suffice to say that the phenomenon that interests me – and judg-
ing by the scholarship, that interests other jurists – is  the movement of legal norms 
from one jurisdiction to another.  In its most basic form, this refers to cases where 
74
6 The New Oxford American Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. “transmit”.  From trans- “across” + mittere “send”.
7 Finn Makela,  “The Migration of Drug Testing Norms From the United States  to Canada: A Geneal-
ogy”  (Paper presented to the Joint Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association and the Cana-
dian Law and Society Association,  Montreal, May 31, 2008) [unpublished]; Finn Makela, “La circula-
tion non intentionnelle des normes juridiques":"une approch épidémiologique” (Paper presented to the 
Annual Congress  of the Québec Society of Comparative Law, Montreal,  April 24, 2009) [unpub-
lished].
8 One drawback is that “transmit” is  transitive (X transmitted the Y to Z) whereas  “migrate” is  gener-
ally not (X migrated to Z).  Transmission is, as it were, more ontologically prodigal.
the legal system of some jurisdiction X had feature ! at some time t, while jurisdic-
tion Y didn’t have ! at t, and finally Y “acquired” ! from X at some time t+n.  
Now, it should immediately be admitted that this seemingly simple defini-
tion of the scope of my inquiry relies upon a series  of presuppositions concerning 
both  the nature of the law and of legal phenomena.  First, it presupposes that the 
features  of a legal system are the kinds of things amenable to empirical study and 
that they may be usefully analysed qua social facts.  I argue in the next subsection 
that this  rules  out legal positivism as the organizing theoretical framework of an 
account of legal norm transmission.  Second, the way I have formulated the prob-
lem of norm transmission presupposes what may be characterized as monist con-
ception of jurisdictions and their boundaries.  I will therefore respond to potential 
criticisms by legal pluralists.
1.2. The Inadequacy of  Legal Positivism
A positivist theoretical approach to law cannot provide an adequate analysis of 
legal norm transmission, though varieties of positivism may have something to say 
about the phenomenon.  In particular, some positivist analysis may contribute to 
understanding how a legal system might articulate its criteria for welcoming or re-
jecting a norm that is  a candidate for transmission.  What positivism cannot pro-
vide, however, is  an explanation for how and why the transmission process un-
folded as it did, nor make predictions of this nature regarding future transmission. 
At best, positivists could claim “norm X was accepted or rejected for reasons a, b, 
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c…” or “norms sharing characteristics  X, Y, Z… will be accepted or rejected in the 
future for reasons !, ", #…”
There are, of course, almost as many legal positivisms as there are legal 
positivists.9   As H.L.A. Hart remarked (in what is arguably the most widely cited 
footnote in all of jurisprudence10) the term “positivism” is often used indiscrimi-
nately to describe a variety of related, but nevertheless distinct, doctrines.   Hart 
provides  the following non-exhaustive list of contentions that can be (and have 
been) designated as positivist:11
(1)  [T]he contention that laws are commands  of 
human beings,
(2)  the contention that there is no necessary connec-
tion between law and morals or law as it is and law as 
it should be,
(3)  the contention that the analysis (or study of the 
meaning) of legal concepts is  (a) worth pursuing and 
(b) to be distinguished from historical inquiries into 
the causes or origins of laws, from sociological inquir-
ies  into the relation of law and other social phenom-
ena, and from the criticism or appraisal of law, 
whether in terms of morals, social aims, “functions” 
or otherwise,
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9 In the words of one commentator “[l]egal positivism, like breakfast cereal, seems  to come in a wide 
variety of brands,  with modest variations  in the ingredients”,  Brian Bix, “Patrolling the Boundaries: 
Inclusive Legal Positivism and the Nature of Jurisprudential Debate” (1999) 12 Can. J. L. & Jurispru-
dence 17 at 17.
10  See e.g. Uberto Scarpelli, Qu’est-ce que le positivism juridique? trans. C. Clavreul (Paris: 
Bruylant/L.G.D.J., 1996) at 14.  
11 H.L.A. Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals” (1958) 71:4 Harvard Law Rev.  594 
at note 25 [601-602, intertextual references omitted].
(4)  the contention that a legal system is a “closed 
logical system” in which correct legal decisions can be 
deduced by logical means from predetermined legal 
rules  without reference to social aims, policies, moral 
standards, and
(5)  the contention that moral judgements  cannot be 
established or defended, as statements of facts can, by 
rational argument, evidence, or proof…
It is readily apparent that though some of these contentions are compatible with 
non-positivist explanations of legal norm transmission, none of them can provide 
an explanation.  
! Holders of (1), such as Austin,12  might argue that a legal norm has been 
transmitted when (and only when) the sovereign of the jurisdiction to where it has 
transmitted has made it into a command, either explicitly (“I hereby proclaim that 
norm X is now part of our legal system”)13 or implicitly (by not issuing edicts that 
forbid X’s application).  But this does not supply an explanation of the transmis-
sion.  In the first case, the question of how norms are transmitted is essentially 
begged, since it provides no insight into how the sovereign got the idea to edict the 
norm originating in another jurisdiction.  Furthermore, this case is particularly 
unhelpful for the specific subset of norm transmission that I am interested in, 
which I stipulated occurs in the absence of legislative intervention.  Indeed, Chap-
ter 1 clearly illustrates that – to the extent that Canada’s parliament is an Austin-
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12 John Austin, The Province of  Jurisprudence Determined (London: John Murray, 1861).
13 This is not a mere hypothetical and there is no shortage of examples of edicts of exactly this kind. 
Consider,  for instance the The Quebec Act, 1774, 14 George III, c.  83 (U.K.) which ratified two different 
legal transmissions to what is  now Quebec: the French law in civil matters (which came with the origi-
nal settlers to New France) and the English common law in criminal and public law matters (which 
came with the British conquest). 
ian sovereign – the sovereign specifically declined to edict the norms in question.  In 
the second case (that is, the sovereign who tolerates a newly transmitted norm and 
thus implicitly puts it in his catalogue of “commands”) doesn’t get us any closer to 
an explanation.  All it tells us is what happens at the final step of the norm’s 
transmission, not how or why it was transmitted.  In both of these cases, positivism 
can only provide account of the sovereign’s  ratification of the very process for 
which we want an explanation. 
Proponents of (2) may have a lot to say about norm transmission, or noth-
ing at all to say about it, but their adherence to the position that law and morality 
are separate can only constrain the field of possible explanations for norm trans-
mission; they cannot provide an explanation.  In other words, there may be explana-
tions of legal norm transmission that do not violate the tenets of positivism (as it is 
construed by these versions of it), but this  in no way enhances our understanding 
of  the phenomenon.
Contention (3) explicitly denies that positivism is concerned with the very 
kind of explanation that we are looking for, i.e. historical inquiry into the origins  of 
laws and sociological inquiry into the relationship between law and other social 
phenomena.  This kind of positivist might be quite open to such explanations, find 
them valuable sources of understanding about a particular legal system, etc.  But 
she would deny that positivism as a theoretical framework is of any use to this  ex-
planation.  On the contrary, she merely asserts that a meaningful analysis of legal 
concepts that doesn’t appeal to such explanations is also worth pursuing.
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The position set out in (4), which is  the (usually implicit) underlying premise 
of the greater part of published doctrinal legal commentary, suffers the same de-
fect of question begging as  (1).  This doesn’t mean a positivist of this persuasion 
would have nothing to say about norm transmission.  Certainly one could take an 
entirely “internalist” perspective of the law of a particular jurisdiction and have 
something to say about the acceptance of new norms.  For example, an exhaustive 
review of the applicable legislation and jurisprudence of a given legal system 
might generate a rule of recognition14 that specifies  under what conditions a newly 
transmitted legal norm is to be considered part of the legal system in question.15 
Again, however, this  tells us  nothing about transmission per se; it is simply a special 
case of the general proposition that an internalist perspective can produce a co-
herent account of the conditions under which norms accede to the status of “legal 
rules.”
Finally, the ethical non-cognitivism of (5) is simply irrelevant to the kinds of 
questions to which I am seeking answers.  A theory of norm transmission needn’t 
entail any commitment either way on the fact/value distinction.  A moral realist 
explanation of legal norm transmission may be conceivable, but all that this  entails is 
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14 On the notion of a “rule of recognition” see H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law,  2nd ed. (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press/Clarendon, 1994 [1961]) at 100-124.
15 Among the many examples  of such an exercise, consider Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigra-
tion, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177, in which the Supreme Court of Canada noted that Parliament had imported 
the definition of “refugee” set out in chap. 1, art. 1, paragraph A(2) of the United Nations Convention Re-
lating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 into Canadian law through the operation of 
s. 2(1) of  the Immigration Act, 1976, 1976‑77 (Can).
that – as with (2) – the positivist committed to (5) would rule that out as a good ex-
planation.   It would not bring us any closer to understanding the phenomenon.
Hart’s  typology is non-exhaustive and indeed there are other descriptions 
and definitions of legal positivism.16  I have chosen Hart as representative of posi-
tivism because his view is the most “open”, by which I mean it is  less prescriptive 
than other positivist views.  That positivists should have a prescriptive approach to 
jurisprudence may seem initially counterintuitive, given their emphasis on the im-
portance of separating normative claims of the law from factual claims about the 
law.  Yet, while positivism’s conceptual analysis  appears simply to provide a deci-
sion procedure for sorting social phenomena into the categories “law” and “every-
thing else”, it also serves as a set of  norms for setting out how law should be by de-
nying juridicity to any phenomena that does not meet its criteria.17  If Hart’s posi-
tivism cannot provide an account of legal norm transmission, then this is a fortiori 
true of positivists who insist on more radically hermetic boundaries for the con-
cept of  law (e.g. Austin and Kelsen).  
This  section is not meant as  a complete catalogue of possible positivist posi-
tions on legal norm transmission.  Neither is  my aim to provide a critique of any 
or all of the versions of legal positivism discussed (though I think there is ample 
room for such critique).  Rather, I hope to have illustrated that whatever the ad-
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16 See generally Scarpelli,  supra note 8;  Bix,  supra note 9.  See also François Chevrette and Hugo Cyr, 
“De quel positivisme parlez-vous?” in Louise Rolland and Pierre Noreau, Mélanges Andrée Lajoie (Mon-
tréal: Thémis, 2008) 33.
17 On this “deep contradiction” within positivism, see Lon L. Fuller, “Positivism and Fidelity to Law – 
A Reply to Professor Hart” (1958) 71:4 Harvard L. Rev. 630.  See also Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 
(Cambridge, Mass.:  Harvard University Press, 1986), especially at 31-44.
vantages or drawbacks of legal positivism as a theory of jurisprudence, it cannot 
provide an adequate explanation of the phenomenon of legal norm transmission. 
This  is in part because legal positivism is engaged in the project of prescriptively 
defining law rather than of theorizing the conditions that make law both possible 
and adaptable as a social product.  Thus, positivism – and in particular the effects 
that the de facto adoption of positivism by legal professionals  and scholars has on 
the self-understanding of legal systems – may provide data that is  an important 
part of accounting for legal norm transmission, but it cannot provide a theory that 
explains it.
1.3. Legal Pluralism and Norm Transmission
Recall that my provisional definition of legal norm transmission is the movement 
of a norm from one jurisdiction to another, with “movement” being cashed out in 
terms of the sequential appearance of some feature of the legal system in each of 
the jurisdictions.  I admitted that this leaves  me open to a charge of presupposing 
a kind of monism regarding jurisdictions and their boundaries.  In this subsection, 
I will set out what I mean by “monism” in contrast to the theoretical approach of 
legal pluralism and respond to some potential critiques by legal pluralists.  
Another reason for discussing legal pluralism here is that the study of norm 
transmission was central to early pluralist thought, though the contemporary legal 
pluralist literature has had little to say about the kind of norm transmission in 
which I am interested. This is  in part because of the research programme that 
81
contemporary legal pluralism has adopted, which is in turn a consequence of its 
development as a theoretical position. 
Legal pluralism can be described as a family of theoretical approaches to 
legal phenomena that challenge the view that juridicity is  uniquely attributable to 
norms that are explicitly adopted by institutions of the political state and that are 
exclusively and universally applicable in a particular geographic area.18   In con-
trast, pluralists argue that there are often more than one legal order operating in a 
given territory, that many of these legal orders are partially or completely inde-
pendent of the state, and that their normativity need not stem from explicit and 
institutionalized rule-making.
Until the 1970s, legal pluralism was primarily concerned with the coexis-
tence of multiple legal systems resulting from colonization; this perspective has 
been called “classical” legal pluralism.19  Its  roots  – which go back to ethnographic 
studies of  customary law in colonized societies – can be summarized as follows: 
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18  That is, pluralism challenges the ideology of modernity, the central tenets  of which are centralism 
(the law is uniquely attached to the political state), monism (there is a one-to-one ratio between legal 
orders and geographical areas), and positivism (the law is always the product of explicit institutional 
rule-making).  See e.g. Roderick A. Macdonald, “L’hypothèse du pluralism juridique dans les  sociétés 
démocratiques avancées” (2002-2003) 33 R.D.U.S. 133 [“L’hypothèse du pluralism juridique”].  See 
also John Griffiths, “What is Legal Pluralism?” (1986) 24 J."Legal Pluralism & Unofficial Law 1 at 3 
(calling centralism the ideology according to which “…law is and should be the law of the state, uni-
form for all persons, exclusive of  all other law, and administered by a single set of  state institutions”).
19 Sally E. Merry “Legal Pluralism” (1988) 22 Law & Society Rev. 869 at 872 and ff.  See also M. B. 
Hooker,  Legal Pluralism: An Introduction to Colonial and Neo-Colonial Laws (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1975) at 2 (defining legal pluralism as the existence of “multiple systems of legal obligation… within 
the confines of  the state”).
Research on legal pluralism began in the study of co-
lonial societies  in which an imperialist nation, 
equipped with a centralized and codified legal system, 
imposed this  system on societies with far different le-
gal systems, often unwritten and lacking formal struc-
tures for judging and punishing.20
In one sense, then, legal pluralism has always been concerned with norm transmis-
sion.  But note that the questions of how and why legal norms were transmitted are 
relatively uninteresting from this  perspective.  They are uninteresting because the 
answers are obvious: the norms were intentionally imposed by the colonizing 
power as part of the project of colonization.  This is a paradigm case of legal 
transplant, an account of legal norm transmission to which we will return below. 
The interesting questions  raised in classical legal pluralism lie not in the process of 
transmission, but in its consequences.  Among these questions are the nature and ex-
tent of the interactions between the coexisting legal systems, their relative norma-
tive force among the inhabitants of the colonized territory, their real and imagined 
jurisdictions over various  kinds of social conflict, etc.  All of these questions lead to 
the very difficult problem of theorizing what exactly law is and what exactly con-
stitutes a legal system or legal order.
“Contemporary” legal pluralism can be characterized as adding both 
breadth and depth to the classical legal pluralist project.  Legal pluralists broadened 
the scope of their research by applying the framework of multiple coexisting legal 
orders to industrialized societies.  This extension of the “social scientific” aspect of 
legal pluralism led to the “discovery” of multiple legal orders of varying formality 
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20 Hooker, ibid. at 874.
coexisting within industrial societies.21  With this  empirical approach22 came a re-
discovery of a number of pluralist hypotheses in the literature on the sociology of 
law.23  Pluralists  deepened their analysis in that they began to theorize pluralism as a 
general account of legal phenomena.  Rather than take state law as  a paradigm 
case to which other normative orders can be compared, many pluralists now hy-
pothesize that state law is just one instance among many differing forms of social 
ordering, none of  which has an inherent monopoly on the concept of  law.
As with classical legal pluralism, contemporary legal pluralism finds itself in 
the obverse of the positivist quandary.  The positivist posits a prescriptive defini-
tion of law and suffers the consequence of being unable to account for law as a 
social product.  The pluralist attends to the social production of norms, but is  im-
mediately faced with the critique that she has so expanded the category “law” that 
it is meaningless as a descriptor of  a particular human institution.24
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21  Merry, supra note 19.  See also Jean-Guy Belley, “Law as  Terra Incognita:  Constructing Legal Plural-
ism” (1997) 12 C.J.L.S.  17 (symbolically locating this shift by the 1981 renaming of the Journal “Afri-
can Law Studies” to “Journal of Legal Pluralism”).  For an alternative, more critical, history of legal 
pluralism, see Martha-Marie Kleinhans & Roderick Macdonald’s aptly titled “What is  Critical Legal 
Pluralism?” (1997) 12"C.J.L.S.  25 at 29-37. For an example of this turn from colonized other to indus-
trial self, see Harry W. Arthurs, Without the Law: Administrative Justice and Legal Pluralism in Mid 19th-
Century England (Toronto; University of Toronto Press,  1985).  On the term “social scientific legal plural-
ism” see Griffiths, supra note 18.  For a critique of social scientific legal pluralism see Brian Z. Ta-
manaha, “The Folly of  the ‘Social-Scientific Concept of  Legal Pluralism” (1993) 20 J.L. & Soc’y 192.
22 Griffiths, supra note 18 at 4, claims “Legal pluralism is the fact.  Legal centralism [the conception of 
law as a single, unified and exclusive hierarchical normative ordering] is a myth, an ideal, a claim, an 
illusion.”
23 See e.g. Guy Rocher,  “Pour une sociologie des ordres juridiques” (1988) 29 Cahiers de Droit 91 (pro-
posing an empirical sociology of  legal orders based on the ideas of  Max Weber and Santi Romano).
24 On the pluralist problem of defining law and an attempted solution, see e.g. Brian Z. Tamanaha, “A 
Non-Essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism” (2000) 27 J.  of Law & Soc’y 296.   For an analysis of how 
this  critique is mobilized and a cogent deconstruction, see Kleinhans & Macdonald, supra note 21 and 
Roderick A. Macdonald, “Metaphors of Multiplicity: Civil Society, Regimes and Legal Pluralism” 
(1998) 15 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 69.
This  story of the development of legal pluralist thought may go to explain-
ing why so little attention has been paid by pluralists to the kind of norm transmis-
sion that I am interested in explaining.  As the case of the coexistence of informal 
law and state law resulting from colonial legal transplant was generalized to cover 
all forms of coexisting normative orders, the phenomenon of transmission lost its 
centrality.  As every society is  taken to always  already have had multiple normative 
orders, the question of where these orders  came from is not directly relevant.  Or 
rather, it is no more relevant than the other tasks for the (contemporary) legal plu-
ralist of identifying various orders, interrogating their interrelationship, explaining 
their normative force, and ultimately advancing understanding of legal phenom-
ena in general.
In contrast to positivism then, legal pluralism is not a theoretical framework 
that a priori excludes norm transmission as an object of study.  Indeed, legal plural-
ism provides a theoretical framework that is compatible with my research pro-
gramme, despite the relative absence of legal pluralist scholarship on “uninten-
tional” norm transmission from one state law jurisdiction to another.  For instance, 
it is possible that the vectors  of transmission of norms may operate largely outside 
of state law prior to their eventual recognition by state institutions such as courts. 
Thus, one of the things that needs explaining is  the way in which state law and 
other legal orders interact; this is a central research problem for legal pluralists.  
However, legal pluralism also provides a standpoint from which to criticize 
my project.  To say that two countries have different legal systems (which is a pre-
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condition to posing the problem of how elements of one get incorporated into the 
other) is to make a claim about the primacy of jurisdiction as conceived of by the 
Westphalian nation state.  Pluralists  might argue that all societies have multiple 
legal systems, some of which are entirely within one or another state and some of 
which traverse their frontiers with little or no impact caused by state borders. 
Thus, a research programme that focuses  on the transmission of norms between 
legal systems conceived of as monolithic and hermetic entities runs the risk of 
mischaracterizing the phenomenon, which might be better explained with refer-
ence to  non-state legal orders.  For instance, a legal pluralist could argue that the 
“law of railways” is a legal system spanning both the Canada and the United 
States and that it is comprised not only (or even primarily) of the laws and regula-
tions adopted by legislators  on both sides of the border, but also collective agree-
ments negotiated between the various railways and their unions, employment poli-
cies, safety practices, implicit co-ordination between various  industry actors, 
shared historical meanings, attitudes and values, etc.  On this  view, the legal rela-
tionships between a railway and its employees in Alabama may be more similar to 
the relationship between railways and their employees in the Yukon than it is to 
the employment relationship in other workplaces  in Alabama.  The pluralist might 
then claim that the real  question of norm transmission is how drug testing norms 
were transmitted from the “law of railways” to other legal orders, rather than how 
they were transmitted from the United States to Canada.  Furthermore, the plural-
ist could claim that restricting the analysis to state law contributes to the ideology 
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of modernity by rendering invisible legal orders that do not confirm the hypothe-
ses of  centralism, monism, and positivism.25
I have several interrelated answers to this criticism.  First, though I accept 
that there are multiple and overlapping legal orders  that could be said to govern 
the practice of drug testing in employment, the transmission problem is  particu-
larly striking in the case of the jurisdictional transmission from the United States 
to Canada.  This is not to deny that there may be other ways to carve up jurisdic-
tions and observe transmission between them.  Thus I readily admit to choosing as 
my objects of study legal orders that conform to a rather orthodox conception of 
legal systems but this  does not  entail that I deny either the existence nor the impor-
tance of  other legal orders.
Now, when I say that the transmission problem is particularly striking in the 
case of the jurisdictional transmission between states, I am making a claim based 
on the available evidence set out in Chapter 1.  This  is because – unlike most other 
legal orders –  the norms of state legal systems are systematically published and 
widely available.  My second response to the pluralist criticism is thus that my 
choice of object of study is not the result of any particular theoretical preconcep-
tions about the nature of legal systems; it is based on the availability of data.  I 
come back to this question of data availability in Chapter 3, where I discuss it in 
some detail.
87
25 For a discussion of the commitments of legal theory in terms of hypotheses,  see Kleinhans & Mac-
donald, ibid. and Macdonald, “L’hypothèse du pluralism juridique”, supra note 18.
Finally, my project is to provide an explanation of the phenomenon that is 
an improvement over standard accounts of legal norm transmission, notably 
transplant and harmonization theories.  As we shall see in the following sections, 
these theories generally attempt to explain the transmission of norms between state 
legal systems.  Thus, if my approach is to be compared to them, it behooves me to 
begin by applying it to the same kind of  phenomena.
2. Existing Accounts of  Legal Norm Transmission
There is a substantial literature on legal norm transmission.  Though a variety of 
metaphors to account for norm transmission have been proposed,26 the two domi-
nant conceptions are those of legal transplant27 and legal harmonization28.  These 
two conceptions generally share a focus on the question of “fit” between transmit-
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26 See, e.g., Gunther Teubner, “Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends 
up in New Divergences” (1998) Mod. L.  Rev. 11 (arguing that transplantation is  a misleading metaphor 
and the notion of irritants, which provoke differentiated responses from host legal systems); Martha J. 
Bailey, “Migration of the Same-Sex Family” (2004) Queen's Univ. Law & Economics Paper No. 2004-
05 (applying the metaphor of non-native species introduced or moved by human activity to a location 
in which they do not naturally occur).  See also, Sujit Choudhry, “Migration as  a New Metaphor in 
Comparative Constitutional Law” in Sujit Choudhry, ed. The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (NY: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2006).
27 See especially Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law, 2nd ed. (Athens, Georg.: 
University of Georgia Press, 1993) [Watson, Legal Transplants] (arguing that borrowing from other juris-
dictions is the main source of legal change).  See also Pierre Legrand, “The Impossibility of ‘Legal 
Transplants’” (1997) 4 M. J. E. C. L. 111 (arguing that transplant is impossible because of the differ-
ence in interpretation and outcome that borrowed rules have in new jurisdictions); Alan Watson, “Le-
g a l Tr a n s p l a n t s  a n d E u r o p e a n P r i v a t e L a w ” ( 2 0 0 0 ) 4 . 4 E . J. L . C . , o n l i n e : 
<http://www.ejcl.org/ejcl/44/44-2.html> (responding to Legrand).
28 See,  e.g., Walter J.  Kamba, “Comparative Law: A Theoretical Framework” (1974) 23 I.C.L.Q. 485 at 
501-504 (distinguishing unification and harmonization and situating harmonization in the comparative 
law enterprise);  Arthur Rosset, “Unification, Harmonization, Restatement, Codification, and Reform 
in International Commercial Law (1992) 40 Am. J. Comp. L. 683 (arguing that piecemeal and ad hoc 
harmonization is more important to bringing “world law” together than “grand schemes” of unifica-
tion by codification).  See also Robert Leckey, “Harmonizing Family Law’s Identities” 28 (2002) 
Queen’s L.J. 221 (expanding the notion of harmonization to include harmonization between state law 
and other non-state normativities).
ted norms and the host jurisdiction.  Typical questions  include how similar the 
outcomes generated by the application of a transplanted norm are to the out-
comes it generates  in the original jurisdiction,29  and what its relationship is to the 
other norms of  the receiving jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the phenomenon of legal norm transmission has recently 
gained in importance in the academic literature.30  There are several reasons why 
this trend is likely to continue.  First, the facts of economic globalization, including 
the intensification of international trade and the increasing transnationalization of 
production, have led to competition between states to provide legal regimes that 
are conducive to investment.31  For a variety of reasons, such competition appears 
to result in the convergence – by various mechanisms, including transmission – of 
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29 See e.g., Teubner, supra note 26.
30  For recent works,  see e.g., Sujit Choudhry, ed., The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (NY: Cambridge 
University Press,  2006); Judith Resnik, “Law's Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, 
and Federalism's Multiple Ports of  Entry” (2006) 30 115 Yale L. J. 1564.
31 This is  not a new idea.  Indeed, from the very beginning, proponents of free trade believed that legal 
regulation was  one area in which states could compete for comparative advantage.  See, e.g. Andrea 
Maneschi, Comparative Advantage in International Trade: A Historical Perspective (Cheltenham, UK: Edward 
Elgar, 1998).  The theory of international regulatory competition has also been mobilized as  a critique of 
the arguments for free trade, notably using the concept of a “race to the bottom”, see e.g. Joel R. Paul, 
“Free Trade, Regulatory Competition and the Autonomous Market Fallacy” (1994) 1 Colum. J. Eur. L. 
29.  On the relationship between regulatory competition and harmonization, see Alan O. Sykes, 
“Regulatory Competition or Regulatory Harmonisation?  A Silly Question?” (2000) Journal of Int. 
Economic Law 257; Simon F. Deakin, “Regulatory Competition Versus Harmonisation in European 
Company Law” (2000) Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge,  Working Paper No. 
352.
legal rules across jurisdictions.32   Secondly, the rising number and importance of 
supranational law regimes – not the least of which the European Union – is  likely 
to further sustain interest in questions of legal norm transmission.33  A third rea-
son why legal academics are likely to continue to take an interest in legal norm 
transmission is the increasing acceptance of legal pluralism; a theoretical frame-
work to which transmission has  historically been central.34
However, the kind of “non-intentional” transmission that I am interested in 
has  received little scholarly attention.35   As I argue in the remainder of this sec-
tion, both transplants and harmonization efforts are generally understood to be 
explicit projects  undertaken by actors within one or more of the legal systems in-
volved.  For instance, the transplant of Roman law principles to Scotland can be 
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32 Two reasons for regulatory competition to result in convergence readily present themselves.  The first 
is  that competition may lead to convergence by favouring the most efficient rules  (or rule-sets), which 
tend to resemble one another.  The contemporary roots of this hypothesis can be found in the works of 
Ronald Coase (e.g., “The Problem of Social Cost” (1960) 3:1 Journal of Law and Economics,  1) and 
Richard Posner  (e.g., Economic Analysis of Law, 7th ed. (New York: Aspen Law & Business, 2007)).  It is a 
key thesis in Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law (Washington: American Enterprise 
Institute, 1993).  The second reason why regulatory competition can lead to convergence is that rela-
tively harmonized rules can reduce transaction costs and there is thus  an incentive for states  to harmo-
nize in order to attract investment; see, e.g., Nuna Garupo & Anthony Ogus,  “A Strategic Interpretation 
of Legal Transplants” (2006) 35 Journal of Legal Studies 339 (arguing for an economic explanation of 
harmonization and unification efforts  as attempts by states to “free-ride” on the efforts  of other juris-
dictions).
33  See, e.g. Neil Walker,  “The Migration of Constitutional Ideas  and the Migration of the Constitu-
tional Idea: The Case of  the EU” in Choudhry, The Migration of  Constitutional Ideas, supra note 30.
34  For an example of (moderately) pluralist scholarship on legal migration, see Judith Resnik, “Law’s 
Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s  Multiple Ports of Entry” 
(2006) 115 Yale L. J. 1564 (arguing that rights can migrate across borders  through the actions of may-
ors, city councils, etc., and not only through the Federal or State legislatures). For a pluralist critique of 
the “international norm entrepreneurs” who try to effect law reform through harmonization and 
transplant initiatives, see Roderick Macdonald, “Unitary Law Re-form, Pluralistic Law Re-Substance” 
(2007) 67 Louisiana L. Rev. 1113.
35  But see Martha J. Bailey, “Migration of the Same-Sex Family” (2004) Queen's  Univ. Law & Eco-
nomics Paper No. 2004-05.
traced to a few seventeenth century legal scholars who engaged in a concerted ef-
fort to ground Scots civil law – an effort that was motivated, in part, by a national-
ist reaction to English law.36   Harmonization and unification efforts have largely 
been undertaken by states themselves (e.g., UNIDROIT37) or through organiza-
tions of which states  are members (e.g., UNCITRAL,38 NCCUSL39), though often 
with the active participation of  legal scholars and commercial interests.40
2.1. Transplant
The possibility of legal transplants, that is “…the moving of a rule or system of 
law from one country to another, or from one people to another…”41 is  the subject 
of long standing debate between legal scholars.  The various positions in this  de-
bate can be set along a continuum between “culturalists” on one end and “trans-
ferists” on the other.42  The former, characterized by Montesquieu, Savigny, and 
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36  Watson, Legal Transplants, supra note 27 at 44-56.  Note, however, that Watson also indicates  that 
“sheer chance” plays a role in legal transplants.
37  See Statute of the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), 15 March 1940, 
A.T.S. 1973 No. 10 (entered into force 21 April 1940, as  amended).   See generally, 
<http://www.unidroit.org>.
38  The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, established by Establishment of the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, GA Res, 2205 (XXI), UN GAOR, 21st Sess.,  Supp. 
No. 16, UN Doc.  A/6316 (1966) 99.  See generally, <http://www.uncitral.org>.
39 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws is one of the two organizations 
(along with the American Law Institute) responsible for the United States Uniform Commercial Code. 
Technically, it is not the states who are members, but the commissioners  who are appointed by each 
state.  See generally, <http://www.nccusl.org>. 
40  Paul Dubinsky, “Human Rights Law Meets  Private Law Harmonization: The Coming Conflict” 
(2005) 30 Yale J. of  Int’l Law 211 at 218-222.
41 Watson, Legal Transplants, supra note 27 at 21.
42  For brief histories of this debate,  see Richard G. Small “Towards  a Theory of Contextual Trans-
plants” (2005) 19 Emory In’l L. Rev. 1431.  See also Teubner, supra note 26.
more recently, Pierre Legrand, see the law as  a particular expression of a national 
culture.43  Since an entire national culture cannot be transplanted along with a le-
gal rule, legal transplants are impossible.44  On the other end of the continuum we 
find, among others, Roscoe Pound45 and Alan Watson, in his immensely influential 
(and controversial) book Legal  Transplants.46  For transferists, legal transplant is not 
only possible, it is the primary source of  change in legal systems.47
Ultimately, the disagreement between culturalists and transferists may be 
less  about transplants per se than about the ontology of legal rules in general.48 
The culturalist claims that a legal rule cannot be transplanted, since it is always 
anchored in a Volksgeist or esprit  national and thus  its purported insertion into an-
other national culture would so transform it that it would not count as  “the same 
rule”.  The transferist, on the other hand, will readily admit that a rule may 
change radically once transplanted:
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43 The standard references to Montesquieu and Savigny are, respectively, De l’Esprit des lois I,  3 (1748), 
and Vom Beruf unsrer Zeit für Gesetzgebung und Rechwissenschaft (Heidelberg, 1814),  Ch. 1, though they are 
routinely invoked without citation on this point.
44 Legrand, supra note 27.
45 Who stated that the “[h]istory of a system of law is largely a history of borrowings of legal materials 
from other legal systems…” in Roscoe Pound, The Formative Era of American Law (Boston: Little & 
Brown, 1938) at 94.  Pound is quoted without citation by Alan Watson in Legal Transplants, supra note 27 
at 22.
46 Watson, Legal Transplants, supra note 27.
47 Ibid. at 95.
48  Structurally, this debate is  analogous  to the ship of Theseus paradox described by Plutarch.  The 
ship in question had its  planks replaced one by one over time until, eventually, no planks from the 
original ship remained,  leaving Plutarch to note that some philosophers claimed it was the same ship, 
whereas others said it was  a different ship altogether.  See Plutarch, Plutarch’s Lives, trans. J. Langshorne 
and W. Langshorne, (Philadelphia: Crissy, 1834) vol. 1 at 43.
A successful legal transplant – like that of a human 
organ – will grow in its  new body, and become part of 
that body just as  the rule or institution would have 
continued to develop in its parent system.  Subse-
quent development in the host system should not be 
confused with rejection.49 
Indeed, in extreme cases, a jurisdiction might adopt a rule that it completely mis-
understands, thus applying it differently, even in exactly the opposite sense, once 
incorporated.  The transferist would say that this rule has been transplanted,50 
whereas the culturalist would cite this as an evidence supporting the impossibility 
of  transplants.
In one sense, then, my research on the transmission of drug testing norms 
from the United States  to Canada falls under the rubric of a transferist view sup-
porting legal transplants.  I  depart from traditional legal transplant scholarship, 
however, in two distinct ways.  First, I am interested in norm transmission that has 
occurred absent explicit attempts – notably by legislatures – to effect a transplant. 
Traditional transplant scholarship is primary interested in intentional transplant; 
indeed, in many accounts  of transplant intention plays  a necessary role.  Alan 
Watson explains:
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49 Watson, Legal Transplants, supra note 27 at 27 [emphasis added].
50 See Watson’s  example of U.S. Supreme Court justice William Story’s reliance on a misunderstanding 
of the Dutch theorist Ulrich Huber’s Paelectiones Iuris Civilis et Hodierni in deciding conflict of laws cases, 
in Legal Transplants, ibid. at 109-10.  He develops this  example further in Joseph Story and the Comity of Er-
rors: A Case Study in Conflict of Laws (Athens, Georg.: University of Georgia Press, 1992).   Watson also 
cites the example of the role of constructive possession in the transfer of ownership in Scots  law, where 
he concludes that Scots  lawyers’  ignorance or misunderstanding of Roman law was not fatal to its 
transplant, leading him to conclude that “…foreign law can be influential even when it is  totally mis-
understood…” Legal Transplants, ibid. at 50-51 and 99.
[F]or a legal rule or institution to come into being, to 
be borrowed, to be changed, or to disappear, an official 
act must  intervene… Such acts  may be laws enacted by 
the sovereign or legislature, or be the work of such 
subordinate lawmakers as judges, jurists  or academ-
ics, which is, in its turn, acceptable to the govern-
ment.  Only legislation can make radical changes, be-
cause reliance on authority is  an almost necessary in-
gredient in subordinate lawmaking…51 
One important place where I diverge from Watson is  in the importance that I put 
on the role of (what he calls) “subordinate lawmakers” as well as the scope of this 
term.  Watson, it appears, adheres to some form of Austinian positivism, whereby 
the will of the sovereign or legislature –"either by explicit enactment or by tacit ac-
ceptance – is the litmus test for determining whether a legal rule or institution 
forms part of a legal system.  Although I gave several reasons to reject this view 
above, for present purposes the important one is that so-called subordinate law-
makers may be operating outside of the purview of the sovereign or legislature.  It 
seems to me a strange sort of sovereignty that allows even the unintentional igno-
rance of the legislator to be determinative of the juridicity of a rule.  Not only do 
I think that Watson’s “subordinate lawmakers” have more power than he attrib-
utes  to them, but I would expand the scope of this  category substantially.  If legal 
pluralism has taught us anything, it is that there are many more sources of law –
"even of official state law"– than orthodox legal scholarship usually acknowledges. 
In Chapter 1, I suggested that that corporate personnel policies and the human 
resources industry may have been as instrumental in the process as any “official” 
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51 Watson, Legal Transplants, ibid. at 108.
actors in the legal system.  Watson does allow for this kind of borrowing, under the 
rubric of customary law, but hastens to add that it takes an official such as a judge 
or lawyer to conclude the transplant:
Even customary law may be borrowed.  A rule that 
does not correspond to local customary behaviour 
may be adopted to become recognized as customary 
law.  This  often happens when judges faced with an 
actual case cannot discover any local customary prac-
tice and seek a solution elsewhere, or when a schol-
arly lawyer who wishes to write down the local cus-
tomary law finds gaps in the system…52
Watson does not, however, take the next logical step in reasoning about the role of 
“customary law” in legal transplants.  His example assumes that there is no local 
custom concerning the issue at hand and it is thus the judge or scholarly lawyer 
who does the borrowing.  But there is no reason why the customary law itself 
could not be transmitted, for instance by travelling merchants or moving popula-
tions.  If the only act required for this  to constitute a successful transplant is  the ex 
post  facto recognition by the sovereign (or, in Hart’s  terminology, the activation of 
whatever other mechanism is required for the receiving legal system’s “rule of rec-
ognition” to be triggered) then the whole transplant process could occur uninten-
tionally, including the last step whereby the sovereign affixes  his  stamp of approval. 
Of course, from the sovereign’s perspective, he would not be effecting a transplant 
at all, since he would merely be endorsing the customary law as it is found in his 
jurisdiction.
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52 Ibid. at 114.
Watson clearly does think that transplant is  effected by various means and 
influenced by various factors, including “non-legal historico-political factors,”53 the 
availability and language of books  in libraries accessible by legal actors,54 and “…
climate, economic conditions, religious outlook… or even chance…”55  He does 
not, however, provide a general explanation for how these conditions affect trans-
plant.  This is the second point on which I depart from traditional transplant 
scholarship.
Watson’s  book catalogues a number of examples of legal transplants (e.g. 
the reception of Roman law in Scotland, English law in New Zealand, etc.).  Each 
of these examples is  convincingly described.  However, the descriptions  leave the 
impression that these are a series of sui generis historical accidents.  For Watson, 
comparative law is essentially a form of  legal history:
I would suggest that [comparative law] is the study of 
one legal system and its  rules with another.  The na-
ture of any such relationship, the reasons for the simi-
larities and the differences, is discoverable only by a 
study of the history of the systems or of the rules; 
hence in the first place, Comparative Law is Legal 
History concerned with the relationship between 
systems.56
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53 Ibid. at 50-51
54 Ibid. at 93
55 Ibid. at 97
56 Ibid. at 6.  He goes on to say that comparative law is  not only legal history, but the historical dimen-
sion is his primary focus in each of  the example that he gives throughout his argument.
Insofar as Watson argues that his historical examples share common characteris-
tics that can be generalized to explain the transplant mechanism, he limits himself 
to “general reflections” rather than specific testable hypotheses.
What I am proposing, on the contrary, is  that another metaphor – that of 
the spread of a virus – is more amenable to providing a generalized explanation of 
the mechanism whereby legal rules move from one jurisdiction to another.  In con-
trast to the transplant metaphor, which misleadingly calls to mind a single event 
perpetrated intentionally by one (or at least few) actor, norm transmission (even in 
the cases cited as paradigmatic examples  of transplant) is often a diffuse process 
that occurs over time and is carried out by a distributed set of agents who may 
have no particular intentions to import or export a rule.  
2.2. Harmonization
When applied to legal phenomena, the term “harmonization” covers a wide vari-
ety of distinguishable cases.  Its root, “harmony”, often in relation to music, refers 
to the combination or adaptation of parts  or elements to form an orderly whole.57 
Applied to law, we can say that harmonization is the process of adjustment or 
change of a set of rules or institutions to ensure their interoperability.  The most 
drastic method of harmonization is to unify rule sets; that is, to replace one or 
more of the rule sets by another, which is uniform across jurisdictions.  The E.U. is 
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57 Shorter Oxford Dictionary, 3rd ed., s.v. “harmony”.  See also, s.v. “harmonize” (“to accord, agree, to form 
a concord”).
a paradigm case of unification attempts.58  The United Nations Convention on Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods provides another example.  When applicable, 
the provisions  of the Convention replace the private law of signatory states relat-
ing to “the formation of the contract of sale and the rights and obligations of the 
seller and the buyer arising from such a contract.”59  Another method of realizing 
harmonization is adjustment, whether unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral.  Thus, 
for instance, one jurisdiction might modify its  rules to ensure that they conform to 
those of a particularly valued trading partner.  More often, the jurisdictions in-
volved will mutually adjust their rules, bringing them into conformity with an 
agreed set of  principles or a model law.60    
The above description of forms and methods of harmonization is  by no 
means exhaustive.61  What accounts of harmonization generally share, however, is 
the assumption that the convergence of rules is an outcome that is  desired by iden-
tifiable actors who set out to effect it.  In many cases, the actors are states or sub-
states  (e.g. Canadian provinces or American states) who either legislate or use treaty 
signing powers to achieve harmonized rules, though there are many other players 
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58 Konrad"Osajda, “The Experiences, Methods,  Objectives and Perspectives of Unification of Private 
L a w i n t h e E u r o p e a n U n i o n ” ( Wo r k i n g P a p e r, A p r i l 1 8 , 2 0 0 6 ) , o n l i n e : 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=897403>".  Note that E.U. directives (as opposed to E.U. regulations) can 
be seen as an example of  harmonization (thank you to Jeremy Webber for this point).
59 Apr. 10, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18 (1980), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 668 (1980), art. 4.
60 The U.S. Uniform Commercial Code is an example of the model law approach.  UNIDROIT uses 
unification, shared principles, and model laws, depending on the area of  law.
61 For broader (but not themselves exhaustive) typologies, see Rosset, supra note 28 and Dubinsky, supra 
note 40.  See also Innocent Fetze Kamdem, “Harmonisation, unification et uniformisation.  Playdoyer 
pour un discours affiné sur les moyens  d’intégration juridique” (2009) 43 R.J.T. 605.  For a more critical 
perspective, see Macdonald, “Unitary Law Re-form, Pluralistic Law Re-Substance”, supra note 34.
on the harmonization field, including independent or quasi-independent advisory 
bodies62 and academic research groups.63
Another shared feature of accounts  of harmonization is  their general lack 
of theorization of the phenomenon.  This is  unsurprising: if  we take harmoniza-
tion to be the intentional work of identifiable actors, then there is little need to 
theorize a mechanism that explains why harmonization occurs.  It occurs because 
people set out to make it happen and much of the intellectual work will involve 
cataloguing successes and failures.  To the extend that this raises theoretical issues, 
they tend to centre around the questions of why some groups or institutions are 
successful in their attempts to harmonize while others  aren’t.  There are, of course 
exceptions to this characterization of harmonization scholarship,64  among which 
perhaps  the most notable are “law and economics” type analyses  that attempt to 
explain the harmonization of  rules through market or market-like mechanisms.65
This  overview of harmonization accounts is necessarily perfunctory.  I have 
reduced, maybe unfairly, a large and diverse body of scholarship to what I take to 
be a single shared blind spot.  But my purpose is  not to provide an exhaustive de-
scription of the various mechanisms of harmonization and their theoretical critics 
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62 E.g. the Hague Conference on Private International Law and the American Law Institute.  See gen-
erally Dubinsky, supra note 40.
63 E.g. the Study Group on a European Civil Code, online: <http://www.sgecc.net>.
64 See e.g., Sigrid Quack, “ Agency Legal Professionals and Transnational Law-Making: A Case of Dis-
tributed Agency” (2007) 14 Organization 643 (hypothesizing that transnational rule-making is driven 
largely by legal practitioners seeking solutions to practical problems; solutions  that eventually crystallize 
into stable norms through privately ordered institutions such as commercial arbitration boards).
65 See supra
and defenders.  Rather, my intention is to draw attention to the fact that there is 
an important way in which harmonization may occur – through the unintentional 
transmission of legal norms – that is too often ignored.  Thus, as with transplant, 
my approach can be seen as  an extension rather than a refutation of existing theo-
ries.  If a viral model allows us to explain unintentional legal norm transmission, 
then that explanation can be added to the catalogue of ways in which harmoniza-
tion may occur.
3. A Viral Account
I propose that a viral account of the spread of employment drug testing norms 
from the United States to Canada provides a better explanation than accounts 
based either on transplant or harmonization.  In this section, I  examine briefly 
how viral metaphors have been mobilized – both in popular and academic litera-
ture – to describe the spread of social phenomena.  I will pay particular attention 
to one subset of these viral accounts, which I take to be the most rigourously for-
mulated, that of memetics.  I then defend the use of metaphors in legal theory and 
legal explanation.  In particular, I argue that metaphors  are a rudimentary form of 
modelling, and in turn, that models are an essential tool in scientific reasoning.  
3.1. A Brief  Proviso on the Pejorative Connotations of  “Virus”
Existing viral accounts transpose some of the language of epidemiology and virol-
ogy onto the domain of social phenomena.  I will do likewise in describing my 
model.  The use of some of these terms – “infection” for example – can be con-
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strued as having negative connotations.  It brings  to mind an otherwise healthy 
host environment that is  rendered somehow pathological through contact with a 
virus.
Viruses, as it turns out, have a bad reputation.  This  preconception can 
colour our interpretation of theories that mobilize the viral metaphor.  As Spencer 
Waller remarks:
Not all viruses are harmful, although more attention 
naturally is focused on their negative consequences. 
For obvious reasons, one does not hear a lot about the 
helpful or innocuous viruses that inhabit our planet in 
massive numbers and in proportion to other biologi-
cal organisms.  Most viruses are, in fact, innocuous, 
and are a leading source of genetic innovation.   Vi-
ruses can have a constructive, as well as destructive, 
impact on society.  For example, exposure to viruses is 
the leading source of immunity to future infection. 
In addition, viral capsids potentially can be used as 
cellular delivery devices for a number of positive 
medical applications.  Good, bad, or indifferent, the 
virus represents a fundamental building block of life 
and a powerful metaphor when applied to law and 
legal ideology.66
My use of a viral model is not meant to be normative, but rather analytic 
and explanatory.  I certainly have opinions on the merits of the drug testing norms 
that spread from the United States to Canada, but one should not deduce them 
from my use of  the language of  epidemiology and virology.
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66  Spencer W. Waller, “The Chicago School Virus” (2007) at 10-11 [unpublished on file with the 
author].  This is an earlier version of  “The Law and Economics Virus” infra note 90.
3.2. Existing Viral Explanations of  Social Phenomena
In recent years, the metaphor of a virus has rapidly gained in popularity as a way 
to explain the spread of social phenomena.  For instance, in 1996, Jeffrey Rayport 
– then a faculty member at Harvard Business School – published an article in the 
business magazine Fast Company claiming that successful marketing campaigns 
were viral in that they were self-perpetuating and self-propagating.67  In the article, 
Rayport sets  out six  “rules” for would-be viral marketers to follow, the last of 
which is to “[i]nvest to reach the tipping point”, which he describes  as the thresh-
old over which the rate of infection must pass in order for it to become an 
epidemic.68
Rayport’s article was immensely influential and the term “viral marketing” 
quickly entered the popular vocabulary.  In 2000, the journalist Malcolm Gladwell 
used Rayport’s  notion of a tipping point for the title of what was to become a 
best-seller.69 In The Tipping Point, Gladwell argues  that fads are “social epidemics” 
and that “[i]deas and products and messages and behaviors  spread like viruses 
do.”70
Rayport and Gladwell are just two examples of a vast literature mobilizing 
the metaphor of a virus to describe the spread of social phenomena from fashion 
102
67 Jeffrey Rayport, “The Virus of  Marketing” Fast Company 06 (December 1996/January 1997) 68.
68 Ibid. (strangely, though “rules” 1 through 5 are described as such, the sixth is referred to as a “law”).
69 Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference (New York: Little & 
Brown, 2000).  The Tipping Point spent a total of twenty-eight weeks on the New York Times Best Seller 
List, see Danielle Sacks, “The Accidental Guru” Fast Company 90 (January 2005) 64.
70 Gladwell, ibid. at 7.
fads to catchy tunes to chain letters.  For all their talk of “rules” and “laws” these 
accounts  are more popular than scientific and the metaphor of viral spread is not 
deployed with particular rigour.  Behind this  pop-culture phenomenon, however, is 
a theoretical framework proposed by academic scientists; a framework that has its 
roots not – as one might expect – in epidemiology, but in genetics.  This field of 
research is referred to by the neologism “memetics”.
3.3. Memetics: Genes, Memes and Cultural Transmission
The undisputed “founder” of memetics is the evolutionary biologist Richard 
Dawkins.  In his  1976 book The Selfish Gene, Dawkins proposed a view of Darwin-
ian evolution that radically diverged from the then prevailing orthodoxy.71  A cen-
tral research question for evolutionary biology at the time was the so-called “prob-
lem of altruism”.72   If animal behaviour has an evolutionary basis then altruism 
would appear to  be maladaptive, since it results in increased risk for the organism 
without any evident benefits in terms of survival.  The best explanation for this, 
before Dawkins, was the theory of group selection, which posited that though al-
truism is of no direct benefit to individual members  of a population, it benefits the 
population as a whole.  According to group selection, the frequency of distribution 
of “altruism genes” in a population should fluctuate around a constant rather than 
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71 Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976). 
72 That altruism should prove a problem for evolutionary biology as  well as  much of the moral theory 
of economic liberalism is unsurprising.  It was, after all, from Malthus that Darwin got the idea that the 
mechanism driving evolution was the competition or struggle for scarce resources between members of 
a population, resulting in the “survival of the fittest”.  See e.g., Sandra Herbert, “Darwin, Malthus, and 
Selection” (1971) 4 J.  Hist. Biol.,  209; but see Peter J. Bowler, “Malthus, Darwin, and the Concept of 
Struggle” (1976) 37(4) J. His.  Ideas, 631 (arguing that there were significant differences  in the way Mal-
thus and Darwin mobilized the concept of  “struggle”). 
decreasing to zero, as  classical Darwinian theory predicts.73   Dawkins rejects the 
group selection explanation and instead proposes a “gene’s  eye” view of evolution. 
The ultimate unit of selection, according to Dawkins, is neither the individual nor 
the group, but the gene itself.  Thus, individuals are nothing more than transitory 
“hosts” that temporarily house genes on their eternal quest to get reproduced. 
Any behaviour that increases the chance of reproduction (and thus of a gene be-
ing passed on to a new generation) is selected for, regardless of  the survival conse-
quences for the individual or the population.
Dawkins’ view is  thus that we can treat genes as though they had intentions. 
Though they are mindless replicators, genes function as though they were “telling” 
the tokens of the phenotypes  in which they are expressed what to do.  If altruism 
increases  the possibility of replication (i.e. of being passed on to successive genera-
tions) then that is the behaviour that will be selected for.74
In the final chapter of The Selfish Gene, Dawkins speculates that a similar 
mechanism can be found in all situations where there is replication, variation and 
selection; not just biological evolution.  He goes on to note that replication, varia-
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73 This is a radical simplification of group selection.  The locus classicus of the theory is George C. Wil-
liams, Adaptation and Natural Selection (Princeton: Princeton University Press,  1966).  For an overview of 
the debate between group selectionists and individual selectionists,  see e.g. Elisabeth A. Loyd, “Units 
and Levels of Selection: An Anatomy of the Units of Selection Debate” in Rama S. Sing et al.,  Thinking 
About Evolution: Historical, Philosophical, and Political Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000) 267.
74 Take the simple example of an animal with two offspring.  If she sacrifices herself so that they can 
survive, then the chances of her genes  being passed on are, ceteris paribus, the same as what they would 
be if she allowed them to die and saved herself (since # of each child’s genes come from the mother). 
If she has three children, then ceteris paribus, the chances  are in favour of sacrificing herself (1 to 3/2).  If 
she has one child, then ceteris paribus, the best strategy from the genes’  perspective is to sacrifice the 
child.
tion and selection appear to be at work in the development of culture.  In biologi-
cal evolution, the smallest unit of  selection is the gene; Dawkins thus posits that 
culture must also have a smallest unit of selection.  Rather than using terms such 
as “ideas” or “thoughts”, Dawkins proposes the term “memes”.75
Dawkins claimed that memetics is not governed by principles similar to the 
those of Darwinian evolution – which governs genetics – but rather that it is gov-
erned by the same principles.  In Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, Daniel Dennet explains  this 
position:
Meme evolution is not just analogous to biological or 
genic evolution, according to Dawkins.  It is  not just a 
process that can be metaphorically described in these 
evolutionary idioms, but a phenomenon that obeys 
the laws of natural selection quite exactly.  The the-
ory of evolution by natural selection is neutral, he 
suggests, regarding the differences between memes 
and genes; these are just different kinds of replicators 
evolving in different media at different rates.76
Memes, then, are like genes in that they are subject to replication, variation, and 
selection.  It does not follow that there is a necessary link between genes and me-
mes; that is, memetics needn’t posit that specific human behaviours or human cul-
ture in general has a definite biological basis.  The identity of memetics and genet-
ics is at a structural level.
What Dawkins  needed was a “medium” in which memes could replicate. 
He proposed that they replicate by moving from one person’s mind to another 
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75 Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, supra note 71 at 206.  “Meme” is  a shortened version of “mimeme” which 
calls to mind memesis or imitation.
76 Daniel Dennet, Dawrin’s Dangerous Idea (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995) at 345.
person’s mind through communication.  Thus, a catchy tune replicates when 
somebody whistles it, somebody else hears it and then whistles it in turn.77   The 
memes of a chain letter reproduce when somebody reads it and then passes it 
on.78   In other words, unlike genes, memes are contagious.  This “thought conta-
gion” view of memetic replication lends itself  to  the application of the viral 
metaphor.79  Dawkins himself  mobilized the viral metaphor in the Selfish Gene:
Examples of memes are tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, 
clothes fashions, ways of making pots or of building 
arches.  Just as genes propagate themselves in the 
gene pool by leaping from body to body via sperms 
or eggs, so memes propagate themselves in the meme 
pool by leaping from brain to brain via a process 
which, in the broad sense, can be called imitation… 
When you plant  a fertile meme in my mind you literally parasi-
tize my brain, turning it into a vehicle for the meme’s propaga-
tion in just the way that  a virus may parasitize the genetic 
mechanism of  a host cell…80
In his continued work on memetics, Dawkins has maintained his use of this meta-
phor81 and it has become a standard part of memetic theory that memes spread as 
viruses do.82
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Richard Dawkins, “Viruses  of the Mind” in Nigel Wharburton, ed., Philosophy: Basic Readings (London: 
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metaphor.  The contagion and spread elements of the metaphor are based on concepts from epidemi-
ology,  whereas the description of memes as parasites  that hijack existing machinery to make copies of 
themselves is based on virology.
81 Goodenough & Dawkins, supra note 78; Dawkins, “Viruses of  the Mind”, supra note 78.
82 See e.g., Richard Brodie, Virus of  the Mind: The New Science of  the Meme (Integral Press, 1995).
But the use of the viral metaphor in memetics  suffers from insurmountable 
defects.  The most serious is  articulated by Derek Gatherer: “The central flaw in 
the ‘thought contagion’ and ‘mind virus’ hypotheses  may be summed up in a sin-
gle phrase: these theories require individuals to have memes.”83  Memes, as defined 
by Dawkins, are information structures within the brain that are expressed as 
words  or other forms of behaviour.84  Yet people do not “have” these information 
structures in the same way that they have genes.  We are born with genes and they 
continue to inhabit our bodies throughout our lives, whether they are eventually 
passed down or not.  Gene sequences  can be observed in individuals  even in the 
absence of phenotypic expression.   Information structures, on the other hand are 
mutable and unstable.  Furthermore, there is no way to observe them except by 
their manifestations; indeed Dawkins defines memes in terms of their manifesta-
tions.  It is  thus impossible to say that a meme has been “transmitted” from one 
individual to another, since this simply amounts to  cataloguing similar behaviours 
(verbal or otherwise) and not the observation of  a shared characteristic.
Similar reasoning leads Mark Jeffreys to conclude:
The meme-virus and meme-symbiant analogies need 
to be dropped altogether. It is impossible to  theorize a 
distinct process  of selection by making reference to 
parasitism. Except in science-fiction tales of alien in-
vasion, all parasitism is part of the same system of 
natural selection…
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…Either the phenomenon of culture evolves or it 
does not"–"and if it does  evolve, it either does so by a 
separate system of Darwinian selection or it does 
not"–"but in no case is it contagious, or viral, or para-
sitic, at least not from the point of view of individual 
humans and their brains. If cultural viruses exist, they 
infect other cultural entities, and describing the entire 
process of cultural replication itself in virological 
terms, as if ideas replicated as germs that fever our 
vulnerable, but otherwise coolly reasoning brains, 
takes us steadily further away from understanding 
how any cultural entities might actually be said to 
replicate and evolve.85
Thus, whatever benefits the memetic approach may have as  a theory of 
cultural evolution, they do not derive from the viral metaphor; indeed they are 
undermined by it.  This does not mean, however, that the viral metaphor itself is 
incoherent or unworkable as an explanation for the spread of social phenomena; 
only that it must be uncoupled from the conceptual apparatus of memetics.86  In-
deed, as we shall see below, I will argue that epidemiology (rather than genetics) 
provides  a fruitful base domain from which a model of legal norm transmission 
can be derived.
3.4. Viral Explanations in Legal Scholarship
Using the metaphor of a virus to describe the spread of legal phenomena is noth-
ing new.  An 1828 article in The Jurist describes opponents of codification as  be-
lieving “…the whole legal profession to be impregnated with the virus of Code-
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85  Mark Jeffreys, “The Meme Metaphor” (2000) 43:2 Perspectives in Biology and Medecine 227 at 
230-31.
86 Nor does the incoherence of the viral metaphor necessarily sound the death bell for memetics.  Dan-
iel Dennet has formulated sophisticated theories  of mind and culture that rely on a version of memet-
ics that is thoroughly evolutionary and is purged of  the viral metaphor.  See Dennet, supra note 76.
mania…” contracted, apparently, from Jeremy Bentham.87   The viral metaphor 
continues to be mobilized as  a rhetorical device; a colourful way to make the claim 
that a legal doctrine or ideology has  spread.88  The following passage from Rich-
ard Fischl’s article “The Epidemiology of  Critique” is typical:
[M]uch like a virus, Pierre [Schlag’s]’s work seems to 
produce patterned symptoms among many of those 
who encounter it (e.g. irritable scholar syndrome and a 
compulsion to ask, with increasing impatience, for 
directions); in other cases to mutate into harmless 
conformity with the predispositions of the host 
(“we’re all deconstructionists now”); to encounter 
hearty resistance in certain populations  (one can al-
most picture the antibodies swarming his texts); and 
to reproduce itself  endlessly in still others…89
Whatever the rhetorical strength of the metaphor (and – as I argue in the next sec-
tion – we should not underestimate the power of metaphors) its use is unlikely to 
deepen our understanding of the kind of legal norm transmission that I described 
in Chapter 1 without first being rendered more systematic.
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89 Fischl, ibid. at 478.
There does exist one attempt – that I am aware of – to apply the viral 
metaphor systematically to legal phenomena.  That attempt is made by Spencer 
Waller in his paper “The Law and Economics Virus”, where he uses the viral 
metaphor to generate and then test hypotheses about the spread of the theoretical 
framework espoused by the Chicago school of  law and economics.90 
Waller’s project is somewhat different from mine in that the phenomenon 
that he is trying to account for is the spread of a legal ideology rather than of legal 
norms.  There are many ways to define ideology91 and it is not my intention to set 
out a definition here, but from Waller’s object of study it is clear that what he is 
discussing is the spread of a set of beliefs about  the law rather than the spread of 
law.92  Though it certainly could be argued that legal ideologies are in fact part of 
the law – exerting normative force by shaping the interpretation and application of 
other legal norms93 " – Waller implicitly keeps the distinction between positive 
(state) law and legal ideology, with the latter influencing the development of the 
former.  
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91 For an overview, see Slavoj $i%ek, ed., Mapping Ideology (London: Verso, 1994).
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Waller, “The Law and Economics Virus”, supra note 90 at note 1.
93 In civil law jurisdictions, this is  explicit in the recognition of doctrine as  a source of law, though – as 
with most positivist treatments of “black letter” law – doctrinal writers  are loathe to admit that their 
pronouncements are ideological.
Despite this focus on ideology rather than norms, Waller does attempt to 
systematically apply the viral metaphor in order to explain features of the law. 
Starting from some basic principles of  epidemiology, he proposes:
These principles can be distilled into two working hy-
potheses to measure the relative success or failure of 
the spread of the Chicago School virus  between areas 
of the law and between legal jurisdictions.  First, the 
more densely packed the field, the greater the likeli-
hood of deep impact.  The more diffuse a popula-
tion, the less chance of dramatic effect.  Second, a 
virus or ideology spread among a population that has 
a robust ideological immune system has less chance of 
lasting impact than a virus spread among a popula-
tion with no pre-existing ideological immune system 
or one that is actually favorable to the new way of 
thinking.94
Waller concludes  that the law and economics ideology has infected Ameri-
can anti-trust law because that field is both centralized and lacking “…a suffi-
ciently robust set of competing first principles”.95   Conversely, consumer protec-
tion law is too decentralized for a single coherent ideology to take hold,96 and fam-
ily law is  both decentralized and imbued with a “core enduring principle” in the 
form of the “best interests of the child”.97   As  predicted then, the law and eco-
nomics virus hasn’t taken hold in these latter fields.
One weakness of Waller’s approach is  that he does not provide a justifica-
tion for selecting which  principles  of epidemiology he mobilizes in generating his 
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hypotheses.  Indeed, he does not appear to have made an extended effort to map 
concepts of epidemiology onto analogous legal phenomena.  As  I argue in the 
next section, such mapping is a crucial step in going beyond metaphor and gener-
ating a theoretical model.
Furthermore, insofar as there is a mapping of his two concepts, its details 
are  either left unstated or, what’s worse, the mapping is  incoherent.  For instance, 
it is  unclear what exactly gets infected by the law and economics virus.  Waller 
variously claims that what are infected are bodies of law, fields  of law, legal juris-
dictions,98 university faculties,99 disciplines,100  institutions,101  enforcement agenci-
es,102 and people.103
There is also no real argument for why centralization of a legal field is 
analogous to the density of a population, other than that, ceteris paribus, a central-
ized body of law is  easier to imbue with a legal ideology or doctrine.  But the viral 
metaphor is  not needed to make this claim.  Indeed, as  Waller himself points out, 
public choice theory makes  similar predictions regarding the relationship between 
centralization and agency capture.104   Similarly, we are left without an exposition 
112
98 Used, apparently, interchangeably.  See, e.g., Ibid. at 16.
99 Ibid. at 18.
100 Ibid. at 18.
101 Ibid. at 20.
102 Ibid. at 21.
103 Ibid. at 20.
104 Ibid. at 11.
of the precise nature of the alleged similarity between pre-existing ideologies in a 
body of law (or jurisdiction, or institution, or whatever entity susceptible to infec-
tion) and antibodies.  Waller does claim that “…a strong commitment to a pre-
existing competing ideology or deep attachment to a differing first principle (par-
ticularly if deontological in nature) will render a body of law or legal jurisdiction 
more immune to the introduction of new legal ideology, all other things  being 
equal,” but this  is  just a truism of human psychology; not a novel hypothesis gen-
erated by the viral metaphor.
In his conclusion, Waller claims that his use of the viral metaphor can be 
generalized:
There is nothing about this approach that should be 
limited to either the Chicago School, Law and Eco-
nomics more generally, or the specific fields of law 
used as illustrations.  Like any scientific hypothesis, 
the results and predictions of this approach should be 
tested and replicated if possible in connection with 
other ideologies and fields of law.  In particular, 
closely related areas of law, such as securities regula-
tion and corporate law, contracts and commercial 
law, or environmental law and land use can be exam-
ined to see if centralization and the presence of a 
competing counter ideology help explain which fields 
have more broadly embraced the Chicago School 
and which have not.  Similarly, more studies of com-
parative law can reveal the paths through which legal 
ideologies spread globally and where they meet 
resistance.105
Perhaps Waller’s findings can be replicated, but it isn’t obvious that this 
would be through an extension of the viral metaphor.  What he proposes is  that 
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other empirical case studies  may confirm his twin hypotheses: (1) that centraliza-
tion increases the chance of adoption of a legal ideology or doctrine and (2) that a 
strong pre-existing ideology or doctrine decreases this chance.  Even if we grant 
that the viral metaphor may have been useful in formulating these hypotheses (de-
spite the absence of detailed argument to this effect), it could be entirely jettisoned 
in future studies without calling them into question.  In other words, it is unclear 
what work the viral metaphor would be performing, other than the rhetorical role 
that I have identified it plays elsewhere.
To resume: Waller’s  paper is the most systematic attempt to apply the viral 
metaphor to legal phenomena, but it suffers from several drawbacks.  First, it is  not 
systematic enough or incoherent, or both.  Second, to the extent that Waller pro-
poses and tests particular hypotheses subject to confirmation or refutation else-
where, they are not clearly the result of  the viral metaphor. 
3.4.1. Memetics and the Law
In addition to Waller’s work on the viral metaphor, there is small literature that 
attempts to apply memetics to law.  Some of this literature has  taken up Derek 
Gatherer’s call to abandon the thought contagion metaphor,106  and is therefore 
not directly relevant to this review of the application of the viral metaphor to the 
analysis of legal phenomena.107  Another approach is to use the theory of memet-
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107  Oliver Goodenough,  “Cultural Replication Theory and Law” (2001) 1:3 Gruter Institute Working 
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ics as the basis for rethinking those areas of law that govern the spread of ideas.108 
Even if the ideas as virus metaphor is retained in such a context, this work is not 
relevant to the question of  the transmission of  legal norms.
One article, however, that does make a serious attempt to apply memetics to 
legal phenomena is Michael S. Fried’s “The Evolution of Legal Concepts: the 
Memetic Perspective”.109
Though Fried (like others) has abandoned the thought contagion metaphor 
and focuses exclusively on Darwinian fitness,110  his insights  into why legal phe-
nomena may be particularly well suited to memetic analysis are also relevant to an 
attempt to systematize the viral metaphor.  Fried notes  that there are three general 
difficulties with memetic analysis: (1) that memes are difficult to define – or at least 
more difficult to define than genes are – making “…memetics  somewhat less  ame-
nable to study and measurement than genetics”, (2) that the mechanisms often 
cited as responsible for the replication of memes do not guarantee a sufficient level 
of copying fidelity, and (3) that tracing the lines of descent of memes is  extremely 
difficult.111   Fried then claims that legal memes have some peculiar features that 
are shared by few, if  any, other collections of  memes, and thus:
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These problems constitute significant hurdles for any 
general theory of memetics.  Nonetheless, when one 
restricts attention to memes that occur within the le-
gal system, these concerns are greatly reduced.  Thus, 
while this  Article primarily addresses the benefits that 
memetics has to offer the law, it seems that the law 
also has a great deal to offer the science of 
memetics.112
According to Fried, the features of legal memes (described as “rules  of law, 
precedents, and legal doctrines”)113  that make them so amenable to memetic 
analysis are that they are invariably recorded in reporters that are referenced ac-
cording to a standardized citation form.  Thus legal memes can be accurately 
identified and their spread traced in ways that other memes can’t.  Furthermore, 
standardized citation mechanisms ensure greater copying fidelity than other forms 
of meme transmission.  Consequently, Fried argues, legal memes can be subjected 
to quantitative analysis through citation counting.114
That jurisprudence can be quantitatively analysed by using citations  as a 
proxy for some other phenomenon is not a novel idea.115   What is  novel about 
Fried’s  approach is the phenomenon for which he uses the citations  as  a proxy. 
Orthodox jurimetric analysis  seeks to find out something about courts through 
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analysis of their deployment of citations.  Thus, for example, a high number of 
citations  to minority opinions could indicate a divided or “fractured” court,116 and 
a high proportion of citations to decisions from a foreign jurisdiction could indi-
cate a lack of legal autonomy.117  But Fried proposes that citations can be used as a 
proxy for measuring the fitness  of legal memes.  That is, citation density and fre-
quency is evidence of replication and thus reproductive success.  In evolutionary 
biology (for Dawkins), individuals  can be seen as simply vessels  for their genes; in 
memetics, “a scholar is just a library’s way of making another library”118; in legal 
evolution, a court is just a citation’s way of  making another citation!
Note that, despite his iconoclastic take on the role of courts in decision-
making, Fried is  essentially within what pluralists  call the ideology of modernity.119 
Whatever legal memes are, Fried assumes that they propagate within an ecosystem 
of official state institutions explicitly engaged in rulemaking.  Conversely, the 
stronger one’s commitment to legal pluralism, the smaller a role standardized cita-
tions in official law reports  play.  Thus, Fried’s claim that legal memes have “a 
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119 See text accompanying note 18.
great deal to offer the science of memetics” appears to depend on a monist 
perspective.120
I will return to this tension between a pluralist perspective and the use of 
official law reports as  a source of data in Chapter 4.  For now, what should be re-
tained is that the very features of what Fried calls legal memes that allow for them 
to be analyzed quantitatively will prove useful in modelling the epidemic spread of 
legal norms. 
4. Theoretical Basis: Metaphors and Models in Legal Theory
Thus far, I have maintained that the viral metaphor can be extended into a model. 
In this  section, I will defend the theoretical basis of  this project.  Often when we 
come across a metaphor about the law, it is simply a rhetorical device; a convinc-
ing or memorable way to make a point that could be made otherwise.  At least 
sometimes, however, the use of metaphor in the analysis  of the law goes beyond a 
clever turn of phrase.  The purpose of this section is to interrogate just such cases. 
In the first subsection I draw some distinctions that clarify some of the different 
ways we can think about metaphor and the law.  The second subsection is  aimed 
at identifying a working theory of the role of metaphors – and their more system-
atic cousins, models – in legal theory.
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4.1. Four Relationships Between Metaphor and Law
The rubric “metaphor and the law” as a field of inquiry covers a multiplicity of 
phenomena.  Upon reflection, we can see that there are at least four different ways 
in which we might be interested in the relationship between metaphors and law.  
First, we might look at what could be called “legal metaphors.”  The object 
of interest would be how the law figures as a metaphor in non-legal texts.  For ex-
ample, Shakespeare’s  Sonnet" 46 is structured as litigation between the author’s 
heart and his  eye, complete with pleadings and verdict.121   Another example is 
Kant’s  claim that the Critique of Pure Reason, is a “tribunal” that will apply the laws 
of reason and make it “secure in its  rightful claims.”122  From this perspective, the 
objects of study include metaphor itself as  a literary device, as  well as the ways in 
which the symbolism of the law frames our thoughts about any number of sub-
jects, from love to reason.
Second, we may take an interest in metaphors in law, that is, how meta-
phors are used to illustrate points within legal texts.  Here, the study of metaphor 
is subsumed under a larger category of analysis: the use of rhetoric in legal rea-
soning. From this perspective, legal texts are a “literary genre”123 and metaphor is 
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one technique – among others – that the author uses  to “discharge the… persua-
sive burden.”124   Consider, for example, Viscount Sankey’s famous remark in 
Woolmington v. DPP:
Throughout the web of the English Criminal Law 
one golden thread is always to be seen, that it is the 
duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner's guilt 
subject to what I have already said as  to the defence 
of insanity and subject also to any statutory 
exception.125
The metaphor of a “golden thread” running through the “web” of the law 
convincingly illustrates the point that a single principle unites the disparate norms 
of the common law in criminal matters.  Furthermore, the metaphor functions to 
restrict subsequent judicial interpretations by framing later analysis.  A later 
judgement that denied the claim that in criminal matters  the Crown must prove 
the requisite mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt would have to admit that it was 
thereby “severing” the “single golden thread.”
Conversely, a metaphor may be used rhetorically to allow for expansive in-
terpretation.  For instance Viscount Sankey (who clearly had a penchant for a 
clever turn of phrase) supplied Canadian constitutional law with the principle that 
the Constitution should be given a “large and liberal interpretation” by stating 
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that: “[t]he British North  America Act  planted in Canada a living tree capable of 
growth and expansion within its natural limits.”126
A third relationship between metaphor and law that may be of interest 
could be called metaphors of law.  The inquiry here focuses on how legal reasoning 
itself is metaphorical and how the very concepts and categories of the law are shot 
through with metaphors.  This approach can be distinguished from the analysis of 
metaphors in law in so far as metaphor is taken not just as a rhetorical trope that 
helps  makes a legal point persuasive but as  a constitutive element of the law.127 
This  perspective draws from cognitive science, to which we owe “cognitive meta-
phor theory”.  The fundamental thesis of cognitive metaphor theory can be stated 
as follows:
This  theory reconstructs the foundation in which 
metaphor was seen as merely literary or rhetorical in 
contrast with the “real” literal and scientific world. 
In cognitive theory, metaphor is not only a way of 
seeing or saying; it is a way of thinking and knowing, 
the method by which we structure and reason, and it 
is fundamental, not ornamental.128
In contrast to metaphors  in law, metaphors of law are not concepts  that are 
metaphorically stated for rhetorical reasons, but metaphorical concepts.  For in-
stance, the notion of “standing” is defined as “[a] party's right to make a legal claim 
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or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right.”129  Derived from the Latin locus 
standi  (literally “place of standing”), the concept appeals  to the image of standing 
up before the tribunal.  A whole complex of metaphors in English relate this im-
age of physical presence by standing to the vindication of a right or claim (“stand 
up and be heard”, “I won’t stand for it”, “stand one’s ground”, etc.).130  Unlike Vis-
count Sankey’s “single golden thread” or “living tree” the metaphor of “standing” 
is not a persuasive way to describe a legal concept; it is the legal concept.131
Finally – and most importantly, for my purposes  – there are metaphors 
about the law.  A metaphor about the law is a way of making claims regarding law 
(or a part of the law) as a"phenomenon per"se.  Consider the following well-known 
passage from the preface to Marx’s Contribution to the Critique of  Political Economy:
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of degree.   On this  view, metaphors of law are simply those metaphors in law that have been so often 
repeated that they have “died.”  Though my personal view is that the cognitivist approach describes 
something deeper and epistemologically more important than the passage from “live” to “dead” meta-
phors, I am not prepared to defend this intuition here.   For a critical discussion of the notion of “dead 
metaphor” see George Lakoff, “The Death of Dead Metaphor” (1987) 2:2 Metaphor and Symbolic 
Activity 143.  See also Max Black “Metaphor” in Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press,  1962) 25 at 32-34 (describing the view that dead metaphors are a 
species of catachresis, i.e. “the use of a word to remedy a gap in the vocabulary”).   I do not propose that 
the four ways I have divided the analysis of the relationship between metaphor and law is anything 
other than a heuristic device.
In the social production of their existence, men inevi-
tably enter into definite relations, which are inde-
pendent of their will, namely relations of production 
appropriate to a given stage in the development of 
their material forces of production. The totality of these 
relations of production constitutes the economic structure of 
society, the real  foundation, on which arises a legal and political 
superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social 
consciousness.132
Marx’s  architectural metaphor has all the rhetorical advantages  of the literary 
trope; it uses a simple and concrete image to convey a complex and abstract claim. 
But it is more than just a persuasive way of stating what could easily be stated lit-
erally.  The metaphor of foundation and superstructure makes a substantive claim 
about the law.  Marx posits  an ontology of the law: the legal and the political are 
not like a superstructure, they are a superstructure.  We can thus say that the meta-
phor does not merely fulfill an aesthetic function, but also an epistemic one in so 
far as it serves to generate knowledge about the world.
From Marx’s simple metaphor, a large number of conclusions can be 
drawn about the law.  Whether we (metaphorically!) describe the metaphor as a 
framework, a lens or a map,133 it serves to organize our experience by highlighting 
some features of the world while overlooking others.134  Furthermore, this  organiz-
ing function allows us to compare, contrast and order empirical observations 
about the law using the metaphor as a standard.  For example, we might notice 
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132 Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977) at 21 
(italics mine).
133 Berger, supra note 128 at 169-70.
134 Black, “Metaphor”, supra note 131 at 41-42 (arguing that we “see through” metaphors).
that freedom of contract is  an important principle of most modern legal systems. 
From this observation, we can ask what features of the economic base correspond 
to or determine this feature of the legal superstructure.  We can then go on to ask 
whether these features are also related to other features of the same legal system, 
for instance the law of successions.135  In other words, Marx’s metaphor provides 
us  with an elementary model for understanding the law.  It is  this relationship be-
tween metaphors about the law and models of law that I want to explore in the 
following subsection.
4.2. Metaphors and Models: What They Mean and What They Do
While there is a substantial literature on (what I have called) legal metaphors, 
metaphors in law and metaphors of law, there is little published research that 
theorizes metaphors about  law.136   This is not to say that theorists  do not make 
abundant use of metaphors in thinking about the law; legal theory is  rife with 
metaphor.137   Typically, however, metaphor is  mobilized without an explicit de-
fence of its  use.  In the few works  that do defend the use of metaphor, the defence 
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135 A large body of Marxist legal theory is concerned with exactly this  type of question.  See e.g. Evgeny 
B. Pashukanis, “The General Theory of Law and Marxism” in P. Beirne & R. Sharlet (eds.) Pashukanis: 
Selected Writings on Marxism and Law, trans.  P. B. Maggs (London: Academic Press, 1980 [1924]); Karl 
Renner, The Institutions of Private Law and Their Social Functions,  trans. A. Schwartzchild (London: Rout-
ledge, 1979 [1949]).
136  Two exceptions  are Macdonald, “Metaphors of Norm Migration”,  supra note 88, and Bernard J. 
Hibbitts, “ Making Sense of Metaphors:  Visuality, Aurality, and the Reconfiguration of American Le-
gal Discourse” (1995) 16 Cardozo L. Rev. 229.
137  To cite just two “classics” consider: Thomas Hobbes,  Leviathan (London: Penguin Books, 1968 (the 
metaphor of a commonwealth being a person); Hart, The Concept of Law, supra note 14 (the metaphor of 
law having an open texture).
is based either (a) on a general claim that metaphors are important to thought,138 
or (b) on a claim that law is an inherently discursive phenomenon.139  Whereas (a) 
is true, it is not particularly satisfying as a defence of methodology.  On the other 
hand, (b) constitutes essentially a category mistake.  It is a non sequitur to claim that 
since some X has a property Y that a theory of X should also have property Y.  A 
theory of duck behaviour may claim that ducks quack, but it would be absurd to 
claim that therefore a theory of  duck behaviour quacks!
This  does not mean, however, that we are without any resources  for think-
ing about the role of metaphor in legal theory.  Significant work has  been done on 
the analysis of metaphor generally and on the relationship between metaphors 
and models in particular.  In the remainder of this subsection I provide a brief 
overview of the state of (some aspects of) metaphor theory, ultimately arguing that 
metaphors are best understood as a kind of speech act.  Drawing primarily on the 
work of the philosopher Max Black, I will then provide a sketch of the relationship 
between metaphors and models, paying particular attention to their role in legal 
theory.
The standard view of metaphor is  that it involves the transfer of a term 
from the object to which it designates to another object that it designates by anal-
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138 See e.g. Jean-Guy Belley, “Une métaphor chimique pour le droit” in Le droit soluble, Contributions québé-
coises à l’étude de l’internormativité (Paris: LGDJ, 1996) 7-20.
139 See e.g. White, supra note 124 at 2.
ogy or comparison.140  According to this “comparison view”, which is attributed to 
Aristotle,141 a metaphor is essentially an ellipsis of a simile.142  Thus, Marx’s meta-
phor cited above would be a gloss of (something like): “the economic is like a foun-
dation; the political and the legal are like a superstructure; and furthermore the 
relationship between the political, legal, and economic is  like the relationship be-
tween a foundation and a superstructure.” 
The comparison view suffers from several problems, the most serious of 
which is its  vacuity.  To gloss  “the law is a superstructure” as “the law is  like a su-
perstructure” tells us nothing about the relation of similarity between the two.  For 
the metaphor to have meaning requires us  to know in what respects the law is  like a 
superstructure.  Thus the gloss would have to be something like: “the law has some 
set of properties (P1, P2 … Pn) and it is like a superstructure in that superstructures 
also have that set of  properties.”  But this gloss demonstrates the vacuity of the 
comparison view as a theory of metaphor meaning since whatever set of proper-
ties that the law shares with a superstructure is not contained in the metaphor, but 
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140  This  is  consonant with the philology of the word “metaphor”, which derives from the Greek meta-
phor! – “transfer.”
141 See Aristotle, The Poetics, in The Rhetoric and The Poetics of Aristotle,  trans.  Ingram Bywater (New York: 
Random House, 1954) 223-24 (7457b lines 8-11) (“[m]etaphor consists in giving the thing a name that 
belongs to something else; the transference being either from genus to species,  or from species to genus, 
or from species to species, or on grounds of  analogy). 
142 See e.g. John R. Searle, “Metaphor” in Andrew Ortony, ed., Metaphor and Thought (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press,  1979) 92-123 at 105 and ff. (describing “…the comparison theory… goes back 
to Aristotle… [and] says  all metaphor is really a literal simile with the “like” or “‘as” deleted”); Black, 
“Metaphor”, supra note 131 at 35 and ff. (stating that this view of metaphor, as condensed simile or 
comparison, has been very popular).  See also, Donald Davidson,  “What Metaphors  Mean” in Aloysius 
P. Martinich, The Philosophy of  Language, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) 415 at 419-21.
requires the interpreter to supply them.143   Furthermore, the metaphor provides 
no guidance, in principle, for what set of properties should be used as comprising 
the similarity relation, since, as one critic put it: “everything is like everything, and 
in endless ways.”144 
Some philosophers have attempted to retain a theory of metaphor based 
on metaphor meaning, either by rehabilitating the comparison view145 or by pro-
posing another theory of meaning.146  A more promising approach – in my view – 
is to refocus  the analysis of metaphor from what metaphors mean to what meta-
phors do; that is, to analyse the pragmatics of  metaphor.
! Pragmatics is  that part of linguistic theory which focuses on what words  do, 
rather than what they mean.  Thus “[a] pragmatic treatment of a feature of the 
use of a language would explain the feature in terms of general principles govern-
ing appropriate utterance, rather than in terms of  a semantic rule.”147  
Typical cases of utterances that are not satisfactorily accounted for by se-
mantic rules but which are readily explained by pragmatics include orders, threats 
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143 Davidson, ibid. at 416-17.
144 Ibid. at 423.
145  See e.g. Andrew Ortony, “The Role of Similarity in Similes and Metaphors” in Ortony, supra note 
142, 186. 
146 See e.g. Black, “Metaphor”, supra note 131 (proposing an “interactive” view of metaphor that aban-
dons  the comparison view but maintains the centrality of metaphorical meaning).  See also, Max Black 
“More on Metaphor” in Ortony, Metaphor and Thought, supra note 142, 19 (further fleshing out the inter-
active view).
147  Simon Blackburn, Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press,  1996) s.v. “prag-
matics”.
and promises.  Some philosophers, have suggested that metaphor should be added 
to this list.148  Donald Davidson states this  view – which we can call “the speech 
act theory of  metaphor” – in its strongest form:
No theory of metaphorical meaning or metaphorical 
truth can help explain how metaphor works.  Meta-
phor runs on the same familiar linguistic tracks that 
the plainest sentences do… What distinguishes  meta-
phor is not meaning but use – in this it is like asser-
tion, hinting, lying, promising or criticizing.  And the 
special use to which we put language in metaphor is 
not – cannot be – to “say something” special, no mat-
ter how indirectly.  For a metaphor says only what 
shows on its face…149
Note that this approach need not do violence to our common-sense intui-
tions about metaphor.  Certainly, one of the things metaphors do (and perhaps 
what they do best) is to invite the hearer150 to make comparisons.  Perhaps the best 
way to think about this is to say that the utterer of a metaphor is posing a hypothe-
sis.  This  hypothesis can lead the hearer to see things differently, to notice relation-
ships, analogies and similarities, etc.  The metaphor doesn’t do this by bearing 
some special metaphorical meaning, but precisely because of its  literal meaning. 
The fact that the utterance would be defective if interpreted literally acts as an in-
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148  See e.g. Davidson, supra note 142; Searle, supra note 142; Jerry L. Morgan, “Observations on the 
Pragmatics of  Metaphor” in Ortony, Metaphor and Thought, supra note 142, 136.
149  Davidson, ibid. at 423.  John Searle makes a nearly identical point in supra note 142 at 100 (“…
strictly speaking, in metaphor there is never a change of  meaning…”).
150  In this section I use the standard terminology of pragmatics,  including “speaker,” “hearer,” and 
“utterance.”  Of  course this also applies to written metaphors.
dicator to the hearer that she should embark upon such an interpretative 
exercise.151
Another advantage of the speech-act theory of metaphor is that, in jetti-
soning the search for a the literal meaning that can be inferred by “correctly” 
glossing metaphorical meaning, it allows for the open-ended nature of metaphor. 
If metaphors are just elliptical similes and similes are just comparisons waiting to 
be translated by the mapping of the correct set of shared properties, then meta-
phors have no particular creative role to play.  And yet metaphors do play such a 
role, as Max Black explains: 
A memorable metaphor has the power to bring two 
separate domains into cognitive and emotional rela-
tion by using language directly appropriate to the one 
as a lens for seeing the other; the implications, sugges-
tions, and supporting values  entwined with the literal 
use of the metaphorical expression enable us to see a 
new subject matter in a new way.  The extended 
meanings  that result, the relations between initially 
disparate realms created, can neither be antecedently 
predicted nor subsequently paraphrased in prose.  We 
can comment upon  the metaphor, but the metaphor 
itself neither needs nor invites explanation and para-
phrase.  Metaphorical thought is  a distinctive mode of 
achieving insight, not to be construed as an ornamen-
tal substitute for plain thought.152
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151 For instance because if understood literally the utterance would be patently absurd, obviously false, 
or trivially true.  See Davidson, supra note 142 at 422-23.  See also Searle, supra note 142 at 114.
152 Max Black, “Models and Archetypes” in Black, Metaphors and Models, supra note 131, 219 at 237.
It is arguably this creative role that distinguishes metaphor from other speech-acts 
that rely upon hearer recognition of defectiveness as  interpretative indicators  (such 
as irony).153
Though the speech-act theory of metaphor provides a more satisfying ex-
planation for metaphor than the comparison theory, it does not clearly account for 
metaphors of law like Marx’s base/superstructure description.  On the speech-act 
view, Marx’s metaphor needn’t be glossed in order to discover an elliptical simile 
that will reveal the literal meaning for which the metaphor is  a substitute.  But if 
the “implications, suggestions, and supporting values” that the base/
superstructure metaphor conjures are to genuinely provide a “distinctive insight”, 
then something more systematic is required.  Marx’s  metaphor functions as a 
model.
Models and metaphors  appear to work in a similar fashion.  In both cases, 
insight is achieved by the projection of a phenomenon or set of phenomena onto 
another.  But how does this projection function?  As I proposed above, we can say 
that a metaphor proposes a hypothesis  to the hearer, who then interprets  its literal 
meaning to see a new subject matter in a new way.  This is achieved by the projec-
tion of the complex of “implications, suggestions, and supporting values” beyond 
the literal meaning of the utterance.  Following Max Black, I think a similar phe-
nomenon is at work in the construction of models, with the primary difference be-
ing their systematic nature. 
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153 See Searle, supra note 142 at 120-21.
In the case of a scale model (of an airplane, for example), the relationship 
between the modelled object and the model is one of isomorphism.  Two objects 
are isomorphic – from Greek “isos” (equal) and “morph"” (form) – when they are 
identical in form and proportion, though not necessarily size.  Similarly, in 
mathematical logic, two logical languages are isomorphic when all the possible 
statements in one language have an equivalent in the second.  When two lan-
guages are isomorphic, we say that the second language models the first.154
In a general sense, isomorphism also characterizes theoretical models.155 
We can say that X models Y in so far as the structure of X is reproduced in Y.  Of 
particular interest is the structure of inference or of implication.156  This allows us 
to “move” from a (relatively) well-known domain to a (relatively) unknown one. 
Thus, if X is some phenomenon about which we know that whenever it has prop-
erty a it also has property b, then if  Y is a model of X and we know that Y has 
property a, we can hypothesize that Y also has property b.
How can this conception of a model be applied to theories  of law?  And 
what is  the relationship to metaphor?  An example is in order.  Throughout this 
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154  This is  what is  often called “classical model theory” in mathematical logic.  It is  the basis of 
Goëdel’s proof of the completeness theorem, in which he proved that no additional inference rules are 
required to prove all the logically valid formulas in a deductive system of first-order predicate calculus 
– i.e. first-order predicate calculus is “complete.”  For a simpler proof of the same theorem, see Leon 
Henkin,”The Completeness of the First-Order Functional Calculus” (1949) 14 Journal of Symbolic 
Logic 159.  On model theory in general, see Alain Badiou, Le concept de modèle, 2nd ed. (Paris: Fayard, 
2007).  For a discussion of model theory and law, see William H. Widen, “Forcing Analogies in Law: 
Badiou, Set Theory and Models” (2009) 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 2407.
155 Black, “Models and Archetypes”, supra note 152 at 222.
156 Ibid. at 223 (“The analogue shares with its original not a set of features or an identical proportional-
ity of  magnitudes but, more abstractly, the same structure or pattern of  relationships.”)
thesis, I have been defending the claim that, in some cases, legal norm transmis-
sion is viral.  This is clearly a metaphor; legal norms are no more viruses than 
ogres are onions.  But it also suggests that some of the features of  virus transmis-
sion (a field about which there is a significant amount of detailed knowledge) are 
also features of unintentional norm transmission (a field about which we know 
very little): “[e]very metaphor is the tip of a submerged model.”157   Of course, a 
substantial amount of work needs to be done before the metaphor becomes a 
model.  Max Black describes the difference between the two as follows:
Use of theoretical models resembles the use of meta-
phors in requiring analogical transfer of a vocabulary. 
Metaphor and model-making reveal new relation-
ships; both are attempts to pour new content into old 
bottles.  But a metaphor operates largely with com-
monplace implications.  You need only proverbial 
knowledge, as it were, to have your metaphor under-
stood; but the maker of a scientific model must have 
prior control of a well-knit scientific theory if he is to 
do more than hang an attractive picture on an alge-
braic formula.  Systematic complexity of the source 
of the model and capacity for analogical develop-
ment are of  the essence.158
One of my central claims is  that the metaphor “law is  a virus,” which is 
based on the “proverbial knowledge” that viruses are self-replicating organisms 
that spread across a host population through a process of infection, can be trans-
formed into a model.  What is required is (a) a deeper understanding of the vari-
ous entities and relationships  that constitute epidemiology, and (b) “projection” of 
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157 Black, “More on Metaphor”, supra note 146 at 31.
158 Black, “Models and Archetypes”, supra note 152 at 239 [emphasis in original].
these entities and relationships onto empirical observations of legal norm trans-
mission.  This is precisely what I propose in Chapters 3 and 4.
Some provisos apply to this sketch of a methodology of moving from 
metaphor to model.  First, it must be admitted that the process of projection im-
plies a choice.  Just as metaphors do not have a single meaning just waiting to be 
translated into literal speech, the different domains of knowledge related by a 
model do not have a single set of mapping or translating functions just waiting to 
be discovered.         Every model carries with it “…risks of fallacious inferences 
from inevitable irrelevancies…”159   Second, just as  a metaphor proposes a hy-
pothesis to the interpreter, so a model proposes a set of hypotheses about the tar-
get domain.  These hypotheses must still be tested.  In other words, a model is  a 
methodology of hypothesis generation that allows us to “see connections” that 
would otherwise be overlooked;160  it is not  a methodology of hypothesis verifica-
tion.  Finally, in choosing to extend a metaphor to a model, one must be prepared 
to run the risk that the expected isomorphism does not reveal itself.  Not every 
secondary domain “fits” the domain on which we would like to model it.161
4.3. Concluding Remarks on Metaphors and Models
Legal scholars who venture beyond the doctrinal exposition and analysis of “black 
letter law” tend to think of themselves  as engaging in some form of social science 
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159 Ibid. at 223.
160 Ibid. at 237.
161 Ibid. at 238. 
or philosophy.  As such, we tend to view metaphors with some suspicion.  After all, 
metaphors are the realm of literature and rhetoric; reliance upon them to do sub-
stantive intellectual work smacks of methodological sloppiness.  Models, on the 
other hand, have the ring of rigour, and most of us would readily admit to using 
them – if  only we could figure out what they were.
What I hope to have shown in this section is that metaphors and models 
are related phenomena.  Furthermore, there is no need to look askance at meta-
phor, which can be a powerful methodological tool for generating models.  Finally, 
there is nothing mysterious about models.  Properly understood, they can be useful 
in generating new hypotheses about legal phenomena.
5. Conclusion
In this chapter I situated the metaphor of viral spread within the context of other 
explanations of norm transmission in legal theory.  My primary argument in this 
regard was that a viral account is  better suited to explaining unintentional norm 
transmission than the competing metaphors of  transplant and harmonization.
Having established the essentially metaphorical nature of existing explana-
tions of norm transmission as well as the viral account, I advanced that metaphors 
about law are both ubiquitous and under-theorized.  I then argued that systema-
tizing metaphors into models may generate new hypotheses  about legal phenom-
ena.
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We will now embark upon the process of refining and systematizing the vi-
ral metaphor into an epidemiological model.  First, in Chapter 3, I provide an in-
troduction to the base domain of epidemiology.  Then, in Chapter 4, I describe 
the mapping function whereby the concepts of epidemiology can be transposed to 
the legal field.
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Introduction
Part of the initial persuasiveness of the viral spread metaphor is the result of a 
subtle conflation of the base domains of epidemiology and virology.1  On one 
hand, the virus metaphor calls to mind the propagation of a pathology across a 
population, with the virus serving as the proximate cause of the symptoms.  Here 
the base domain of the metaphor is  epidemiology, and the metaphor would be 
perfectly adequate if other forms of infection and contagion were proposed, pri-
ons or bacteria for instance.2 But the virus metaphor also calls to mind the hijack-
ing of a host organism’s  cellular machinery in order to replicate and propagate 
itself.  Here the base domain of  the metaphor is virology.3
There is  certainly nothing wrong with a metaphor that calls upon two base 
domains.  If –"as I argued in Chapter 2 – a metaphor is  essentially a hypothesis 
that invites the hearer to attend to relationships, analogies and similarities, then 
one that draws upon two base domains is likely to be particularly rich.  However, if 
we want to refine the metaphor into a model, then we must pay strict attention to 
the claims of isomorphism that are made between base domains and the secon-
dary domain.   This is further complicated by the fact that the concepts of one 
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1 Dawkins is particularly guilty of  this, see Chapter 2, note 80 supra.
2 Robert Aunger proposes the prion as  a base domain for the meme in “Culture vultures” (1999) 39:5 
Sciences  36.  Mark Jeffreys rejects prions as a base domain on the grounds that “...prions offer only an 
impoverished and limited sort of replication, hardly an adequate analogy for the magnificent complex-
ity of cultural evolution” (“The Meme Metaphor” (2000) 43:2 Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 
227 at 229).
3 See e.g. James M. Chen & Gil Grantmore, “The Phages of American Law” (2003) 36 U.C. Davis  L. 
Rev. 455.
base domain may be used in the other.  If a concept from one base domain is 
mapped onto the secondary domain, then this does not immediately authorize one 
to draw conclusions on the basis of implications derived from the second base 
domain, which may also use the concept.  For instance, in virology, virulence is 
defined as “[t]he capacity of a virus… to produce disease in a host...”4 but viru-
lence is also an important factor in the epidemiology of viral infections.5  If I want 
to make a claim about the virulence of a legal norm, then I need to be explicit 
about which base domain I am drawing from and to be careful not to draw con-
clusions implied by a second base domain.  With this in mind, I will draw solely on 
epidemiology in constructing a model of  norm transmission.
The reason for this narrowing of the base domain is  precisely to  avoid the 
kind of conflation that I described.  As  I argued in Chapter 2, such conflation (not 
only between epidemiology and virology, but also between these base domains and 
that of evolution) is one of the causes of incoherence in social contagion theories. 
Though it is possible in principle to build a model using two base domains, it raises 
serious problems of feasibility, notably by adding an order of complexity to the 
model.  It may be the case that virology and epidemiology could be used simulta-
neously as base domains without contradiction, but there is  nothing necessary 
about this.  A more prudent approach is to attempt to create an epidemiological 
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4 Kennet L. Tyler & Bernard N. Fields “Pathogenesis of Viral Infections” in Bernard N. Fields  et al., 
Fundamental Virology, 2nd ed. (New York: Raven, 1991) 191 at 191.
5 The rate of spread of viruses that propagate by host-to-host transmission will depend in large part on 
their virulence if their transmission requires the spreading host to exhibit symptoms (e.g., sneezing, 
sores, coughing, etc.
model and a viral model and then to see if  they can be fruitfully integrated.  Such 
an endeavour would go well beyond the scope of this thesis.  Instead, I propose to 
use epidemiology as my exclusive base domain.  I chose epidemiology rather than 
virology because the former captures my initial intuition that norms are in some 
sense contagious and that they can spread.  If this model proves  defensible and 
useful, then later work can build upon it and one of the options would be to inte-
grate virological concepts.
In this chapter I provide an overview of the field of epidemiology, concen-
trating on key concepts that may prove useful in an epidemiological model of 
norm spread.  One of the points  on which I shall insist is that one’s conception of 
several core concepts in epidemiology will depend on one’s research objectives. 
This  overview of epidemiology will allow me to proceed, in Chapter 4, with the 
mapping of  several of  its key concepts onto the domain of  law.
1. Epidemiology and Epidemic Theory
Epidemiology is conventionally defined as the study of the distribution of disease.6 
It is thus distinct from other fields of research into human health, as  it is “…pri-
marily concerned with disease and health hazards in populations and not 
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6 From Greek “epi”,  “d!mos” and “logos” we can say that epidemiology is a discourse relating that which 
is “upon” the people.
individuals.”7 However, this definition is somewhat narrow and actually only cov-
ers a subset of phenomena that might be of interest to epidemiologists.  This sub-
set is  limited by the concept of disease and thus is more properly termed 
“epidemiopathology”.8 Even if we leave aside the problems inherent in determin-
ing what constitutes a pathology,9 limiting the field of epidemiology to the study of 
disease distribution is  difficult to defend on principled grounds.  The concepts, 
methods, and reasoning of epidemiology are applicable to many obviously non-
pathological phenomena that may be distributed across  a population.  For exam-
ple, there is  no principled difference between studying the incidence of clinical 
obesity (defined as a pathology) in a population and studying the distribution of 
individuals of “normal” weight.  Furthermore, epidemiology may fruitfully be 
used to study non health-related phenomena and their distribution across  a popu-
lation; voting preferences within a citizenry, for example.10  For our purposes, we 
can define epidemiology as: the study of the distribution of measurable phenomena across a 
population.  Of course, the majority of epidemiological research is in the field of 
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7 Raj S. Bhopal, Concepts of Epidemiology: An Integrated Introduction to the Ideas, Theories, Principles, and Methods 
of Epidemiology (Oxford: Oxford University Press,  2002) at 6.  See also, Abraham M. Lilienfeld & David 
E. Lilienfeld, Foundations of Epidemiology, 2nd ed.  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980) at 3 (stating 
that epidemiology is the study of “...the patterns of disease occurrence in human populations  and of 
the factors that influence these patterns.”).  This concern with populations rather than individuals is 
encapsulated by the joke according to which an epidemiologist is a physician who can count (recounted 
in Anders  Ahlbom & Staffan Norell, Introduction to Modern Epidemiology, 2nd ed.,  trans. by Gunilla Ahl-
bom (Chesnut Hill, MA: Epidemiology Resources, 1990) at i.
8 See Bhopal, ibid. at 3.
9 See generally, Georges Canguilhem, Le normal et le pathologique, 10th ed. (Paris: P.U.F., 2006).
10  See e.g. Daniel Dorling, Colin Rallings & Michael Thrasher, “The Epidemiology of the Liberal 
Democrat Vote” (1998) 17:1 Political Geography 45.
epidemiopathology and consequently much of the literature upon which I will 
draw in this chapter is concerned with disease.
If the conventional definition of epidemiology is  in one sense too narrow 
for our purposes (in that it is limited to pathology) it is also too broad in another 
sense.  I am arguing that employment drug testing norms spread; first from the 
United States to Canada and then within the Canadian jurisprudence.  Epidemi-
ology, even when restricted to the sub-field of epidemiopathology, is  not necessar-
ily concerned about the spread of disease.  Returning to the example of obesity 
studies, the epidemiologist may try to relate the geographic dispersion of obesity 
to local diet, without making any claims about the spread of obesity.11  Another 
example is the famous pair of “Whitehall studies”12 which demonstrated that so-
cial class background is a strong predictor of future health outcomes.  Evidently, 
the social class of  one’s parents is not something that is susceptible to spread.  
Furthermore, not all spread is the kind of spread that I am interested in. 
My claim is that the spread of employment testing norms is the result of contagion, 
that is, the process  by which a condition spreads  from one individual to another. 
Obesity might spread in the sense that diet patterns related thereto may be 
adopted by neighbouring populations, or populations with such diet patterns may 
migrate.  Insofar as obesity prevalence is also related to genetic predisposition, it 
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11 See generally, Frank B. Hu, Obesity Epidemiology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
12  Michael G. Marmot et al., “Employment Grade and Coronary Heart Disease in British Civil Ser-
vants” (1978) 32 J. of Epidemiology and Community Health 244; Michael G. Marmot et al.,  “Health 
Inequalities Among British Civil Servants: The Whitehall II Study” (1991) 337 Lancet 1387.
may also spread as the reproductive patterns of the population change (for in-
stance as new members, having a greater or lesser predisposition to obesity, inter-
breed with members of the pre-existing population).  Similarly, the social class 
background of a population may be observed to spread.  For instance, as a neigh-
bourhood becomes popular amongst those from a higher class  background than 
the previous population (i.e. gentrification) we may be able to observe a geographic 
shift in the distribution of the social class backgrounds population members.  In 
none of these cases, however, would we infer that obesity or social class  back-
ground were contagious – at least not in the ordinary sense that this term is used. 
This  common-sense conception of contagion will be further refined below, but for 
now we can further refine the base domain used in constructing our model to be: 
epidemiology, understood as the study of the distribution of a contagious phenomenon across a 
population.
Epidemiology is both an applied science and a theoretical body of knowl-
edge.  As an applied science, it underpins the practice of public health and is 
largely concerned with empirical questions that can be mobilized to solve real-
world problems.13 Thus, much of the epidemiological literature is  concerned with 
study design under conditions of imperfect information.  There is  also, however a 
large body of theoretical literature in epidemiology; a field that is  aptly called 
“theoretical epidemiology”.  This field is characterized by a high degree of 
mathematization.  It seeks to uncover the general principles (or “laws”) that regu-
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13 Bhopal, supra note 7 at 4-6 and 98-101; Lilienfeld & Lilienfeld, supra note 7 at 10-12.
late the distribution of phenomena across  populations, given certain parameters.14 
Within theoretical epidemiology, I will be particularly concerned with the work on 
epidemic theory, which seeks to understand and explain the spread of contagious 
phenomena across a population.
In building our model, then, we will need to cash out the notions of popu-
lation, contagion, and distribution, both in terms of how they are mobilized within 
epidemiology and how they might be adapted to apply in the case where the phe-
nomenon under investigation is legal norms.
2. Populations
Populations are not natural objects that simply exist “out there” to be studied; 
rather they are constructs that are used to understand aggregates of individuals. 
These constructs are defined in terms of the objectives of the researcher.  Thus, 
for instance, if I want to know what the prevalence15 of obesity is  among Canadi-
ans  over the age of sixteen, then my population is defined as “Canadians over the 
age of sixteen”.  In this  population, the sex  of the individual members  is a per-
sonal characteristic that might be useful to count in order to determine whether it 
is related to prevalence (i.e. whether sex is  a risk factor16 for obesity).  Yet, I could 
just as easily have the research objective of determining what the prevalence of 
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14 Lilienfeld & Lilienfeld, ibid. at 355-63.
15 Simplifying somewhat,  we can say that prevalence is  the count of all instances of the factor of inter-
est in the study population.  See Bhopal, supra note 7 at 179-188.  See also Ahlbom & Norell,  supra note 
7 at 5.
16 Risk factors are generally assumed to be causal, though they need not be, see Bhopal, ibid. at 161-67. 
Ahlbom & Norell use the term “risk indicators” (ibid. at 36-40).
obesity is among Canadian women over the age of sixteen.  My population is  then 
defined as “Canadian women over the age of sixteen” and sex becomes an ele-
ment of my population definition, rather than a property of its  members that 
could have an impact on incidence.  This process  of defining a population is called 
“drawing a population boundary”.17
Once a population boundary has been drawn, then we must make deci-
sions about who falls within it.  Using the same example, we could ask ourselves 
whether people whose sixteenth birthday occurred during the period studied 
should be considered members of the population.  Note that if decisions about 
who falls within a population generate stable criteria, then those criteria can be 
used to refine its boundary.
Defining a population is the first step in creating a “population profile”, 
which includes defining a time-period over which the population will be examined, 
counting the population members, describing their characteristics, etc.18  A well-
profiled population will allow for hypotheses to be proposed explaining the distri-
bution of  the phenomenon under investigation.
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17 Bhopal, Ibid. at 36.
18 Ibid.
Epidemic theory defines  population intensionally as a set or class of 
individuals.19  An intensional definition is  one whereby set membership is defined 
by a shared property, rather than by their enumeration.20 Thus, “P is the set of all 
legal positivists” is  an intensional definition, whereas “P={Hobbes, Bentham, Aus-
tin, Hart, etc.}” is an extensional definition.  In epidemiology, we can say that the 
shared properties that determine an individual’s membership in the population are 
defined by the population profile.  Epidemic theory, on the other hand, is  more 
concerned with populations as such  rather than any particular population.  It is 
likewise concerned with general problems of epidemics rather than any particular 
epidemic.
It was the attempt to address one of these general problems in the 1920s 
that yielded the definition of population that has since served as the foundation of 
epidemic theory.  The problem was set out in 1927 by William Kermack and An-
derson McKendrick in the following terms:
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19 In set theory – a branch of mathematical logic – a “set” is any collection of objects,  including collec-
tions whose elements  are themselves sets.   Many early set theorists, such as Gregor Cantor and Ber-
trand Russell made no distinction between “sets” and “classes”.  However, such an approach leads to 
number of paradoxes.  So-called axiomatic set theory strictly defines a “class” as a collection of sets 
definable by a single shared property and stipulates that all sets are classes but not all classes are sets (in 
which case we refer to a “proper class”).   See generally, Azriel Levy, Basic Set Theory (Berlin: Springer-
Verlag, 1979).  For the purposes  of this chapter, when I refer to a set, I mean a collection of objects and 
when I refer to class, I mean a collection of  sets.
20 See Bertrand Russell, The Principles of  Mathematics (New York: Norton, 1996) at 66-67.
One (or more) infected person is introduced into a 
community of individuals more or less susceptible to 
the disease in question.  The disease spreads from the 
affected to the unaffected by contact infection.  Each 
infected person runs through the course of his sick-
ness, and finally is  removed from the number of those 
who are sick, by recovery or by death.  The chances 
of recovery or death vary from day to day during the 
course of his illness.  The chances  that the affected 
may convey infection to the unaffected are likewise 
dependent upon the stage of the sickness.  As the 
epidemic spreads, the number of unaffected mem-
bers  of the community becomes reduced.  Since the 
course of an epidemic is short compared with the life 
of an individual, the population may be considered as 
remaining constant, except in as  far as it is modified 
by deaths  due to the epidemic disease itself.  In the 
course of time the epidemic may come to an end. 
One of the most important problems in epidemiology 
is to ascertain whether this  termination occurs  only 
when no susceptible individuals are left, or whether 
the interplay of the various features of infectivity, re-
covery and mortality, may result in termination, 
whilst many susceptible individuals are still present in 
the unaffected population.21
Due to the complexities involved in the general problem, Kermack and McKen-
drick proposed a simplified model (called the SIR model or the Kermack-
McKendrick model).22  In this model, the population is  defined as  a class N con-
taining three disjoint23  sets of individuals: susceptibles (S), infectives (I) and re-
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21 William O. Kermack & Anderson G McKendrick, “A Contribution to the Mathematical Theory of 
Epidemics” (1927) 115:772 Proc. Royal Soc. London. A. 700.
22 Kermack and McKendrick’s  model has been extremely influential and thus there are many deriva-
tions of it based on the basic categories  of susceptibles,  infectives, and removeds.  For clarity, I will refer 
to the very simple version initially proposed as the Kermick-McKendrick model.  Conversely, by SIR 
model, I mean any model that is  based on these three categories, including the more refined versions 
that add variables.
23 The sets are disjoined in that no member of  any one set is a member of  the other two.
moveds (R).24  The spread of an epidemic can thus be described in terms of the 
number of members of each set, plotted through time.  Though the problem for 
which the Kermack-McKendrick model was initially created has  been solved,25 
their basic description of a population for the purposes of epidemic theory re-
mains relevant.
One advantage of the adoption of the SIR model is that it is clearly appli-
cable to the spread of phenomena other than diseases.  An early literature review 
of attempts to generalize the SIR model describes its field of application as fol-
lows:
We are concerned with deterministic and stochastic 
models for the spread of some “infectious” or “con-
tagious” phenomenon through a population as a 
function of time.  This comprises not only the trans-
mission of a pathogenic agent from an infected host 
to an uninfected susceptible, with or without an in-
termediate animal vector, but also the propagation of 
ideas, rumours and consumers’ goods.26
My contention is that the conception of the spread of an infectious phenomenon 
through a population evoked here may be applied to legal norms.  In the following 
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24 Kermack & McKendrick, supra note 21.  See also Paul Waltman,  Deterministic Threshold Models in the 
Theory of Epidemics (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1974) at"1-2.  A different, but equivalent formulation of the 
population in the SIR model is  that it is a set N of individuals each of which may be in one of a set of 
states " (susceptible, infected and removed).  See William A. Goffman & Vaun A. Newill, “Communi-
cation and Epidemic Processes” (1967) 298:1454 Proc. Royal Soc. London. A 316 at 316-17.  
25  The solution is set out in David G. Kendall, “Deterministic and Stochastic Epidemics in Closed 
Populations” (1956) 4 Proc. 3rd Berkeley Symp. Math. Statist.  & Prob. 149 at 151-155.  Kendall’s solu-
tion allows for an epidemic curve to be traced for any initial values of N (population size) and I (num-
ber of infectives).  He demonstrates that for many of these values, an epidemic will in fact cease before 
the number of susceptibles is  exhausted.  For a discussion of Kendall’s solution and a comparison with 
Kermack and McKendrick’s earlier approximate solution, see Norman T. J. Bailey, The Mathematical 
Theory of  Epidemics (London: Griffin, 1957).
26 Klaus Dietz, “Epidemics and Rumours: A Survey” (1967) 130:4 J. Royal Stat. Soc. A 505.
section we therefore turn to a detailed overview of the notions of infection and 
contagion as they used in epidemiology and epidemic theory.
3. Infection, Contagion and Spread
An adequate description of the spread of a contagious phenomenon through a 
population mobilizes a number of distinct concepts from the fields of epidemiol-
ogy and epidemic theory.  In its  most abstract formulation, we can say that an epi-
demic is the transmission of an agent to or between members of a population. 
This  subsection will flesh out this formulation and explore the concepts of “agent” 
and “transmission” that it relies upon.
3.1. Agents and Pathogens
Epidemiology generally defines an agent as that which causes the condition under 
observation27  (also called the “etiological agent”28).  For instance, the agent of 
cholera is the bacterium Vibrio cholerae and the agent of (one form of) malaria is the 
protozoan Plasmodium falciparum.  Since epidemiology is  largely concerned with dis-
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27 In the case of diseases thought to be caused by a micro-organism, the agent of infection is often in-
formed by the postulates  set out in Robert Koch, Investigations Into the Etiology of Traumatic Infective Dis-
eases, trans. by W. Watson Cheyne (London: The New Syndehma Society, 1880), namely that (1) the 
putative agent must be found in abundance in all organisms suffering from the disease, (2) it can be 
isolated and grown in pure culture,  (3) it causes the disease when introduced into a healthy organism, 
and (4) it can be re-isolated from the organism into which it was introduced and found to be identical 
to the original putative agent.  These postulates are used as guidelines,  but have been relaxed, given 
that (2) is not always feasible for unknown micro-organisms (see e.g. Lary Walker, Harry LeVine & 
Mathias Jucker,  “Koch's Postulates  and Infectious Proteins” (2006) 112 Acta Neuropathologica 1), and 
(3) rules out subclinical carriers  (see e.g. V. Jacomo, P.J. Kelly & D. Raoult, “Natural History of Bar-
tonella Infections  (an Exception to Koch’s  Postulate)” (2002) 9:1 Clinical and Diagnostic Laboratory 
Immunology 8 at 16).
28 See e.g. Lilienfeld & Lilienfeld, supra note 7 at 48-50.
ease, the term “pathogen” (that is “an agent causing disease”)29 is often used inter-
changeably with “agent”.  
As I noted above, I am particularly interested in infectious agents, that is, 
agents that may spread within a population by a mechanism of contagion.  Infec-
tious  agents are generally associated with micro-organisms, such as bacteria or vi-
ruses;30  indeed, some epidemiologists use the terms  “agent” and “pathogen” as 
shorthand for “pathogenic micro-organism”.31  Strictly speaking, a pathogenic 
agent isn’t necessarily a micro-organism; it may also be an excess or deficiency in 
nutritive elements, a chemical such as a poison or allergen, or a physical process as 
in the case of radiation.32  Furthermore, agents that are not micro-organisms may 
be transmitted between members  of a population.  For instance – as anyone who 
is significantly allergic to cats  can attest – allergens may stick to hair and skin and 
then be transmitted to another person.  But these are marginal cases and generally 
pathogenic agents that are transmitted among members of a population are 
micro-organisms.  I therefore propose to use the term “agent” in a sense that is 
consonant with “pathogenic micro-organism” or, more generally, “a transmissible 
cause of a phenomenon observed in a population.”  We can thus refer to infected 
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29 The Oxford Encyclopedic Dictionnary, s.v. “pathogen”.
30 Infectious proteins, such as prions, are an exception.  See Walker, LeVine & Jucker, supra note 27.
31 See e.g. the definitions  of “pathogen” in the glossaries of Bhopal, supra note 7 at xxv (“[a]n organism 
(usually reserved for micro-organisms) that causes disease”) and John J. McKelvey, Bruce F. Eldridge & 
Karl Maramorosch, eds., Vectors of Disease Agents (New York: Praeger, 1981) at 197 (“[a] specific causa-
tive agent (as bacterium or virus) of disease”).  This is also part of common usage, see e.g. The New Ox-
ford American Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. “pathogen” (defined as “a bacterium, virus or other micro-organism 
that can cause disease”).
32 This list is drawn from Lilienfeld & Lilienfeld, supra note 7 at 49.
members of a population as “hosts” and a population containing susceptibles and 
infectives as a “host population”.  
  On a side-note, I should point out that what counts as an agent and what 
counts as its transmission in the context of a specific population may depend on 
the perspective of the researcher.  For instance from one perspective, cigarettes 
could be seen as a mechanism whereby carcinogenous  agents are transmitted.33 
An equally valid perspective is  that cigarettes are themselves the agents of lung 
cancer.34  The difference here is  one of granularity in the analysis of causation,35 
rather than a predetermined definition of  “agent”.
My working definition of “agent” appeals to the notion of transmission be-
tween members of  a population.  It is to this notion that we now turn.
3.2. The Basic Concept of  Transmission and Typologies of  Transmission
The basic concept of transmission is the passing on of an agent from one member 
of a population to another.  In terms of the Kermack-McKendrick model, an 
agent is transmitted when a member of I has the kind of contact with a member 
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33 See e.g. ibid. at 121.
34 See e.g.. Bhopal, supra note 7 at 108.
35 Saying that overcrowding and malnutrition are causes of tuberculosis  is as valid as saying that tuber-
culosis  is caused by the tubercle bacillus.  The designation of the latter as  the agent is  purely a matter of 
conventional definition.  See Bhopal, ibid. at 103-104.
of S such that she subsequently becomes herself  a member of I.36 Let us  call the 
kind of  contact necessary “effective contact”.
Though infectious diseases are often classified by biologists and medical re-
searchers on the basis of their etiological agents, epidemiology is more concerned 
with the characterization of their transmission.37  There are two interrelated ty-
pologies that classify the transmission of infectious agents: first by the mode (or 
mechanism) of transmission and second by the pattern of transmission.38 I will first 
describe the major modes of transmission and the relationship between them.  In 
the subsequent subsection I will describe the major patterns of transmission, with 
some reference to how those patterns relate to the different modes of  transmission.
3.3. Modes of  Transmission
This  subsection is concerned with the mode of transmission.  In classifying infec-
tious  diseases  by their mode of transmission, we are interested in the mechanism 
whereby the etiological agent passes from one member of the population to an-
other.
152
36 Or, to use the alternative terminology, the kind of contact between a member of N whose "-state is 
infective and a member of N whose "-state is  susceptible, such that the latter’s "-state changes to infec-
tive.  See supra note 23.
37 Lilienfeld & Lilienfeld, supra note 7 at 48.
38  Paul E. M. Fine, “Epidemiological Principles of Vector-Mediated Transmission” in John J. 
McKelvey, Bruce F.  Eldridge & Karl Maramorosch, eds., Vectors of Disease Agents (New York: Praeger, 
1981) 77.
3.3.1. Direct Transmission of  Agents
As its designation suggests, direct transmission is  the least circuitous form of agent 
transfer.  It is  commonly effected by physical or aerosol contact between members 
of the population.  Many diseases can spread by several different forms of direct 
contact, as  is the case with influenza, which can spread through droplets contain-
ing the causative virus (sneezing and coughing) as well as through physical contact 
(handshaking and kissing).39 Direct transmission of a disease agent between mem-
bers  of a human population is also referred to as “person to person” 
transmission.40
3.3.2. Indirect and “Common Reservoir” Transmission of  Agents
Indirect transmission occurs when the disease agent is transferred from one mem-
ber of the population to another mediated by an object (called a fomite41).  An ex-
ample of fomite transmission is the spread of the viruses  responsible for influenza 
by doorknobs or other nonporous plastic or metal surfaces.42 
“Common reservoir” transmission occurs when members of the population 
are infected through contact with an object or site contaminated by the agent.  An 
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39  This definition of simple direct transmission is adapted from Fine, ibid. at 81.  Note that the SIR 
model can be modified to allow for other forms of transmission.  For instance, transmission through an 
intermediate host can be integrated into the SIR model using the notion of “vectorial capacity”.  Thus, 
“effective contact” (the probability that two members of N have the kind of contact necessary for 
transmission) is cached out as  “the probability that a given susceptible receives at least one of the infec-
tive bites ultimately delivered by those vectors feeding upon an infected host at one time” (83-85).  
40 Bhopal, supra note 7 at xxv.
41 “[O]bjects  or materials that are likely to carry infection, such as clothes, utensils, and furniture.” The 
New Oxford American Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. “fomite”.
42  B. Bean et al., “Survival of Influenza Viruses  on Environmental Surfaces” (1982) 146:1 Journal of 
Infectious Diseases 47.
example of a common reservoir is a body of warm stagnant water in which Le-
gionnaire’s disease is found.43
Though the categories  overlap, for analytic purposes we can make a dis-
tinction between fomites  that act as mere surrogates for direct contact and “true” 
common reservoirs.44 In the first case, the infectious agent can be spread through 
direct contact and just happens to “stop off for a moment” on a fomite.  In the 
latter case, the infectious agent is not contagious  in the sense that it cannot be 
transmitted directly from host to host; it resides in a common reservoir where it 
emerges.45
Indirect and common reservoir modes of transmission can be combined 
with simple direct transmission among members of the host population.  In the 
case of cholera, for example, some members may be infected by their contact with 
a common reservoir such as a contaminated well, whereas others may be infected 
through direct or indirect contact with infectives.  
3.3.3. Vector-mediated Transmission of  Agents
The mathematical concept of a vector refers to a quantity having both a magni-
tude and a direction.  When applied to disease transmission, the term “vector” 
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43 R. R. Muder, V. L. Yu & A. H. Woo, “Mode of Transmission of Legionella Pneumophila. A Critical 
Review” (1986) 146:8 Archives of  Internal Medicine 1607.
44 Some authors refer to such common reservoirs as “common vehicles”.  See e.g., Lilienfeld & Lilien-
feld, supra note 7 at 48-49.
45 This is the case with legionella.  See V. L. Yu et al., “Lack of Evidence for Person-to-Person Trans-
mission of  Legionnaires' Disease” (1983) 147:2 Journal of  Infectious Diseases 362.
may be used to describe “...any agent of pathogen transfer”.46  Thus, we could say 
that one vector of influenza transmission is fomites and another is aerosol droplets. 
More often, however, when epidemiologists  refer to the vector-mediated transmis-
sion of disease agents, they are using “vector” as a shorthand for “secondary 
host”.47  This conforms to colloquial usage,48  and I will follow this convention 
hereafter unless the context clearly indicates otherwise.
A secondary host is a member of a species  other than the species of the 
host population under study (which can then be called the “primary host”).  For 
example, the virus that causes  Dengue fever is  transmitted from human to human 
by the Aedes aegypti mosquito, which we can call both the vector and the secondary 
host.49 
Denominating the primary and secondary hosts  is a matter of convention. 
Often, epidemiologists are concerned with the distribution and spread of disease 
across human populations, the members of which are therefore dubbed the primary 
hosts.50  Whatever other species (for example arthropods, rats, bats, etc.) acts as a 
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46 McKelvey, Eldridge & Maramorosch, supra note 38 at 199 (glossary).   The use of the term “agent” is 
unfortunate here, as it invites confusion with the notions of etiological agent and pathogen.  A better 
formulation would be “vehicle of  pathogen transfer”.
47 Commonly an arthropod in the case of animal viruses.  For plant viruses,  the secondary hosts desig-
nated by “vector” are insects, mite, nematodes (i.e. roundworms) and lower fungi.  Ibid.
48 See The New Oxford American Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. “vector” (“an organism, typically a biting insect or 
tick, that transmits a disease or parasite from one animal or plant to another”).  But see The Oxford Ency-
clopedic Dictionary, s.v. “vector” (“a carrier of  disease”).
49 See McKelvey, Eldridge & Maramorosch, supra note 38 at 192, 195, 197-98.
50 The study of the distribution and spread of disease in animal populations is  often referred to as “vet-
erinary epidemiology” though “epizoology” is etymologically more correct.
vector of transmission is then designated as  the secondary host.  There is nothing 
necessary about this designation.  An entomologist whose research objective is to 
study the spread of a malaria virus across a population of mosquitos would be 
perfectly justified in claiming that humans are the secondary host that serves  as  a 
vector of  transmission among mosquitos, which are the primary hosts.
One might designate the primary and secondary hosts  on the basis of dis-
ease etiology or the reproductive cycle of the infectious  agent.  If an infectious 
agent causes disease in one species but not in another, we could rely on this fact as 
a justification for calling the former the primary host species and the latter the sec-
ondary host species.  Similarly, if the agent is a micro-organism that only reaches 
sexual maturity in one species and thus does not reproduce inside the bodies of 
the members of a second “carrier” species, the designations of primary and sec-
ondary respectively could be justified on these grounds.51  Unfortunately, nature 
does not provide us  with such neat categories and reliance on disease etiology or 
pathogen reproductive cycle would not obviate the need for a stipulative definition. 
Such a definition would be required, inter alia, in cases – such as that of the Avian 
Influenza A (H5N1) virus52 – where the infectious agent is a pathogenic micro-
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51 Some epidemiologists  use the term “intermediate host” to designate species  that carries the disease 
agent in a state of sexual immaturity.  The obverse of “intermediate host” is the “definitive host” (i.e. 
the host in which the sexually mature – and thus reproducible – pathogen is found).  Though most of-
ten the intermediate host is the secondary host and the primary host is the definitive host, this is  not 
always the case.  For example, the primary host of the viruses that cause malaria is human beings, but 
their definitive host is  the Anopheles mosquito.  See McKelvey, Eldridge & Maramorosch, supra note 38 
at 197-98.
52 The Writing Committee of the Second World Health Organization Consultation on Clinical Aspects 
of Human Infection with Avian Influenza A Virus, “Update on Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Virus Infec-
tion in Humans” (2008) 358:3 N. Engl. J. Med. 261.
organism capable of reproducing in multiple species, more than one of which ex-
hibits symptoms of  infection.
3.3.4. Complex Transmission of  Agents
The typology of modes of transmission that I have set out thus far provides a use-
ful shorthand for describing how infectious agents come into contact with mem-
bers  of a population.  It is, however, a construct, and as  I have noted, the charac-
terization of a mode of transmission depends in large part on the objectives  of the 
researcher.  The transmission of hantaviruses – which can cause fatal pulmonary 
disorders in humans – provide a useful example.  Hantaviruses are generally 
transmitted to humans by rodents, with the usual route of infection being contact 
with rodent droppings, which emit the virus in aerosol form when disturbed.53 
How should this infection route be categorized? Certainly it looks like a good can-
didate for vector-mediated transmission, with rodents being the secondary (or vec-
tor) population.  Yet the mechanism of transmission could also be characterized as 
indirect, passing by fomites  (the droppings).  Several cases in a community might 
be clustered around a single location where rodents  are present, a barn for exam-
ple.  This suggests that the mode of transmission is that of a common reservoir. 
There is no single “right” characterization.  The typology of modes of transmis-
sion simply provides a framework for discussing the infection route.
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53  Centre for Disease Control, “Update: Hantavirus Pulmonary Syndrome - United States, 1999” 
(1999) 48:24 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 521.
Furthermore, few infectious agents  are transmitted by a single mode.  The 
examples I gave above of direct and indirect transmission of the influenza virus 
and of the common reservoir and direct transmission of cholera are the rule 
rather than the exception.  Yet even these examples are simplifications; empirical 
investigations of the spread of disease will often identify many different modes of 
transmission.  Figure 3-1 – which shows the transmission routes for one of the vi-
ruses that causes encephalitis in humans – illustrates how multiple modes of 
transmission can be involved in the propagation of  a single disease.54
Fig. 3-1.  An example of  complex modes of  transmission:
the summer infection chains for western equine encephalitis.
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FIGURE 2. The. chains for 
rural St. Louis encephalitis are similar, except that horses are inapparent rather than ap- 
parent hosts. 
Culex tarsalis is the primary vector in the sylvaii transmission cycle as well 
as in the endemic chain of infection in the western United States. I t  is the 
one species in which population densities, virus infection and vector ability, 
blood-feeding habits, and consistent association with epidemics are adequate 
to account for WEE encephalitis in humans and horses (Hammon and Reeves, 
1945; Reeves, 1953; Eklund, 1954; Cockburn, Sooter, and Langmuir, 1957). 
Furthermore, the distribution of this species in North America closely coincides 
with the general area in which outbreaks of WEE have been known to occur 
(Jenkins, 1950). WEE virus has been isolated many times in nature from 
C.  tarsalis. Isolations have also been made from C. pipiens,  C. quinqibefasciatus, 
C. restuans, C. stigmatosoma, Aedes melanimon (dorsalis), A .  nigromaculis, 
A .  infirmatus, A .  rexans, Anopheles freeborni, Cdiseta melanura, and C. inomuta, 
as well as several species of bird mites and an assassin hug, Triatoma sanguisuga 
(a general review of published records of isolations was made by Ferguson, 
1954; some later isolations were reported by Blackmore and Winn, 1954, and 
Burroughs and Burroughs, 1954; Reeves, 1953; Kissling et al., 1955). Species 
other than C. tarsalis are, however, considered to be of secondary importance. 
Some of them may, however, be essential in the transmission of WEE in the 
eastern and southeastern states, since this is out of the range of C. tarsalis. 
C. pipiens and C. quinquefasciatus have heen shown experimentally to be poor 
vectors for WEE (Hammon and Reeves, 1943; Chamherlain et al., 19.54). 
The primary vectors of WEE in the East are, therefore, yet to be determined. 
Although it seems quite clear that birds are the important natural hosts of 
WEE (Hammon and Reeves, 1945; Reeves, 1955; Eklund, 1954), it has not 
yet been determined which species are primary reservoirs and which are of 
secondary importance. Published and unpublished records indicate that 
WEE virus has been recovered from about 20 species of birds and 6 species 
of mammals, and that WEE antibodies have been found in more than 75 
Summer infection chains for western equine encephalitis. 
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54 Reproduced from A. D. Hess & P. Holden, “The Natural History of the Arthropod-Borne Encepha-
litides in the United States” (1958) 70:3 Annals of N.Y. Ac d. of Sciences 294 at 297.  A modifi d r-
sion of the same figure appears in Lilienfeld & Lilienfeld, supra note 7 at"52.  Hess and Holden describe 
(at 294) the species that serve as  vectors for other populations as  “reservoirs” and those that do not as 
“dead-end hosts”.  The species are also divided into primary and secondary.
In this figure, two types of populations (wild and domestic birds) are con-
sidered part of a reservoir.  From this reservoir, the virus is  transmitted by arthro-
pod vectors to other populations, which are defined as secondary hosts.  The pri-
mary hosts  are horses and humans.  Each of these modes of transmission may also 
have a distinct pattern of  transmission.  That is the subject of  the following section.
3.4. Patterns of  Transmission
A good grasp of a pathogen’s mode of transmission is an important factor in un-
derstanding the dynamics of its distribution and in formulating action to control it. 
For example, the knowledge that mosquitos are the primary vector of malaria 
transmission is  the basis  for policies of mosquito eradication and the use of bed-
nets in reducing human infection rates.55  But the mode of transmission is not the 
only characteristic of disease that allows us  to understand and affect its distribu-
tion.  Another important factor used by epidemiologists to understand the dynam-
ics of  the spread of  infectious disease agents is the pattern of  transmission.  
3.4.1. Horizontal and Vertical Patterns of  Transmission
One classic dichotomy used to classify transmission by pattern is between horizontal 
and vertical  transmission.  Horizontal transmission (also called “serial host trans-
fer”) is  characteristic of the spread of infectious agents that can be transmitted be-
tween any two members of the population; or rather – to be more precise – from 
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55 For an overview, see C. A. Goodman & A. J. Mills, “The Evidence Base on the Cost-Effectiveness  of 
Malaria Control Measures in Africa” (1999) 14:4 Health Policy Plan. 301.
any infective to any susceptible.  In contrast, the vertical pattern of transmission 
“implies transfer from a parent organism to his or her progeny.”56
Direct transmission is often horizontal in its  pattern.  One’s risk of getting 
the flu through aerosol droplets when somebody sneezes has  nothing to do with 
the question of whether the sneezer is  your parent.57  Similarly, indirect transmis-
sion is horizontal in that it spreads  across a population; with the distinction that a 
fomite may come into contact with many more members  of the population than 
an individual host.  An infected doorknob in a high-traffic area is like shaking the 
hands of  hundreds of  people!
Though many cases of direct and indirect transmission are horizontal, 
there is no necessary connection between the mode of transfer and its pattern of 
spread.  It is possible for agents that spread by direct transmission to do so in a 
largely or even exclusively vertical pattern.  This is the case, for example, with 
transovum, transplacental and transmammary infection routes in mammals and 
with seed-borne infections in plants.  Of course, all hereditary diseases are – by 
definition – vertically transmitted.
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56 Fine, supra note 38 at 77.
57 The probability of effective contact between parents and children may be higher than between any 
two random members of the population.  But this  is only because parents and children are more likely 
to live together.
Both horizontal and vertical transmission exhibit a “tree” pattern; every 
infective is a branch and each susceptible who comes into contact with an infective 
becomes either a dead-end or a new branch, as illustrated in Figure 3-2.58
Fig. 3-2.  Branching pattern of  serial-transfer transmission
It is  readily apparent how this figure illustrates both horizontal and vertical 
transmission.  Let us suppose that the hypothetical epidemic illustrated is  a hori-
zontally transmitted disease that can only be transmitted by kissing.  The first in-
fected member kisses  three susceptibles, each of whom becomes infected and 
passes the disease on by further kissing.  The people kissed either go on to infect 
Infective
(infected person who infects others)
Removed
(infected person who doesn’t infects 
others, or immune person)
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58  Adapted from Lilienfeld & Lilienfeld, supra note 7 at 51, citing M. Burnet & D. O. White, Natural 
History of  Infectious Disease, 4th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).
others by kissing (white circles) or don’t (shaded circles) for whatever reason; e.g. 
they do no further kissing, all of  the people they kiss are immune, etc.  The figure 
works equally well for a vertically transmitted disease.  Say the disease is an inher-
ited condition that only affects men.  The first infected father has three sons, each 
of whom are infected.  They go on to have sons of their own, some of whom pass 
it on to their sons (white circles) some of whom don’t (shaded circles) for whatever 
reason – e.g. they only have daughters, they don’t have children, etc.
The SRI model is predicated on serial host transmission; effective contact is 
presumed to be possible between any infective and any susceptible.  How this  is 
modelled mathematically will depend on the nature of the population.  In some 
populations it is reasonable to assume homogenous mixing.  In a homogeneously 
mixing population, the probability of any given infective coming into contact with 
any given susceptible is constant.59  Consequently, the model required to predict 
cumulative incidence60  – and thus the rate of spread – is deterministic, and 
changes in the population are described using differential equations.61  On the 
other hand, a model applicable to populations that mix heterogeneously will be 
probabilistic and changes in the population described using stochastic processes.62 
A heterogeneously mixing population is  one in which the probability of effective 
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59 “This is reasonable if the population consists  of students in a school where changing classes, attend-
ing athletic events, etc.,  mix the population.  It would not be true in an environment where socio-
economic factors have a major influence on contacts” (Waltman, supra note 24 at 2).
60 Cumulative incidence is “...the proportion of individuals in the disease-free state at the beginning of 
the period that move to the disease state during the period.” See Ahlbom & Norell, supra note 7 at 6.
61 Waltman, supra note 24 at 1.  See also Lilienfeld & Lilienfeld, supra note 7 at 356-58.
62 Waltman, ibid.
contact between a given infective and a given susceptible varies.  This is generally 
the case in very small or very large populations.63 For instance, say the population 
under study is  residents  of Canada: clearly, an infective in Alberta is  much more 
likely to come into contact with a susceptible in Alberta than one in Newfound-
land.
Vertically transmitted diseases – whether inherited or directly transmitted – 
can most often be described using deterministic models similar to mendelian ge-
netics.  Ceteris paribus, the probability of any given parent transmitting the condi-
tion to any given offspring is constant.
3.4.2. Common Reservoir Pattern of  Transmission
The patterns of horizontal and vertical transmission can also be distinguished 
from the pattern of common reservoir transmission.  Here we can see that though 
mode of transmission and pattern of transmission are distinct, in some cases they 
are connected.  As I explained above, “true” common reservoir epidemics refer to 
the mode of transmission; that is how susceptibles come into contact with the 
pathogenic agent.  In these cases, the agent is infectious in the sense that suscepti-
bles who come into contact with it may develop the disease, but it does not spread 
across a population.  Consequently, common reservoir epidemics  are associated 
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63 Dietz, supra note 26 at 507-509.  For a treatment of the mathematical difficulties involved in stochas-
tic epidemics, see Kendall, supra note 25.
with high localization of infections; for instance as in the case of a food poisoning 
outbreak.64
Though epidemics  caused by disease agents  whose mode of transmission is 
that of a common reservoir generally also exhibit the common reservoir pattern of 
transmission, this connection is not necessary.  The common reservoir pattern can 
also be seen in epidemics with other modes of transmission, such as fomite trans-
fer.  For instance, the mode of transmission of Typhoid fever is  often spread by 
fomites such as contaminated food.65 However, Typhoid transmission may follow a 
common reservoir pattern, as  in the case of a restaurant in which the cook is 
infected.66  Similarly, though malaria is  a paradigmatic case of a vector transmit-
ted disease, in some cases its pattern may exhibit characteristics of a common res-
ervoir.  This  might be the case, for example, where a single stagnant body of water 
in an otherwise arid region provides the only breeding ground for mosquitos.
The branching that is  typical of both horizontal and vertical transmission 
patterns  does not adequately illustrate the dynamics  of common reservoir epidem-
ics.  Instead, common reservoir patterned epidemics can be visualized as clusters 
of cases in space and time.  A famous example of such cluster diagrams is  Dr. 
John Snow’s map of London during the 1854 cholera outbreak.  Snow plotted the 
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64 Lilienfeld & Lilienfeld, supra note 7 at 50.
65 The Salmonella typhi can also occur in “true” common reservoirs, such as infected wells.
66 The example is drawn from the case of “Typhoid Mary”, the first diagnosed asymptomatic infective 
of typhoid fever, who was forcibly quarantined for a total of 41 years  after refusing to cease working as 
a cook.  See Judith Walzer Levitt, Typhoid Mary, Captive to the Public's Health (Boston: Beacon, 1996).
number of confirmed cholera cases  and – through observing how they clustered – 
identified a water pump on Broad Street as being the common reservoir.67 
3.4.3. Zig-Zag Pattern of  Transmission
Epidemics of diseases whose mode of transmission is vector mediated can be de-
scribed as having a horizontal pattern.  In this case, the vector acts  as a mediator 
between infectives  and susceptibles and occupies the role of contact between 
members of the population or contact with a fomite.  Thus, the notion of effective 
contact is translated into “vectorial capacity”.  In cases of disease agents whose 
mode of transmission is direct contact and whose pattern of transmission is hori-
zontal, the probability of effective contact can be glossed as the probability that in 
one day a susceptible will have the kind of contact with an infective necessary for 
the disease agent to be transmitted.  In vector mediated transmission described as 
having a horizontal pattern “...the probability of effective contact parameter be-
comes the probability that a given susceptible receives at least one of the infective 
bites ultimately delivered by those vectors feeding upon an infected host in one 
day.”68
Though this  translation allows for the mathematical models  of horizontally 
patterned transmission to be applied to vector mediated transmission, it does not 
capture the unique pattern of vector mediated transmission.  In other words, 
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67 John Snow, On the Mode of Communication of Cholera, 2nd ed. (London: John Churchill, 1855).  Snow’s 
findings on the pattern of the cholera outbreak led him to identify its mode of transmission.  He is 
credited with being the “father” of modern epidemiology; see e.g., John G. Simmons, Doctors and Discov-
eries: Lives That Created Today's Medicine (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2002).
68 Fine, supra note 38 at 85.
though an epidemic caused by a disease agent whose mode of transmission is  vec-
tor mediated can be modelled such that it “fits” the branching tree in Figure 3-1, 
this does not illustrate the particular dynamics such an epidemic.  A truer illustra-
tion of the spread of an agent between the primary and secondary host popula-
tions follows a zig-zag pattern,69 as illustrated in Figure 3-3.70
Fig. 3-3.  Zig-zag pattern of  simple vector mediated transmission.
This  figure illustrates  “simple” vector mediated transmission in that it as-
sumes that there is only one route by which the disease agent spreads.  The agent 
must pass from a member of the primary host population to a member of the sec-
ondary host population or vice versa and no serial host transfer is present. 
Though this an idealization,71  it nevertheless captures the essential properties of 
Primary host 
population
Secondary 
host (vector) 
population
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69  The zig-zag pattern was first described in C. H. Andrewes, “Factors  in Virus Evolution” (1957) 4 
Advanced Virus Research 1.  See also Fine, ibid. at 80-81.
70 Adapted from Fine, ibid. at 78.
71 See e.g.. Figure 3-1 (An example of complex modes of transmission: the summer infection chains for 
western equine encephalitis), above, which shows how complex infection routes may be.
vector mediated transmission and shows how it may display a distinct pattern of 
transmission.
As I noted above, determining what counts  as a primary host population 
and a secondary host population (that is, a vector) is a matter of a priori  designa-
tion, rather than the inherent properties of the populations themselves.72 In other 
words, if  we look at Figure 3-3, which species is  represented by the square and 
which species is  represented by the circle is purely conventional.73   Furthermore, 
the zig-zag transmission pattern can be observed within sub-populations of a given 
species:
…[V]enereal transmission, which at first appears to 
be a straightforward mode of horizontal transfer, has, 
at least in heterosexual societies, a distinctly zig-zag 
pattern, the infectious agent moving through a popu-
lation by alternating between separate subpopulations 
of males and of females.  Either the male or the fe-
male may be considered the “vector” and the other 
the “host,” according to one’s prejudice.74
This  example reveals  not only that the designation of primary and secondary host 
populations is a matter of convention, but that the characterization of the pattern 
of transmission may affect how we conceive of the mode of transmission.  The 
propagation of venereally transmitted diseases  is usually considered a paradigm 
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72 See text accompanying note 50.
73 Although the reproductive cycle of the pathogen may provide additional reasons to opt for designat-
ing one or the other of  the host populations as being primary.
74 Fine, supra note 38 at 81.
case of direct transmission between members of a human population, but as the 
example above illustrates, it can easily be described as vector mediated.
3.5. Transmission Over Time
Both the mode of transmission and the pattern of transmission can only be under-
stood as occurring across time.  Regardless of the mode of transmission, it is 
axiomatic that for a member of a population to be infected, she must have had 
effective contact (with an infective, a vector, a fomite, etc.) before she became an in-
fective.  Similarly, a pattern of transmission can only be identified by observing the 
change in the status of susceptibles and infectives over time.  This is  not some spe-
cial feature of epidemiological reasoning; it is simply a statement that “causation 
follows time’s  arrow.”75 However, not all epidemiological models take into account 
all the time-dependant factors  involved in disease transmission.  My purpose in 
this subsection is  not to survey all such factors.  Instead, I limit myself to a basic 
explanation of what are called “epidemiological epochs” (which cover some of the 
time-dependant factors in individual transmission) and “epidemic curves” (which 
illustrate the rate of  infection over time).
3.6. Epidemiological Epochs
Among the simplifying assumptions that the Kermack-McKendrick model pro-
poses in order to make the problems that it seeks to address mathematically trac-
table is that transmission is  instantaneous.  In other words, it assumes that a mem-
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75 This is a common formulation of the statement that an effect cannot precede its  cause.  It was coined 
in Arthur Eddington, The Nature of the Physical World (New York: Macmillan,  1928) at 74 (”The second 
law of  thermodynamics is time’s arrow.”)
ber of S becomes a member of I immediately after effective contact with another 
member of I.  Yet, the progression of a member of N from susceptible to infective 
is far more complex.  After contact with an infective, a member of the susceptible 
set may pass through a period of latency during which she is  infected, but not 
infectious.76  Thus, for example, it takes between eight and twelve hours for some-
one infected with a virus  causing the common cold (rhinovirus) to begin producing 
more of the virus.77 Furthermore, there is invariably a delay between the moment 
of infection and the moment that symptoms of the infection appear.78  This incu-
bation period may be shorter or longer than the latency period.  That is, there 
may be members of the population who exhibit clinical symptoms but are not yet 
able to pass on the infection, or – more often – who are infectious but do not yet 
exhibit symptoms (called “carriers”79).80  The various periods  of time (epochs) of 
transmission are illustrated in Figure 3-4.81
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76 See William A. Goffman & Vaun A. Newill, “Generalization of Epidemic Theory:  An Application to 
the Transmission of Ideas” (1964) 204:4955 Nature 225 at 225 (though note that they do not make the 
distinction between latency and incubation periods).
77  J. M. Harris  & J. M. Gwaltney, “Incubation Periods of Experimental Rhinovirus  Infection and Ill-
ness” (1996) 23 Clinical Infectious Diseases 1287.
78 Lilienfeld & Lilienfeld, supra note 7 at 50-58.
79 Carriers are also called “silent hosts”, see McKelvey, Eldridge & Maramorosch, supra at 198.
80 Indeed, some contagious infections remain asymptomatic throughout the infectious  period.  For in-
stance, 25% of those infected with Rhinoviruses never develop a cold.   See J.  M. Gwaltney, “Rhinovi-
ruses” in A.S. Evans & R.A Kaslow, eds., Viral Infection of Humans: Epidemiology and Control, 4th ed. (New 
York: Plemum Press, 1997) 815.
81 Reproduced from Dietz, supra note 26 at 506.  Note that this  figure presumes that the latent period is 
shorter than the incubation period.
Fig. 3-4.  Relations between epidemiological epochs.
The period that is relevant to epidemic theory is the latent period, since it repre-
sents the “gap” between the moment a member of N is a member of S and when 
she becomes a member of I, the duration of which will have an effect on the rate 
of transmission.82 Empirical (or “descriptive”) epidemiology, on the other hand, is 
more concerned with the period between the first manifestations of symptoms in A 
and the first manifestation of symptoms in B (the “serial interval”) since this is the 
observable phenomenon (i.e. the data) that can be used to plot the spread of a par-
ticular disease in a given population.83
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82 Since Kermack and MacKendrick first set out the SIR model, several modifications  have been pro-
posed to take into account of  this gap.  For a review, see Dietz, ibid. at 508-509.
83 Evidently, how one cashes out the notion of symptoms will determine the length of the serial inter-
val.   A positive test for antibodies would not normally be be considered a “symptom” by a clinician, but 
may be so considered by an epidemiologist.
3.6.1. Epidemic Curves
An epidemic curve is a graph in which the number of new cases of disease is  plot-
ted according to their time of onset.84  When plotting actual outbreak data, epi-
demic curves  are histograms, with the number of cases plotted along the Y-axis 
and the time intervals of the X-axis  based on the incubation period, as in 
Figure"3-5.
Fig. 3-5.  Epidemic curve of  a hypothetical disease outbreak.
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84  David J. Weber, L. B. Menajovsky & Richard Wenzel, “Investigation of Outbreaks” in James  C. 
Thomas & David J. Weber, eds., Epidemiologic Methods for the Study of Infectious Diseases (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001) 291 at 300.  See also, B. Burt Gerstman, Epidemiology Kept Simple: An Introduction 
to Traditional and Modern Epidemiology, 2nd ed. (New York: Wiley-Liss, 2003) at 356-8.
In this figure,85 the number of new cases increases  sharply in the first three 
periods, stabilizes, and then drops to its  initial value.  Variation across time is typi-
cal of an epidemic outbreak.  Indeed, it is  the very definition of an epidemic: 
“…in the ordinary use of language an epidemic which never varied in its demand 
for victims would be something of a contradiction in terms.”86  A histogram in 
which the number of new cases did not vary over time (that is, where the graph is 
not a curve at all, but is in fact flat) would illustrate an endemic condition.
Though variation of the number of new cases across time is what typifies 
an epidemic curve, the shape of the curve depends on a number of factors, includ-
ing the disease’s incubation period and its  pattern of transmission.  Figure 3-6 il-
lustrates four common shapes of  epidemiological curves.87
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85 The data for this hypothetical outbreak is based on the branching tree diagram in Figure 3-2, with 
each white circle in that figure representing a new case.  The time units are not indicated, as they are 
assumed to be the incubation period.   They could vary anywhere from hours to years, depending on 
the nature of  the condition.
86 H. E.  Soper, “The Interpretation of Periodicity in Disease Prevalence” (1929) 92:1 J. Royal Stat. Soc. 
34.  See also The New Oxford American Dictionary, 2nd ed.,  s.v. “epidemic” (“A disease that quickly and se-
verely affects a large number of  people and then subsides is an epidemic”).
87 Adapted from Gerstman, supra note 84 at 53, reproduced from Calvin W. Schwabe, Hans Riemann 
& Charles E. Franti, Epidemiology in Veterinary Practice (Philadelphia: Lea & Febiger, 1977).
Fig. 3-6.  Four epidemic curves.
As mentioned above, the graph of the endemic situation is relatively flat 
and represents a stable incidence over time.  The small fluctuations  would appear 
to flatten entirely if we were to “zoom out” of this  graph by increasing the num-
ber of intervals along the x-axis.  Note that the characterization of a condition as 
being endemic is unrelated to the magnitude of its incidence.  The endemic state 
is one of  stability; not of  low incidence.88
The curve of a propagating epidemic is associated with either serial trans-
fer or continued exposure to a common reservoir.  The number of new cases in 
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88 For example,  in some European countries,  such as Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, the incidence of 
Herpes Simplex Virus Type-1 infection is stable (endemic) at slightly above 80%.  See R. G. Pebody  et 
al., “The Seroepidemiology of Herpes  Simplex Virus Type 1 and 2 in Europe” (2004) 80:3 Sex. 
Transm. Infect. 185.
such epidemics tend either to plateau or to continue rising,89 though some mathe-
matical models  show that there will always be some members of the population 
who avoid infection.90
The sporadic curve and point epidemic curve differ only in the intensity of 
the outbreaks that they illustrate.  A sporadic outbreak is  a small random occur-
rence of a disease, whereas a point epidemic is a sharp increase in incidence fol-
lowed by rapid return to normal levels.91  These curves are typical of  localized 
outbreaks such as food poisoning.  The first might, for instance, illustrate the num-
ber of cases of salmonella after a small picnic, whereas the latter could illustrate a 
widespread but short outbreak, as in the case of a listeriosis  epidemic associated 
with contaminated food that is widely distributed.92
The shape of the epidemic curve associated with a single outbreak will vary 
depending on the time units  used (that is, the scale of the X-axis).  There is no a 
priori “right” units to use, but the time units should be appropriate to the incuba-
tion period of the disease.  For example, the epidemic curve of the listeriosis out-
break mentioned above uses weeks as the units.  This is clearly more appropriate 
than hours or years, since “[t]here is an inherent delay of two to three weeks from 
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89 Gerstman, supra"note 84 at 358.
90 Waltman, supra note 24 at 4.
91 Gerstman, supra"note 84 at 52.
92 For instance, the outbreak that occurred in Canada in 2009,  where packaged meats coming from a 
single meat processing plant resulted in 56 confirmed cases of listeriosis, including 20 deaths.   Public 
Health Agency of Canada, Lis t e r ia Monocy togenes Outbreak : Final Update , onl ine: 
<http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/alert-alerte/listeria/listeria_2008-eng.php>.  For the epidemic curve of 
this outbreak, see Public Health Agency of Canada, Listeriosis Epidemiological Curve, online: 
<http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/alert-alerte/listeria/epi-curve-courbe-eng.php>.
the date an illness starts to the date the case is reported to public health 
authorities.”93  The U.S.  Center for Disease Control recommends that the time 
units used be between one-eighth and one-third of the average incubation 
period.94  It may also be necessary to trace several curves using different units in 
order to generate an image that reflects the temporal pattern.95 This is  particularly 
important if the incubation period is unknown.  Indeed, if the distribution of 
times of onset of illness (that is, what is  represented by the epidemic curve) and the 
time of  exposure are known, the incubation period can be deduced.96
Epidemic curves are also important to epidemic theory.  In fact, a central 
project of epidemic theory is  the creation of mathematical models that predict the 
curves of epidemics given certain initial conditions.  These predictions  can be then 
compared to actual incidence data to validate the models.97  Evidently, the better 
the models fit past incidence data, the more they can be relied upon to generate 
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93 Canada, Listeriosis Epidemiological Curve, ibid.
94  Centres for Disease Control and Prevention United States, Principles of Epidemiology Self-study Course 
3030-G, 2nd ed. (Atlanta, GA: U.S. Department of  Health and Human Services, 1992) at 363-4.
95 Gerstman, supra note 84 at 356-7.
96  Lilienfeld & Lilienfeld, supra note 7 at 52-53 (demonstrating that knowing the values of any two of 
these variables allows for the third to be deduced).
97  See e.g., Kermack & McKendrick,  supra note 21 in which the curve generated by the classic SIR 
model is compared to actual data of a plague in Bombay in 1905-06.   The curve generated by the 
model, superimposed with the empirical data from the plague, is reproduced as Figure 1.2 in Waltman, 
supra"note 24 at 8.
hypotheses related to future epidemics, keeping in mind that it is unlikely such 
models will ever entirely explain a given epidemic.98
4. Conclusion
This  chapter has seen us take a rather whirlwind tour of some basic concepts of 
epidemiology and epidemic theory.  This  exercise is  bound to have left many read-
ers unsatisfied.  On one hand, an epidemiologist could – quite rightly – claim that 
the survey I provided is incomplete and somewhat oversimplified.  I have empha-
sized concepts that may prove useful for an analysis of the spread of legal phe-
nomena, while giving short shrift to some of the finer details, notably with regard 
to the mathematics of epidemic theory.  On the other hand, jurists may find my 
overview somewhat technical and detail-laden.  They may wonder what slogging 
through the subtleties of  disease propagation tells us about the law.  
In response to these potential criticisms, I can only claim that they are an 
inevitable consequence of my model-building methodology.  To the epidemiologist 
unsatisfied by my simplified introduction to epidemiology, I would reply that my 
objective was not to do an in-depth analysis  of the current state of epidemiology 
as a science, nor to exhaustively enumerate its concepts.  I have neither the train-
ing nor the inclination to do either of these.  Instead, my purpose was to get 
enough of the conceptual apparatus of epidemiology “on the table”, as it were, to 
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98 Edwin B. Wilson & Mary H. Burke, “The Epidemic Curve” (1942) 28:9 Proceedings  of the National 
Academy of Sciences of the U.S.A.nited States of America 361 at 362 (claiming that models “cannot 
be expected to explain in quantitative detail the course of any epidemic” and that “[t]he greatest im-
mediate value of the development of theory and of attempts  at its application to concrete instances 
must be upon the qualitative side…”).
begin a discussion of what an epidemiological model of law would look like.  To 
the jurist who claims that I have gone into too much detail, I would reply that a 
certain level of detail is necessary: if we are going to assert that legal norms spread 
and we want this assertion to be something more than a clever metaphor, then both 
our vocabulary and conceptual repertoire need to be expanded and nuanced.  In 
the context of  law reform, Roderick Macdonald describes this need as follows:
Before we naively throw around metaphors that 
sound good when stripped of their complexity in the 
field from which they arise, we should consider 
whether those field specific complexities may actually 
help us to better understand the law reform project to 
which we applying the metaphor…99
One theme that runs through this chapter has  been that applying many 
epidemiological concepts is a matter of making choices and that these choices are 
related to both the intuitions and research objectives of the epidemiologist.  Defin-
ing a population, characterizing the infectious agent, classifying the mode and pat-
tern of transmission, determining the units of time used to plot an epidemic 
curve; all of these steps involve decisions by the researcher.  This  doesn’t mean 
that we can just apply these concepts  willy-nilly and simply claim – as Humpty 
Dumpty did – that the words mean whatever we want them to mean.100 Evidently, 
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99  Roderick A. Macdonald, “Three Metaphors of Norm Migration in International Context” (2009) 
34:3 Brook. J. Int’l. L. 603 at 633.
100 See Lewis  Carrol, Through the Looking-Glass: And What Alice Found There (London: Macmillan, 1872) at 
57-58 (where Humpty Dumpty tells Alice “[w]hen I use a word… it means just what I choose it to 
mean – neither more nor less.”).  On Humpty Dumpty’s theory of meaning, see Keith Donnellan, 
“Putting Humpty Dumpty Together Again” (1968) 77 Philosophical Review 213.
these decisions  will be constrained both by the phenomena under study and the 
explanatory objectives we give ourselves.
These choices must be made in characterizing the phenomenon that I wish 
to explain, namely the spread of legal norms.  One consequence of this process  is 
that the model that I will construct (using what I called the “mapping function” in 
Chapter 2) will be specific to my domain of study: the spread of employment drug 
testing norms from the United States to Canada.  There is nothing surprising 
about this.  Though epidemic theory is concerned with the spread of contageous 
conditions  as such, an epidemiological study will always be specific to the actual 
condition under investigation.  One does not measure the spread of disease in the 
abstract, but rather the spread of a particular disease within a particular popula-
tion.
It is  also necessary to underscore the necessity of such choices so as  to 
avoid claims that the model is somehow “rigged”.  Realizing that choices have 
been made in characterizing the phenomena under investigation, one might claim 
“well of course the model explains the data, it was designed to do so.” This criticism – 
essentially a charge of bootstrapping – fails  to take into account the objectives  of a 
modelling methodology.  My first response is to simply agree with the point, but 
deny that it constitutes a problem, since a model needn’t necessarily generate falsi-
fiable hypotheses to provide illuminating explanations.  In fact, a model may help 
us  understand a phenomenon without generating any new hypotheses or new data, 
simply by allowing us to see connections between existing data points from a dif-
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ferent perspective.  In this case, the strength of the model is  not determined by its 
truth, but rather by its utility.  My second response applies in the case where the 
model does generate hypotheses that can be tested against the data.  The answer to 
the bootstrapping criticism is then to reverse the burden of demonstration.  Thus I 
would respond: the model generates  hypotheses that are confirmed by the data, it 
is up to the critic to show why these hypotheses are not falsifiable.
Before generating and testing hypotheses, however, the epidemiological 
concepts that we have acquired in this chapter must be mapped onto legal phe-
nomena.  That is the subject of  Chapter 4.
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Introduction
In the previous chapter, I restricted the base domain of my model to epidemiology, 
and elaborated on several of the key concepts  of that domain.  As I set out in 
Chapter 2, the process of building a model consists of mapping the concepts of 
the primary (or base) domain onto the secondary domain.  The objective of this 
transposition is  to allow for the implication structure of the primary domain to 
serve as a generator of explanations for phenomena observed in the secondary 
domain.  In this  chapter, I will explore some of the different ways in which we 
might characterize legal phenomena in epidemiological terms in order to build a 
model.
! Modelling the spread of social phenomena using epidemiology has been 
done before.  In the first subsection, we will see the concept mapping that these 
models mobilize, which will serve in thinking through the particular case of legal 
phenomena.  This may seem like an odd place to begin, since in Chapter 2 I ar-
gued that existing viral explanations of social phenomena – notably mimetics – 
are seriously flawed.  Recall that my claim was that mimetics is incoherent because 
it systematically conflates the base domains of virology, epidemiology, genetics, 
and evolutionary theory.  In what follows, I will treat epidemiological models of 
the spread of social phenomena that don’t commit this error – in particular the 
analysis of  rumours and scientific theories.
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" In the second subsection I will compare the strengths  and weaknesses of 
the different ways in which epidemiological concepts can be applied to legal phe-
nomena, with specific reference to the case of employment drug testing norms. 
Finally, I will defend the chosen mapping between the two domains.
1. The Epidemiology of  Ideas: Rumours and Theories
As I have already discussed,1 epidemic theory can be applied to the spread of any 
contagious phenomena.  One can abstract from the particular case of the spread 
of disease to give a general account of its key concepts, which can then be remobi-
lized to account for other forms of spread.  Indeed, one could argue that epidemic 
theory is primarily concerned with the general case, rather than the restricted case 
of  disease spread:
In general, the ‘epidemic’ process can be character-
ized as one of transition from one state (susceptible) 
to another (infective) where the transition is caused by 
exposure to some phenomena (infectious material) 
The process need not  be restricted to infectious diseases but is a 
more general abstract  process that  might  be applied to many 
situations.  All that is  needed is  the appropriate inter-
pretation of the process  elements, that is, susceptibles, 
infectives, removals, infectious  material, intermediary 
host, latency period, disease, etc.2
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1 See Chapter 3, s. 1.
2 William A. Goffman & Vaun A. Newill, “Generalization of Epidemic Theory: An Application to the 
Transmission of Ideas” (1964) 204:4955 Nature 225 [“Generalization of Epidemic Theory”] at 225 
[emphasis added].
Another way of saying this is that an epidemic process is fundamentally a com-
munication process,3  an idea that is captured by the expression “communicable 
disease”.  The communication of information (rather than infection) may be de-
scribed as an epidemic process.
One communication process that is intuitively amenable to analysis is that 
of the rumour, which is commonly described as “spreading” between members of 
a population.  Early work on the epidemic spread of information focused on ru-
mour spread.4  The rumour is thus characterized as an “infectious agent” that 
spreads through a population and “susceptibles are identified as those not having 
heard the rumour and the infectious cases correspond to those who are actively 
spreading the rumour.”5   In other words, rumour transmission is  discussed in 
terms of the SIR model, though with some simplifications.  For example, once one 
has  heard a rumour, one is immediately capable of spreading it – there is no latent 
or incubation period to be accounted for.
Rumours are just one example of epidemic information spread; though 
they may initially appear particularly amenable to the transposition of epidemiol-
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3 William A. Goffman & Vaun A. Newill, “Communication and Epidemic Processes” (1967) 298:1454 
Proc. Royal Soc. London. A 316 [“Epidemic Processes”] at 316 (“[E]pidemic theory seems to be appli-
cable to the study of any communication process  rather than being restricted simply to the process of 
transmitting an infectious disease.”).
4 See, e.g., Anatol Rapoport, “Spread of Information Through a Population With Socio-structural Bias: 
I.  Assumption of Transitivity” (1953) 15:4 Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics  523; Anatol Rapoport 
& Lionel I. Rebhun, “On the Mathematical Theory of Rumor Spread” (1952) 14:4 Bulletin of 
Mathematical Biophysics 375.  For a review, see Klaus Dietz,  “Epidemics  and Rumours: A Survey” 
(1967) 130:4 J. Royal Stat. Soc. A. 505.  For a recent discussion,  see Kazuki Kawachi et al.,  “A Rumor 
Transmission Model With Various Contact Interactions” (2008) 253:1 J. Theoretical Biology 55.  
5 Dietz, ibid. at 523.
ogical concepts because our pretheoretical notions of rumour propagation draw 
heavily on epidemic imagery.  Further reflection, however, allows us to see how 
other forms of information spread may be characterized as epidemic, given a suit-
able construal of  the key concepts used in epidemiology.
So-called “intellectual epidemics” provide another example – one which 
adds some complexity to the rumour model by integrating more of the conceptual 
apparatus of epidemiology.  Consider the following characterization of the spread 
of  the psychoanalytic theory:
Freud was no less host to the infectious material of 
the ‘disease’ of  psychoanalysis than the person carry-
ing the organism capable of transmitting a cold, nor 
is his writing less of a ‘vector’ carrying the ‘infectious 
material’ than the mosquito as a carrier of  malaria.
Moreover, Abraham, Ferenczi, Jung and Jones  were 
no less  ‘susceptibles’ who were infected by the ideas  of 
Freud and who, after a certain latency period, them-
selves  became ‘infectives’ than are those individuals 
infected by the droplets expressed by a cold carrier. 
Jung might represent an example of acquired resis-
tance to the disease while the resistance of the medi-
cal community of Vienna could represent innate 
immunity.6
The use of shudder quotes around the epidemiological concepts of disease, vector, 
infectious material, susceptible and infective indicates that they are being invoked 
in a non-standard context.  Indeed, what is being operated is the very kind of con-
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6 Goffman & Newell, “Generalization of  Epidemic Theory”, supra note 1 at 225.
ceptual mapping that I identified as being central to the modelling methodology in 
Chapter 2.  This mapping is represented in Figure#4-1.7
Fig. 4-1.  Analogy between infectious disease and intellectual epidemics.
Though the table represented in Figure 4-1 shows the analogy between the 
base domain of an infectious  disease epidemic and the secondary domain of an 
intellectual epidemic, it remains schematic.  What is  missing is a formal definition 
of the terms in the secondary domain, which would be required in order to opera-
tionalize the model and generate testable hypotheses.
Elements of  epidemic  
process
Elements interpreted in terms of
Infectious disease epidemic Intellectual epidemic
Agent Infectious material Idea
Infective Case of  disease Author of  paper
Susceptible Person who will be infected given 
effective contact
Reader of  paper who will be 
infected given effective contact
Removal Death or immunity Death or loss of  interest
Agent Infecious material (as for host) Idea (as for host)
Infective Vector harbouring the agent Paper containing useful ideas
Susceptible Vector not harbouring the agent All papers containing potentially 
useful ideas
Removal Death Deletion or loss
H
o
s
t
V
e
c
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r
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7 Reproduced from ibid.
Such operationalization has been done for particular intellectual epidemics, 
particularly in the natural sciences.8 The study of the spread of ideas in the natu-
ral sciences is part of a field of inquiry dubbed “scientometrics”.  The academic 
literature of the natural sciences may be particularly suited to the operationaliza-
tion of a model of intellectual epidemics because of the way its constitutive in-
formation is stored and cross-referenced.  The existence and sophistication of 
large citation indexes provides an easily accessible data set against which hypothe-
ses  can be tested.9  Some proponents of scientometrics have gone further, claiming 
that it is  the nature of the scientific enterprise itself that makes it amenable to 
quantitative analysis.10 
In Chapter 5, I set out a methodology that draws on the insights  of this sci-
entometric literature.  Many legal texts are collected in large databases with a so-
phisticated citation and cross-referencing systems that allow for the use such a 
methodology.  Furthermore, as we shall see, though law is different from science in 
many important ways, the role that authority plays in legal reasoning makes legal 
corpuses well-suited to this kind of analysis.  For now, however, what is important 
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8 For an early such study, conducted by one of the first proponents of the notion of intellectual epidem-
ics, see William Goffman, “Mathematical Approach to the Spread of Scientific Ideas  - The History of 
Mast Cell Research” (1966) 212:5061 Nature 449.  For a review of Goffman’s empirical work on intel-
lectual epidemics, see Eugene Garfield, “The Epidemiology of Knowledge and the Spread of Scientific 
Information” (1980) 35 Current Contents 5.
9  Curiously, the roots of the SCI (Science Citation Index) used as the basis for most scientometric 
work#– and indeed of the very idea of citation pattern analysis  generally – are found in legal citators, 
the most famous of which is Shepard’s citation index.  This  relationship is  largely ignored however, 
constituting a “gaping hole” in the historiography of bibliometrics.   Fred R. Shapiro, “Origins of Bib-
liometrics, Citation Indexing, and Citation Analysis: The Neglected Legal Literature” (1992) 43 J. Am. 
Ass'n for Information Science 337.
10Derek J. de Solla Price, “Editorial Statements” (1978) 1 Scientometrics 3.
to retain is  that the mapping of concepts in creating my model will require rela-
tively strict definitions if  it is to be operationalized.
2. The Epidemiology of  Law
Recall that my initial intuition is that Canadian law was initially infected with 
norms governing employment drug testing from American law and that these 
norms subsequently spread within Canadian law.  Clearly, we need to make the 
notions  of “law”, “norms” and “infection” more robust in order to effect the con-
ceptual mapping from epidemiology.
2.1. The Population Studied
What is the “population” of Canadian law that corresponds to the epidemiologi-
cal concept of population?  In constructing my model, I need to distinguish the 
different elements of  the definition I will be using for populations.
First, I set out the basic unit  of the primary population, which will be used in 
defining a population and drawing its  boundary.  By “basic unit”, I mean what 
sort of element could count as  a member of the primary population.  Thus the 
basic unit of the primary population “Canadians over thirty” is “persons”.  In or-
der to be a member of this population, one must first and foremost be a person. 
We need not enquire into a dog’s  citizenship or age to determine whether it is a 
member of  the population – it is simply not the right kind of  thing.11
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11  In set-theoretical terms, we could say that {Canadians over thirty} ! {persons} and {Canadians 
over thirty} " {persons}$#, whereas {Canadians over thirty} " {dogs}=#.
Next, I draw the population boundary by defining the particular charac-
teristics that must be shared by all of its members  in order for them to be included. 
I also describe some elements of the population profile, which is set out in further 
detail in Chapter 5.
2.1.1. Basic Units of  the Primary Population – Legal Texts
One rather obvious  candidate for the basic unit of the population in the epidemi-
ology of law would be people – in particular, legal actors.  Thus, for example, a 
manager at a Canadian factory could become infected with American norms re-
lating to drug testing upon receiving a directive from the human resources de-
partment, which in turn may have been infected when some of its  members  at-
tended a conference on workplace drug abuse given by an industrial relations con-
sultant who was infected when he read the U.S. jurisprudence, etc.  This stipulation 
– that it is people who are infected – is akin to the population definitions  in both 
the rumour and intellectual epidemic models discussed above.  The infectious ma-
terial consists of some defined set of ideas (the rumour, the scientific theory, the 
norms to be applied) and effective contact between an infective and a susceptible 
consists in a communicative event.  Of course the population profile for a particu-
lar study (i.e. which people, having what characteristics, over what period of time) 
would require further refinement, but the basic unit of the population would be 
the same.
Stipulating that the basic units of the population are people, however, leads 
to serious problems, both conceptual and practical.  First, we are faced with the 
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difficulty of clearly defining what it means for somebody to “have” an idea.  Fur-
thermore, even if we could “have” ideas in the same way that we “have” diseases, 
in order for this  to apply to legal norms we would need to make the further argu-
ment that legal norms are (nothing more than) ideas.  This  is far from obvious, 
given the social nature of norms; it is  not at all clear that we can have private 
norms any more than we can have a private language.12
This  is  the problem I discussed in Chapter 2 in relation to Dawkins’ meme 
concept; although stripped of the false analogy to genes, Dawkins’ formulation 
may appear satisfactory.  Recall that, for Dawkins, an idea is an information struc-
ture within the brain that is  expressed as words or other forms of behaviour.13 We 
could even remain agnostic as to the ontology of the “information structure” and 
simply rely on behaviour to identify infectives.  Call this “the behaviourist solu-
tion”.  This is  akin to relying on the symptoms of a disease determine whether 
someone is infected, without making a claim about its etiology.  
In the case of rumours, the behaviourist solution works well: one is  an in-
vective when and only when one communicates  the rumour to a susceptible.  Si-
lently relishing the thought that Joe from marketing is  dating Mary from account-
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12 On Wittgenstein’s argument against the possibility of a private language, see generally, Owen Roger 
Jones, ed., The Private Language Argument (London: MacMillan, 1971).   On the relationship between the 
private language argument and the notion of rule-following, see Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and 
Private Language (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982).
13 Richard Dawkins, The Extended Phenotype: The Gene as the Unit of Selection (Oxford: Freeman, 1982) at 9. 
See also, Luís M. A. Bettencourt et al., “The Power of a Good Idea: Quantitative Modeling of the 
Spread of Ideas From Epidemiological Models” (2006) 364 Physica A 513 at 514 (“By the term ‘idea’ 
we refer generally to any concept that can be transmitted from person to person...  What is important is 
that it is possible to tell if someone has adopted the idea, understands and remembers it, and is capable of and/or active in 
spreading it to others.” [emphasis added]).
ing simply does  not count.  The idea of a rumour is, as it were, in the spreading 
and not in the having.14 Similarly, a scientist may be said to “have” a theory when 
she publishes an article in which it appears or teaches it in a lecture.  Applied to 
the law, the utterance (for instance) of “the plaintiff ’s cause is dismissed” or the 
citation of a particular case as binding authority in a written judgement would –
#given the appropriate context – count as evidence that someone is  infected with a 
legal norm.
The behaviourist solution thus appears  to get us  off the theoretical hook. 
We needn’t be concerned that “having” a norm is not analogous to having a dis-
ease because we can track infection by the proxy of its symptoms, namely expres-
sive behaviour.  A legal norm would thus be more like a “syndrome” – a condition 
characterized by a set of  associated symptoms – rather than like a disease.
But even if the behaviourist solution does address the problem of the di-
sanalogy between diseases and norms, this does not solve the practical problems 
that arise from stipulating that people are the basic units of the population, nota-
bly the difficulty of collecting data.  Consider the following (non-exhaustive) list of 
expressive behaviours that might indicate infection with the norm “all drivers must 
stop at red lights”:
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14 Strictly speaking, the private rumour relisher would be infected but not infective.  Both the person who 
believes  the rumour but does  not spread it and the person who hears the rumour and does  not believe 
it (i.e.  an immune person) would become removeds.  Some models include other classes, such as  “sti-
flers”, who actively disbelieve the rumour and seek to prevent further spread.  See e.g. Kawachi et al., 
supra note 4 at 56; Bettencourt, et al., ibid. at 518.
- A statute containing a stipulation to the effect that all drivers 
should stop at red lights;
- Positive response to a questionnaire containing the question “must 
all drivers stop at red lights?”;
- Stopping routinely at red lights while driving;
- A police officer pulling someone over for not having stopped at a 
red light;
- A judgement rendered by a tribunal fining someone for not having 
stopped at a red light;
- Routinely showing disapproval when someone fails to stop at a red 
light;
- A pamphlet distributed to new drivers that states “you must always 
stop at red lights”;
- etc.  
On analogy to disease spread, we could say that each of these behaviours is 
a symptom of the condition “adherence to the red light norm.” Notice, however, 
that this list is not only non-exhaustive, but that no exhaustive list could be in prin-
ciple enumerated.  Diseases generally have a list of frequent symptoms, a number 
of less frequent symptoms and some rare symptoms.  Taken together they can be 
characterized as a (more or less) definitive list.  But the number of expressive be-
haviours that can demonstrate adherence to a norm is literally limitless.
Nor does the analogy to a syndrome help us, since even a syndrome whose 
etiology is unknown has – by definition – a finite list of characteristic symptoms. 
The only way to capture the limitless  forms of expressive behaviour that could be 
symptomatic of adherence to a given norm would be to characterize them at a 
high level of abstraction, for instance: “expressive behaviour whose semantic con-
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tent and normative commitment indicate adherence to norm X.” But this is  a tau-
tology; of course behaviour that indicates adherence to a norm is  symptomatic of 
adherence to the norm!
Not only are the expressive behaviours that might indicate adherence to a 
norm extremely varied and theoretically limitless, but many of them are not read-
ily accessible to the erstwhile epidemiologist of law.  One of the preconditions  to 
epidemiological research is access to existing data on incidence rates or the design 
of a study that allows for this data to be collected.  Indeed, the historical develop-
ment of epidemiology as a discipline was predicated, in part, on the emergence of 
a vital statistics  system that collected data on mortality and morbidity.15  If it is 
relatively easy to have access to some forms of expressive behaviour related to law, 
other forms such as routine conduct are difficult to collect in a systematic way.
Furthermore, for many diseases (though admittedly not for syndromes), 
there exists  a conclusive diagnostic test.  If I visit a doctor and complain of a sore 
throat and fever, she might suspect that I have streptococcal pharyngitis  (i.e. “strep 
throat”).  Her suspicion might be strengthened upon examination if she discovers 
that I have inflamed tonsils and yellow and white patches in the throat.  In case of 
doubt, she can confirm the initial diagnosis  by taking a culture (“throat swab”) and 
sending it to a laboratory to detect for the presence the bacterium responsible for 
strep throat (streptococcus pyogenes).  A positive test is  conclusive of infection.  In the 
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15 See generally, Abraham M. Lilienfeld & David E. Lilienfeld, Foundations of Epidemiology, 2nd ed. (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 1980) at 23-43.
case of adherence to a norm, however, it is not obvious what would count as a 
conclusive diagnostic.
These two obstacles – the limitless number and wide variety of expressive 
behaviours that can serve as evidence of infection and the absence of a conclusive 
diagnostic test – make data collection extremely difficult.  If an epidemiological 
model requires  us to identify the number of infectives  in a population over time 
and we have neither a finite number of criteria nor a conclusive test for identifying 
infectives then we are faced with a serious problem.  Let us call this “the data col-
lection problem”.  There is a solution to the data collection problem, but as we 
shall see, the solution entails that there is a better basic unit of population; namely 
the legal text.
The solution to the data collection problem is to stipulate some finite subset 
of symptoms (i.e. of expressive behaviour) the members  of which are: (a) amenable 
to an analysis  that allows for the identification of infection by the norm, and (b) 
readily accessible.  The best candidate that satisfies these two criteria is legal texts. 
Statutes, regulations, tribunal decisions, contracts, wills, policies and commentary 
are all amenable to textual analysis in order to determine whether they incorpo-
rate a particular legal norm.  Many of them are also readily accessible, depending 
on the publicity requirements of  the legal environment in which they operate.
Using the terms of the behaviourist solution, if we consider people to be 
the basic units of the population, then legal texts would serve as evidence of their 
infection.  But, as  the intellectual epidemic model suggests, they can also be seen 
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as methods of transmission to other members of the population.16  Texts would 
thus be analogous both to symptoms and to fomites or –#as in the table in Figure 
4-1 – vectors.  This  is not necessarily incoherent; sneezing is both a symptom of 
the flu and a method of  its transmission.
So, legal texts  can be seen as  tokens of a certain type of expressive behav-
iour that may be symptomatic of infection by a member of the population.  We 
thus have a (somewhat imperfect) way of identifying infectives.  The author of a 
legal text that expresses the contagious norm is  an infective.  Similarly, the authors 
of legal texts in which the norm is considered and explicitly or implicitly rejected 
can be identified as immune members of the population.  Identifying susceptibles 
presents a challenge however; perhaps we could dub susceptibles as all of the po-
tential authors of  legal texts.
Now, defining the members of the population as the authors or potential 
authors  of legal texts suffers  from a number of serious drawbacks, not the least of 
which is a restriction of the category of law to its written expression.  I shall dis-
cuss this below, but for now I want to point out that if – as I suggest – we concen-
trate our analysis of the spread of legal norms on the texts in which they are ex-
pressed, then the functional role of the basic unit of the population has  essentially 
been reduced to nil.  In other words, the people  who are authors  (or potential 
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16  The table in Figure 4-1 (Analogy between infectious disease and intellectual epidemics) identifies 
them as “vectors”.
authors) of legal texts  have become mere placeholders in the model and do little 
theoretical and no practical work.
This  is an ironic consequence of the behaviourist solution.  If  – to avoid 
the problems associated with defining what it means to “have” an idea – we focus 
our attention exclusively on behaviour, then we have no need for people in our de-
scription of the basic unit of the population.  Indeed this was  precisely the objec-
tive of the behaviourist movement in the philosophy of mind characterized by 
Skinner17 and Quine.18 It is essentially an application of Ockam’s razor: if every-
thing we want to explain can be explained with behaviour then we can jettison the 
category of  mind out of  “ontological parsimony”.19
Instead of using people as the basic unit of the population, I therefore pro-
pose to use legal texts as  the basic unit.  What is  infected by a norm is a text and 
the distribution and pattern of spread of the norm are to be looked for in the rela-
tionships between these texts.
In excising people from my description of the population, I don’t mean to 
imply that people are unimportant in spreading norms or that norms somehow 
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17 See B. F. Skinner, About Behaviorism (New York: Knopf, 1974).
18 See Willard v. O. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1960).
19 “[Ockam’s  Razor] can be straightforwardly applied… when a theory,  T, postulates entities which are 
explanatorily idle.  Excising these entities from T produces a second theory, T*, which has the same 
theoretical virtues  as T but a smaller set of ontological commitments.  Hence, according to [Ockam’s 
razor],  it is rational to pick T* over T.” (Alan Baker,   “Simplicity” in Edward N. Zalta, ed., The Stan-
f o r d E n c y c l o p e d i a o f P h i l o s o p h y , F a l l 2 0 0 8 e d . , 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/simplicity/>).   For Quine’s argument for the 
minimization of ontological commitments, see Willard v. O. Quine, “On What There Is” (1948) 2:5 
Review of  Metaphysics 21.
spread independently of people.  Of course legal texts are written by authors and 
they are read and interpreted by readers.  Ultimately, it is  people who adhere (or 
not) to norms and who govern their behaviour accordingly.  The use of texts as  the 
basic unit of the population is not meant as  a denial of this  fact.  Rather, it is a re-
sponse to some of theoretical and practical problems that arise by focusing on in-
dividual actors  in describing the spread of norms.  Furthermore, this is  in keeping 
with a certain tendency to depersonalize law; a tendency that I don’t believe is en-
tirely pernicious.20 Lawyers and legal scholars are generally interested in legislation 
and jurisprudence for what they say and not for who wrote them.21
Critics might argue that I have taken an overly textual approach; literally 
one of “law on the books” that ignores the multifaceted “law in action”.  The law, 
they could say, is much more than a collection of words  on paper.  It includes un-
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20 Depersonalization is, for example, the basis of the rule against bills of attainder (e.g.  in U.S.  Const. 
art.#1,#§#9,#cl.#3).
21This  is not to deny that there is  room for biography in legal scholarship or practice.   It is  a legitimate 
research project to analyze how a particular judge shaped the jurisprudence on a given topic or how a 
particular legislator managed to affect the law.  Likewise, citation of a judgement rendered by a par-
ticularly eminent judge may be a good strategy for legal practitioners.
written norms, practices, attitudes – the whole “buzzing blooming confusion”22 of 
human interactions that can be organized using categories conventionally deter-
mined as “legal”.  My response to this is to agree that texts imperfectly capture the 
complexity and nuance of the universe of legal normativity, but to deny that this 
means I am unjustified in taking legal texts as my basic unit of population.  Cer-
tainly, there are other possible methodological solutions to the data collection 
problem: a sociologist might try to discover norm adherence by analysing re-
sponses to a questionnaire or running focus groups, for instance, and an anthro-
pologist might do legal ethnography as a participant observer.  In each of these 
cases, the solution to the data collection problem is a variation on the same theme: 
reducing the categories of expressive behaviour examined in order to have a man-
ageable data set.  Furthermore, these methodologies suffer from a defect that tex-
tual analysis of the jurisprudence does not: the need for an account of the rela-
tionship between the texts and the various other expressions of legal normativity. 
Imagine that (say) a sociologist had performed a methodologically sound study of 
Canadian workplaces and discovered that adherence to a set of norms relating to 
198
22  The phrase is from William James, see, e.g. William James, Some Problems of Philosophy (London: 
Longmans, Green & Co., 1911) at 50; William James, “Psychology: Briefer Course” in William James 
& Gerald E. Myers, eds., William James: Writings, 1878-1899 (New York:  Library of America, 1992) 1 at 
24.  Its use to describe the range of human interactions that can be organized using the concept of law 
is  a favourite of Roderick Macdonald’s.   See, e.g., Roderick Macdonald, “Transdisciplinarity and Trust” 
in Margaret A. Somerville & David Rappaport, eds., Transdisciplinarity: reCreating Integrated Knowledge 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press, 2003) 61 at 64, 75; Roderick Macdonald, “Unitary Law Re-form, 
Pluralistic Law Re-Substance: Illuminating Legal Change” (2007) 67 La. L. Rev. 1113 at 118-19; 
Roderick Macdonald & Thomas McMorrow, “Wedding a Critical Legal Pluralism to the Laws of 
Close Personal Adult Relationships”, online: (2007) 1:1 European Journal of Legal Studies 
<http://hdl.handle.net/1814/6853> at s.#II.A.  (“Law is  a label we attach to human phenomena; be-
fore we apply the word law, there are just data in the world – and even the conception of the “big, 
blooming, buzzing confusion” of experience as  data implies a human intellectual endeavour.  Through 
our labelling, we construct the phenomena, the data, and the confusion as  “law” rather than as some-
thing else.”).
drug testing had spread in a way that could be described epidemically.  This  would 
not – in itself – explain the appearance of the spread of the norms across  legal 
texts  and thus contribute to a solution to the problem raised in Chapter 1, namely 
to explain the spread of the drug testing norms from the United States to Cana-
dian jurisprudence.  To do this, our erstwhile sociologist would have to take the fur-
ther step of explaining just how norms that are adhered to in workplaces find their 
way into jurisprudence.  This is, of  course, no small feat.  Indeed, it would be 
rather surprising to find that jurisprudence perfectly mirrors adherence to legal 
norms “on the ground”.  More likely, the perceived spread across workplaces  and 
the perceived spread across the jurisprudence would not match up.  What looked 
like a promising methodology for answering our research question would thus 
have raised more questions than it addressed.  In contrast, whatever its  limitations, 
the analysis of  legal texts does not suffer from this particular defect.
Incidentally, the same critique (and the same response) apply to studies of 
disease spread.  A researcher’s  decision to rely, say, on the number of cases re-
ported to the health authorities entails  that an aspect of the phenomenon will be 
missed; namely the percentage of the population who suffer symptoms but do not 
report them.  The researcher could also choose to  administer questionnaires about 
symptoms to a sample of the population or to live amongst them and report her 
observations of symptoms in a notebook.  The point is that none of these methods 
will entirely capture the incidence rate.  The choice of a data set is a matter of se-
lecting from the available range of observable phenomena.  As long as one is 
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aware of the limitations of one’s  data set and methodology and the appropriate 
provisos are set out in one’s  conclusions, these limitations are not a serious prob-
lem.
Finally, my decision to use texts rather than people as the basic unit of the 
population is  a matter of choice based on my research objectives.  Just as in the 
case of malaria we can choose to see mosquitos as vectors of transmission among 
a human population or humans as a vector of transmission among a mosquito 
population, so can texts be seen either as  vectors or population members  in the 
epidemiology of legal norms.  Keeping in mind that this is a stipulative definition 
and not a claim of ontological priority, we can simply note that the choice has 
been made and get on with the project.
Besides providing a solution to the data collection problem, working with a 
population of texts – and in particular with legal texts  – has a number of advan-
tages.  First, the structure of legal texts allows  us  to trace the chain of infection 
with relative ease.  Because of the importance of authority as  a justification in le-
gal reasoning, legal texts often explicitly state the sources  that they rely upon.  The 
practice of reference and citation thus provides a valuable indicator of the origins 
of a norm adopted or rejected.  Admittedly, this is  not true of all legal texts; pri-
vate contracts  and wills, for instance, rarely cite other texts.  Nor is  reference and 
citation uniformly spread across legal texts; jurisprudence often cites legislation for 
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authority, but legislation rarely refers to caselaw.23  Nevertheless, many of the 
members of the population of legal texts explicitly indicate their sources,24 which 
greatly simplifies the discovery of particular infection chains.  This is in stark con-
trast to the epidemiology of diseases; with some exceptions (in the case of ex-
tremely rare diseases or sexually transmitted diseases in small populations, for ex-
ample) it is  extremely difficult to figure out which infective was in contact with 
which susceptible and whether that contact was effective in the sense of being an 
instance of  transmission.
Second, legal texts almost always have references situating them in time. 
For example, statutes indicate their dates of adoption and coming into force, tri-
bunal decisions indicate the date rendered and also often the dates on which the 
case was pled, contracts usually indicate the date of signing, etc.  This feature is 
due to the importance of the passage of time in the creation and extinction of le-
gal rights and remedies (as in the case of prescription, filing delays, and so forth) as 
well as in the application of such doctrines as res judicata and stare decisis.  Thus, 
whereas situating the epidemiological epochs25 for diseases is a matter of educated 
guesswork (or at best, probabilistic deduction), situating the epidemiological ep-
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23 For two rare example, see the Arbitration Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 17, ss. 3(1)(i) and 5(4) (describing an 
“agreement… requiring that a matter be adjudicated by arbitration before it may be dealt with by a 
court” as a “Scott v.  Avery clause” in reference to Scott v Avery (1865) 10 ER 1121); U.S.,  H.B.  1374, An 
Act to Overturn the Shepard Case [and] to Overturn the Skinner Case, 2007-2008, Reg.  Sess., N.C., 2007 (en-
acted).
24 Note that the same is often true of scientific texts, which also follow strict norms of citation and ref-
erence.
25 See Figure 3-4 (Relations between epidemiological epochs) and accompanying text in Chapter 3.
ochs affecting legal texts  is both relatively simple and relatively precise; the texts 
themselves display the relevant dates.
Having decided that the basic unit of the population to be studied are legal 
texts, the next step in constructing my model is  the definition of a population and 
the tracing of  its boundary.
2.1.2. Population Definition and Population Boundaries
Recall that the definition of a population and the tracing of its  boundaries are in-
terrelated.  The definition of the population is constituted by a general description 
of the group of individuals to be studied and tracing the boundaries is an exercise 
in refining the criteria for determining whether a given individual falls within the 
defined population.  So far, all I have said about the population that I want to 
study is  that it is comprised of legal texts.  In this subsection I will set out which 
legal texts I will be studying and some of the boundaries that will be used in de-
termining whether a text is included in this population.
Note that this does not mean that I will list all of the characteristics of the 
members of the population that may explain difference in incidence.  In order for 
individual characteristics to be measured and their relationship to  incidence com-
pared, the individuals must first be included in the population.  One of the exam-
ples I gave above illustrates this: if  I want to know whether the incidence of a dis-
ease in a population varies with sex, then I must include members of both sexes in 
my study population.  I set out the characteristics that I will include in analyzing 
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my data in Chapter 5, where I set out the methodology that will be used in opera-
tionalizing the model.
Neither will I set out in detail the entire population profile in this chapter. 
The population profile is an empirical description of the population based on its 
definition and its boundaries.  In Chapter 5, I enumerate the characteristics  of the 
members of the population that will be measured in order to profile it and provide 
a detailed population profile based on the results of  those measurements.
One final proviso: in the previous subsection, I made general arguments  in 
support of using legal texts as  my basic unit of population.  Those arguments  may 
be applicable to a wide range of phenomena, without further modification. 
Whenever we are faced with a legal system in which texts  play an important role, 
we can argue that an epidemiological model of the propagation of norms within 
that system may use legal texts as  its basic unit of population.  In this  subsection, 
however, I define the specific population that I am interested in for this  particular 
study.  While many of the claims that I make to justify my definition may also 
serve to justify similar definitions  of other populations, changes will certainly need 
to be made to account for the differences in research objectives.  
With these provisos in mind, we can now get on with the definition of the 
population.  I have already stated that my interest is in how employment drug test-
ing norms spread from the United States to Canada.  Having defined the basic 
unit of population as the legal text, we can refine our inquiry into how American 
employment drug testing norms spread to Canadian legal texts.  The first element 
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of our population definition is  thus that the legal texts  must be Canadian.  How-
ever, we must still choose which Canadian legal texts.
As I have already discussed, defining a population is  not a question of a pri-
ori deduction.  In other words, having decided what our basic unit of population is 
does not commit us to any particular population definition.  The definition is a 
choice based on research objectives, which are in turn based on our intuitions 
about which populations would produce interesting and meaningful results if stud-
ied.  For instance, if we wanted to study the spread of HIV, the basic unit of popu-
lation would be “humans” (implied by the fact that HIV is the Human Immunode-
ficiency Virus), but we would still have to decide which humans are to form our 
population.  We could choose to study the spread of HIV in Asia (all people in 
Asia), or among intravenous drug users in Montreal (all people who live in Mont-
real and who use intravenous drugs), among Dutch adults (all people resident in 
the Netherlands  over a certain age), etc.  There is  no principled reason for choosing 
one population over another.  If we wanted to, we could do a perfectly valid epi-
demiological study of the spread of HIV among people named George whose 
birthday is in December.  Of course, though there is no principled reason to reject 
such a population definition, the study would be unlikely to be of any interest nor 
to produce meaningful results.
The definition of the population will also depend on practical matters of 
feasibility, notably the quantity and accessibility of available data.  It may initially 
appear tempting to simply include all Canadian legal texts in the population, but 
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this would raise insurmountable obstacles.  Consider the following (non-
exhaustive) list of candidates for inclusion in this population; that is, Canadian 
texts  that can be reasonably construed as legal and which can be expected to refer 
to norms relating to drug testing in the context of  employment:
- Federal, provincial and territorial statutes and regulations;
- Orders-in-council, decrees, ministerial directives, and other execu-
tive instruments;
- Administrative guidelines, policy statements, and other documents 
adopted or promulgated by ministries, departments, and other 
state agencies;
- Decisions rendered by federal, provincial and territorial tribunals 
and boards of  arbitration;
- Claims, grievances, motions, facta, and other procedures filed with 
those tribunals;
- Legal opinions written for employers, unions, individuals, or gov-
ernment agencies;
- Collective agreements and individual contracts of  employment;
- Personnel policies and other private legislative instruments;
- Memos, directives, and other private executive instruments;
- Signs (e.g..  “This is a drug-free workplace!”), pamphlets, leaflets 
and other documents purporting to inform people of their rights 
and responsibilities;
- Commentary and academic papers published in professional jour-
nals, law journals, and monographs;
- Blogs and websites;
- etc.
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It is immediately apparent that this list (which is incomplete) covers  an enormous 
number of texts.  In other words, if  we simply limit our definition of the popula-
tion to Canadian legal texts – even just those that we would expect to refer to drug 
testing in the employment context – our population is going to be much too large 
to perform any kind of useful data analysis.  Furthermore, many of the texts  in the 
list are not available for collection and analysis, either because they are impossible 
to access (for instance in the case of legal opinions, which are covered by attorney-
client privilege) or because they are not publicly available (for instance, in the case 
of many corporate personnel policies).  In addition to these hurdles, even many 
documents that are publicly available are unpublished and it is therefore not feasi-
ble to access them in any systematic way (for instance, in the case of collective 
agreements, which must be filed with the relevant authorities in all Canadian ju-
risdictions,26  but which are not systematically published).  Consequently, we are 
faced with a variant of the data collection problem: even if we substantially reduce 
the limitless number of expressive behaviours that might count as symptomatic of 
infection by defining the basic unit of population as  legal texts, we are still con-
fronted with (a) too much data and (b) data that is difficult if not impossible to col-
lect in a systematic way.
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26  British Columbia Labour Relations Code, R.S.B.C., c. 244, s. 51; Alberta Labour Relations Code, R.S.A. 
2000, c. L-1, s.  132; Saskatchewan Trade Union Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. T-17, s.#31; Manitoba Labour Relations 
Act, C.C.S.M. c. L10, s.#22(5)(b); Ontario Labour Relations Act,  1995, S.O. 1995, c. 1, Sch. A, s. 90; Que-
bec Labour Code, R.S.Q. c.  C-27, s. 72; New Brunswick Industrial Relations Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. I-4, 
s.#37(3); Nova Scotia Trade Union Act,  R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 475, s.#46; Prince Edward Island Labour Act, 
R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. L-1,  s. 43(2); the Newfoundland and Labrador Labour Relations Act, R.S.N.L.  1990, 
c.#L-1, s.#96; Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2, s.#115.
One possible solution to this variant of the data collection problem is to 
confine our definition of what texts count as  “legal”; that is, to restrict our criteria 
for juridicity.  Contra the insights of legal pluralism, we could thus make the argu-
ment that only those texts adopted by the state or that directly reference state 
norms are legal texts.  On this view, the other texts listed might express norms, but 
they are not legal  texts and thus they fall outside of our definition of the basic unit 
of the population.  Consequently, they shouldn’t be included in the population. 
Note that this  solution is not a matter of population definition, but rather a way of 
refining the basic unit of  population.
This  solution is undesirable for two reasons.  The first reason is that it isn’t 
really a solution at all.  That is, even if we remove all texts that are not paradig-
matically legal on a narrow reading of the term, we still have the same data collec-
tion problem.  We may have reduced the total number of texts, thereby making 
the data set prima facie more manageable, but we are still left with many that are 
unavailable.  Surely, even the most restrictive criteria of juridicity will allow for 
procedures filed before state tribunals to count as legal texts, and yet the sheer 
number of these documents  and their dispersion across hundreds, if not thou-
sands, of  registries make their systematic collection impossible.  
The second reason not to restrict the definition of “legal” in order to solve 
our new data collection problem is that it forces us  to adopt a theoretical stance for 
the sole purpose of practical expediency.  Certainly one could defend a narrow 
conception of juridicity on principled grounds, but these grounds should be inde-
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pendent of whether they make data collection easier.  It is one thing to adjust one’s 
theory when confronted with data that doesn’t fit –  this is good scientific practice 
and forms the basis of Popper’s  falsifiability criterion27  – it is quite another to 
change one’s theory simply because it makes research easier.   Karl Llewellyn (who 
relied on appellate cases as the basis for his  legal analysis  despite his view that law 
is the actions of officials rather than the words of judges) described this  risk of bas-
ing one’s conception of  law solely on the easily available data:
I am prey… to the old truth that the available limits 
vision, the available bulks  as if it were the whole. 
What records have I of the work of magistrates. 
How shall I get them?  Are there any?  And if there 
are, must I search them out myself ?  But the appellate 
courts make access to their work convenient.  They 
issue reports, printed, bound, to be had all gathered 
for me in the libraries.  The convenient  source of in-
formation lures.  Men [sic.] work with it, first, because 
it is there; and because they have worked with it, men 
built it into ideology.28
Though the scope of readily available legal texts has widened radically since 
Llewellyn, the basic problem remains.  What is therefore important is that we heed 
Llewellyn’s  warning and resist the urge to reify constraints on available data into 
an ideology.
A better solution to this version of the data collection problem is to  define 
the population (as opposed to the basic population units) in such a way as to only 
cover those members about whom meaningful data can be systematically col-
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27 Karl R. Popper,  The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge,  2002), especially at chap-
ter 4.
28 Karl N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush (Oxford University Press: New York, 2008) at 95.
lected.  This  is simply a recognition that a practical problem requires a practical 
solution, as  opposed to theoretical ad hocery.  We must recognize, however, that in 
defining the population around practical limits  we are reducing the scope and the 
generality of the conclusions that can be drawn from our investigation into it. 
This is part of  any good study design.
My choice of the population definition is thus dependent on two factors. 
First, it must address this new variant of the data collection problem, that is, its 
scope must be such that it allows for systematic collection of meaningful data. 
This  is  a constraint rather than a choice.  The second factor is one of choice: from 
the available subsets of legal texts (i.e. the possible populations that aggregate legal 
texts) I must choose one that corresponds to my research objectives.
Recall that the intuition I set out after a first textual analysis in Chapter 1 
was that the Canadian jurisprudence showed evidence of having been derived 
from U.S.  norms, even in the absence of legislative intervention.  This led me to 
hypothesize that the norms had spread to the Canadian jurisprudence from the 
U.S. and that this  spread could be explained epidemiologically.  I therefore pro-
pose to limit my population of  legal texts to Canadian jurisprudence.
I am aware that this radically reduces the number of texts to be analysed; 
this is  one reason for restricting the definition in the first place.  But I might have 
chosen a larger population that nevertheless avoids the data collection problem. 
For instance – in addition to jurisprudence – I could include legislation and com-
mentary in my population.  These are the only other sets of legal texts that are 
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both routinely published and generally available in databases, and which are 
therefore amenable to systematic collection and analysis.  I have different reasons 
for excluding each of  these sets of  texts from my definition of  the population.
I exclude legislation for the simple reason that there is virtually none, re-
gardless of how the notion of “employment drug testing norms” is  cached out.29 
Indeed it was precisely this legislative silence that led me to dismiss  the transplant 
and harmonization models of legal norm transmission in favour of an epidemiol-
ogical approach.  In any event, a meaningful discussion about the transmission 
and spread of a phenomenon across a population requires a population of a cer-
tain size.30 There are just not enough instances of infection in Canadian legislation 
to ground such a discussion.
Contrary to legislation, there is a substantial amount of commentary that 
deals explicitly with employment drug testing in Canada.  One might therefore ask 
why I have chosen to exclude commentary from my population description, given 
that it does not suffer from the obscurity that led me to exclude other legal texts 
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29  The only clear reference is to be found in Prince Edward Island’s  Student Transportation Regulations, 
P.E.I. Reg. EC485/98 at s. 9 (“A school board may require a driver to undergo… addictions tests or 
treatment as  recommended by the examining physician.”).   The Canada Labour Code, supra note 26 pro-
vides, at s.#125.3(3) that “employers  of employees employed in a coal mine” must require their employ-
ees to undergo searches “for the purpose of preventing… drugs… from being brought into the mine”, 
but the Coal Mines Occupational Safety and Health Regulations, SOR/90-9 at ss.  142-43 clearly indicate that 
this  is to be a search of the person and not a drug test.  Similarly, s.  21 of the Saskatchewan Mines Regu-
lations, 2003, R.R.S. c.#O-1.1 Reg. 2, requires employers and contractors to “...take all reasonable steps 
to ensure that no person whose ability to work safely is  impaired by… any drug… is  allowed to work at 
a mine,” though testing is not explicitly authorized.
30 This statement is  true as a rule, but in purely formal terms, it only requires a population of >1 and 
there have been some studies done on quite small populations.   See Raj S. Bhopal,  Concepts of Epidemiol-
ogy: An Integrated Introduction to the Ideas, Theories, Principles, and Methods of Epidemiology (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002) at 15-16.
(i.e. commentary is published and can generally be accessed with ease in searcha-
ble databases).  The simple answer is that my research objective is  to explain how 
the jurisprudence managed to get infected with the U.S. norms, and how they 
spread thereafter.  The fact that commentary is not impossible to include in my 
population (as, for instance, legal opinions are) does not mean that they necessarily 
should be included.
Before moving on to a brief discussion of the boundaries of my population, 
I should underscore that the mere fact that I have excluded many legal texts from 
my population description does not mean that they therefore cease to play any role 
in my model.  For instance, in determining whether a decision has come into di-
rect contact with the U.S. norms, I will be looking for references to American legis-
lation, corporate personnel policies, and commentary.  I will also refer to elements 
that are not texts – that is, that are not included in my basic population units  – 
such as individual decision-makers, industries, etc.  These may play other roles, 
such as vectors and reservoirs.  This is both legitimate and necessary.  Epidemiol-
ogical analysis depends on an understanding of the relationship between the pri-
mary population and its environment.
2.1.3. Population Boundaries
Having defined my population as Canadian jurisprudence, I should briefly state 
some of the main boundaries  that circumscribe it, that is, the basic criteria that 
will determine whether a given legal text counts as Canadian jurisprudence and 
ought therefore to be included in my population.
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By jurisprudence, I mean the written decisions rendered by tribunals that are 
constituted by statute or authorized by statute to render binding decisions.  Thus, 
not only do judgements  from the various courts count as jurisprudence, but so do 
decisions rendered by administrative tribunals, boards  and commissions.  Insofar 
as boards of arbitration are constituted or authorized by statute – as is  the case for 
example with labour arbitration31  – they are included, though I exclude such 
boards  if they are purely private and consensual, even when they are authorized 
by statute32 and where their decisions are thereby given full effect.33 This exclusion 
is due to the fact that awards rendered by purely consensual private arbitration 
boards are generally not published and are therefore inaccessible.
 By Canadian  jurisprudence, I mean decisions rendered by the tribunals 
mentioned above where the enabling or constituting statute is  a statute of Canada 
or of one of its  provinces or territories.  This excludes arbitration boards consti-
tuted by international agreements, even when the decisions of those boards are 
enforceable under a Canadian statute,34  as well as the decisions of foreign tribu-
nals and arbitration boards even when their decisions are enforceable under a Ca-
nadian statute.35
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31  See e.g. Canada Labour Code, supra note 26 at s. 57; Ontario Labour Relations Act, supra note 26 at s. 48; 
Quebec Labour Code, supra note 26 at s. 100.
32 See e.g. the Arbitration Act, supra note 23, esp. ss. 1-8; arts. 2638-2643 C.C.Q.
33 See e.g. the Arbitration Act, ibid., s. 50; arts. 946-947.4 C.C.P.
34 See e.g. the Commercial Arbitration Act,  R.S.C. 1985, c.  17 (2nd Supp.), s.  5 and the Act Respecting the Im-
plementation of  International Trade Agreements, R.S.Q. c. M-35.2, ss. 8-9.
35 See e.g. Reciprocal Enforcement of  Judgements Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. R.5; arts. 3155-3168 C.C.Q.
Finally, my population will only consist of Canadian jurisprudence that re-
lates to the norms governing drug testing in the context of the employment rela-
tionship.  I provide some more detail on the basis for this criterion in my discussion 
of susceptibles and infectives below, and in Chapter 5 I explain how this is opera-
tionalized.
2.2. Infection, Contagion, and Spread in Legal Epidemiology
In the previous subsections, I identified how my model maps the epidemiological 
notion of population onto the field of law.  I argued that legal texts provide the 
most promising basic unit of population and then defined the population of my 
study as being Canadian jurisprudence relating to the norms governing drug test-
ing in the context of the employment relationship.  Throughout that discussion, I 
left the concept of norm undefined and provided little in way of explanation of 
how exactly a norm might be transmitted to a legal text.  I turn to these questions 
now.
In the first subsection I present a working definition of “norm” that serves 
as the model’s analogue to the epidemiological concept of infectious agent.  I then 
map the different epidemic states of infective, susceptible, and removed onto 
properties of judgements.  Finally, I describe some ways in which judgements 
might be infected by norms.
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2.2.1. A Brief  Definition of  Legal Norms
My objective in this subsection is  to provide a working definition of “legal norms” 
for use in the model.  This working definition must be sufficient to allow for the 
mapping of  the relevant epidemiological concepts to the field of  law.  
My intention is  not to set out a full-fledged theory of legal normativity. 
There is a vast literature in legal theory that addresses the relationships between 
legal norms and other forms of normativity.  In particular, what the criteria of 
“juridicity” are (i.e. what – if anything – distinguishes  a legal norm from other 
forms of normativity such as social mores, games, customs, etc.) is the subject of 
ongoing debate.  The different approaches in this literature can be seen as cover-
ing a spectrum going from a strict definition of juridicity (exemplified by legal 
positivists such as Kelsen and Hart) to an expansive one (exemplified by legal plu-
ralists such as  Fuller and Macdonald).  I do not wish to delve deeply into this  de-
bate, which in any case often amounts simply to an exercise in “externaliz[ing]… 
the burden of the qualifying adjective”, whereby theorists jockey for their stipula-
tive definition of “law” to occupy the core and attempt to relegate divergent views 
to the periphery.36
Furthermore, my definition needn’t allow us to decide on all the different 
ways in which a legal norm can come into being or be expressed.  All I need is  a 
definition that provides  a criterion or set of criteria for determining if, within a 
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36  Martha-Marie Kleinhans & Roderick Macdonald, “What is  Critical Legal Pluralism?” (1997) 12 
C.J.L.S. 25 at 33, n. 21.
given text, a statement is  or is  not the expression of a legal norm.  In other words, 
I need only define one subset of the sufficient conditions of juridicity; there may 
be other conditions  that would also suffice.  Also, I needn’t set out the necessary 
conditions.
In addition to the various positions within legal theory, one’s definition of 
“norm” will depend on the disciplinary perspective from which one looks at hu-
man behaviour.37  From a sociological perspective, norms are continually elabo-
rated by and re-inscribed in the multitude of interactions and institutions that con-
stitute social life.  “Norms” in this sense refer to the entire gamut of behaviours 
that can be described as socially acceptable or unacceptable, and formal pro-
nouncements  of prescribed behaviour with attendant sanctions for failing to con-
form to them are but a small subset of  this category.38
From the perspective of many jurists, however interesting this manifold of 
social norms may be as an object of study, they have little to do with legal norms, 
the hallmarks of which are their formal pronouncement by an individual or body 
vested with the authority to do so and the purported universality of their 
application.39  Let’s call such formal pronouncements “edicts”.  Though some dis-
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37  For a discussion on interdisciplinary dialogue between these perspectives, see Pierre Noreau, “La 
norme, le commandement et la loi# : le droit comme objet d'analyse interdisciplinaire” (2000) 19:2-3 
Politiques et Sociétés 154.
38 Ibid. at 161.
39 See e.g. H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law,  2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).   Note that 
the state does not figure in this definition.   Pace “social scientific legal pluralism”, this does  not exclude 
private clubs, religious  communities, sports leagues,  and thus does not exclude other “legal orders”. 
See Guy Rocher, “Pour une sociologie des ordres juridiques” (1996) 29:1 Cahiers de droit 91. 
agree that the presence of an edict is necessary for a norm to count as a legal 
norm,40  none – that I am aware of – deny that it is  sufficient.  In other words, 
though it may be the case that not all legal norms are edicts, all edicts are legal 
norms.
When I say that a legal text “sets out”, “adheres to”, “contains”, “pro-
nounces”, etc.., a norm, I am referring to edicts.  That is, legal  texts set out legal 
norms.  This is not to say that norms in the sociological sense cannot appear in 
legal texts; it is perfectly possible for a legal judgement to refer to social norms. 
Certainly a judge may take notice of the existence and content of social norms 
and even make legal determinations based upon this.  For instance, a judge decid-
ing whether the defence of provocation is available to a defendant charged with 
murder must determine whether the acts  or words of the victim constitute a suffi-
ciently egregious violation of social norms as to “deprive an ordinary person of 
the power of self-control.”41 Similarly, in interpreting a contract, a judge may be 
take into account the customary norms that prevail in the social context in which 
the contract operates.42  But this  judicial appraisal of the existence and content of 
social norms is an empirical one: the judge must determine what the social norms 
are in fact, rather than what they should be.43
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40  See, e.g., Roderick A. Macdonald, “Pour la reconnaissance d'une normativité juridique implicite et 
«#inférentielle#»” (1986) 18:1 Sociologie et sociétés 47.
41 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 232(2).
42 See, e.g. arts. 1426 & 1434 C.C.Q.
43  On the relationship between customary norms and their recognition by legal authorities,  see Hart, 
supra note 39 at 44-8.  For a more nuanced view of the legal recognition of social norms, see Jeremy 
Webber, “Legal Pluralism and Human Agency” (2006) 44 Osgoode Hall L.J. 167.
 What I mean when I say that a judgement edicts a legal norm is that it 
states  or implies  that – as a matter of law – the norm is a standard against which 
behaviour must be measured.  Thus, the statement, in a legal judgement that, “[y]
ou must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably 
foresee would be likely to harm your neighbour”44 is more than just a description 
of  a social norm; it is an edict.
One might ask why I have recourse to the term “norm” when it may ap-
pear from the examples that I have given that the concept of a rule would suffice. 
I do not wish here to embark on a debate about the semantic differences that may 
or may not exist between the terms “norm” and “rule” (and their cognates, such 
as “principle”45  and “maxim”46).  Though I do not think that norms can be re-
duced to rules – at least not without unduly stretching the concept of a rule – it 
doesn’t seem to me to be fruitful to insist upon the point here.  Readers who be-
lieve that they can properly do away with the concept of legal norms by translat-
ing norms – such as those attributive of jurisdiction and those that confer rights 
and privileges – into statements that can be expressed solely in terms of rules, 
should feel free to read “legal rule” wherever “legal norm” appears in this text.
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44 Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562 at 580.
45 Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986) at 15-28, 243-50.
46 Max Weber, “The Concept of Following a Rule” in W. G. Runciman, ed., Weber: Selections in Transla-
tion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978) 99.
2.2.2. Infected Texts
Having minimally defined legal norms such that pronouncements of standards 
with universal application by individuals  or bodies vested with the authority to do 
so count as instances thereof, it remains to be seen how a text could be infected with 
a norm.
Recall that in epidemiological terms, infections are caused by agents and 
that an agent is defined as  that which causes the condition under observation.  In 
the paradigm case of infection with a disease, the agent is a pathogen.  Thus, the 
agent of  AIDS is the HIV, and the agent of  the common cold is a rhinovirus.
Our first question is then “what is the condition that we wish to observe?” 
At first it would appear that the answer to this  question cannot be “infection with 
a legal norm”, on pain of circularity.  But this is not so.  As we saw above, it is pos-
sible for a member of a population to  be infected without exhibiting any symp-
toms.  Nevertheless, we might ask if there is some observable condition – other 
than the fact of infection itself – that generally accompanies infection with a legal 
norm.  
If we are to map this  distinction between a clinical condition and its etio-
logical agent onto the legal field, then we must make a distinction between the ex-
pression of a norm in a legal text and the underlying cause of that expression.  Fur-
thermore, that cause cannot be something that lies  in the head of the author of 
the text (an “idea” for instance) since I specifically rejected this view in my defini-
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tion of the basic unit of population.  I want to examine the spread of legal norms 
through Canadian jurisprudence; not through Canadian jurists.
Nevertheless, it is useful to make the distinction between the expression of a 
norm in a judgement and the infection of that judgement by that norm.  One of 
the reasons that I chose legal texts for my basic unit of population is that the num-
ber of expressive behaviours that could count as evidence for adhering to a norm 
is limitless.  However, the number of textual expressions of a norm is also  limitless. 
Consider the following statements:
- “The jurisdiction of a grievance arbitrator over disputes arising 
from the interpretation or application of a collective agreement is 
exclusive”;
- “L’arbitre de griefs jouit d’une compétence exclusive sur toute mé-
sentente rélative à l’interprétation ou l’application d’une conven-
tion collective”;
- “The only competent authority to adjudicate disagreements  aris-
ing from the interpretation or application of a collective agree-
ment is a grievance arbitrator”;
- “The Superior Court does not have jurisdiction ratione materiae over 
grievances; this is reserved for arbitrators”;
Surely all of these formulations express the same norm.47 If a decision containing 
one of these statements  cited a decision containing another of these statements as 
authority, we would want to say that the former applied the norm set out in the 
latter.  But since the expressions of the norm are clearly different, the norm must 
be something other than its expression.  This distinction between a norm and its 
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47 Found in ss. 100 and 139 of  the Quebec Labour Code, supra note 26.
expression is  a version of a distinction made by many philosophers of language, 
which calls  upon the notion of “reference”.  For instance, “the author of The Con-
cept of Law” and “H.L.A. Hart” both have the same referent; a certain man born 
in 1907 and who was Professor of  Jurisprudence at Oxford from 1952 to 1969.48
The notion of reference continues to occupy philosophers of language and 
raises a number of puzzles that needn’t concern us here.49  For present purposes, 
all we need to keep in mind is  that two decisions can be infected with the same 
norm without containing precisely the same statements and that evidence for in-
fection with the norm is the presence of  statements that refer to it. 
Just containing a statement that refers to a norm is not, however, sufficient 
to exhaust the notion of infection that I want to mobilize.  This is because many 
judgements may contain statements that refer to a norm but that are not edicts in 
the sense that I described above.  For example, judgements often contain state-
ments that refer to norms for the sole purpose of rejecting them.  For any norm 
referred to by the statement X, there can be any number of formulations of the 
sort “I cannot agree with counsel for the plaintiff that X” or “X is not a part of our 
law” or “the courts have long rejected X, with good reason”, etc.  In other words, 
decisions may mention a norm, without that norm being edicted.  This is  similar 
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48 I am simplifying enormously here.  For some examples of the benefits and pitfalls  of the use of the 
distinction between a denoting phrase and its  referent, see e.g. Bertrand Russell, “On Denoting” (1905) 
14 Mind 479.
49 For instance: we might think that given that “the author of The Concept of Law” and “H.L.A. Hart” 
have the same referent they must be identical in meaning, since everything that is  true of the former is 
true of the latter.  But one might not know that that particular person in fact wrote that particular book 
and so “the author of The Concept of Law is  H.L.A.  Hart” would convey new information in a way that 
X=X does not.
to the person who carries an infectious agent without exhibiting clinical symptoms; 
the norm is present, but it does not cause the phenomenon we are interested in.  
Finally, the difference between mentioning and edicting a norm is  not ex-
clusively a matter of the intention of the author of the text.  Some expressions of 
a norm in a decision may be meant to be edicts  but not function as edicts.  This  is 
the case, for instance in dissenting judgements and obiter remarks.
Bringing all of this together, I can now set out the analogy between infec-
tion with an agent in epidemiology and infection with a legal norm in my model. 
A decision is infected when it contains an expression that refers to a norm.  If the 
norm is merely mentioned – either because this is the intention of the author or 
because the text does not have the requisite authority – then the decision is  an as-
ymptomatic carrier.  If the norm functions as an edict, then the infected decision 
is a full blown case.
2.2.2.1. Transmission of  Norms
Having defined the infection of a judgement with a norm as being the presence of 
a statement that expresses that norm, it remains to be seen how a judgement may 
become infected, that is how norms are transmitted.  In what follows, I take citation 
to be the best – but not the only – evidence for transmission.  The general case is 
that some text A, is infected with norm ! as evidenced by the presence of a state-
ment !', which expresses  !; if a judgement, B, contains either !' (direct quotation) 
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or another statement, ", that expresses ! and is accompanied by a reference to A 
(citation), then we can say that A infected B or that ! was transmitted to B from A.
I said that citation is  not the only possible evidence for transmission, be-
cause we might be able to correlate instances of ! in members of the population 
to texts containing !' without there being any explicit citations  referring thereto. 
This  may appear to be a degenerate case for our population, but it is the rule 
rather than exception in many epidemiological studies.  We often don’t know the 
source of an epidemic and it is precisely for this reason that we search for such 
correlations, since, if established, they allow us to test hypotheses about the mode 
of transmission.  I don’t expect to find many such cases in my data set.  That is, I 
am not sufficiently cynical about the judicial decision-making process as to hy-
pothesize that judges systematically rely upon texts that they fail to cite.50  Never-
theless, my model allows for the possibility.
My project is  to try to describe and explain how it is that U.S. drug testing 
norms were transmitted to the Canadian jurisprudence, as well as how they subse-
quently spread through this  population.  American texts in which the norms ap-
pear can thus be seen as a common reservoir.  If, in expressing a norm, a Cana-
dian judgement directly cites a U.S. text, we can say that this is  evidence of unme-
diated contact with the reservoir.  If a judgement cites another source (other than 
another member of the primary population) and that  source cites the U.S. norms, 
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50  I am using the terms “judicial”, “judgement” and “judge” as a shorthand for “judicial or quasi-
judicial”, “judgement, decision or award” and “judge, arbitrator or other decision-maker” respectively. 
This is purely a matter of readability,  and unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, I should be 
taken to be referring to all of  the members of  my defined population and their authors.
then we can say that we are faced with an instance of indirect transmission, either 
by a fomite or a vector.  
I propose to eliminate the category of fomite in favour of stipulating that 
any intermediate body counts as vector.  Generally an epidemiologist will call an 
organism a vector and an inanimate object a fomite.  We might therefore be 
tempted to apply this distinction by dubbing people as vectors  and texts as fomites. 
But since texts are written by people there doesn’t appear to be anything to be 
gained from this distinction.51   Some people may be particularly effective vectors 
(as expert witnesses, for example) and we would certainly want to be able to iden-
tify them.  Similarly, some texts  (such as a thoroughly researched law review arti-
cle) could be particularly effective in transmitting norms.  We would want to iden-
tify these as well.  There doesn’t appear to be any a priori reason, though, to create 
separate categories to account for these two cases.  They occupy the same func-
tional role: a mediator between the common reservoir and a member of the pri-
mary population.
The only exceptions to  my definition of a vector population are other 
members of the primary population, that is, other Canadian judgements.  Though 
a vector population may be comprised of members who are instances of the same 
population unit as the members of the primary population, they cannot be in-
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51 “But wait!” – an attentive reader might exclaim – “you argued against this in defining your population 
as  texts  rather than people!”  There is no contradiction here.  I  defined the basic population unit of my 
primary population as  texts, but this  does not commit me to any particular definition of secondary or 
vector populations.  Similarly,  the definition “people living within a 1 km radius  of pond X” for a ma-
laria study does not imply that we must prefer “mosquitos” over “arthropods” or “insects” as  a poten-
tial vector population.
cluded in the population definition.52  In other words, citation of another Canadian 
judgement is not an instance of transmission from the U.S. reservoir (either di-
rectly or mediated by a vector) because it is  an instance of transmission between 
members of  the population.
The case of citation of another judgement initially appears to be a case of 
serial transfer: the infectious agent is transmitted from one member of the popula-
tion to another.  This ignores, however, the role that intermediate hosts might play 
in the transmission.  First, the norm must necessarily pass through the author of the 
judgement, since judgements do not write themselves.  Our description could 
therefore be refined such that judgement A is  infected, read by the author of 
judgement B, and so on.  I see no reason to add this refinement.  Since all texts are 
written by authors, nothing is gained by stipulating that the author is an interme-
diate host; this  would be like saying that a disease whose mechanism is hand-
shaking passes by the intermediate host of hands!  It may turn out that judgements 
written by some authors comprise a disproportionate percentage of the infected 
population.  This would be an interesting finding and – as we shall see in Chapter 
5 – for this reason, “authored by” is included in the list of characteristics that I use 
to profile the population.  Be that as it may, this  does not justify treating authors of 
judgement as intermediate hosts.
The same cannot be said of litigants and their attorneys, however.  A 
judge’s attention is  often turned to another judgement by the parties arguing the 
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52 See the example of  a vector-based analysis of  sexually transmitted diseases in s. 3.4.3 of  Chapter 3.
case before her.  Whereas it is axiomatic that all norms that appear in judgements 
have “passed through” the judges who author them, it is not the case that all norms 
that appear in judgements were pled by the parties.  Evidently, there are other pos-
sible vectors  through which the norms may be transmitted between members of 
the population.  Some members of this second set of vectors may even also be 
vectors that mediate between members of the primary population and the reser-
voir of U.S. norms.  For example, a law review article comparing Canadian and 
U.S. jurisprudence could act as a vector for both.
To summarize: transmission occurs when a judgement has direct or medi-
ated contact with either (a) the reservoir of U.S. norms or (b) another member of 
the population of Canadian jurisprudence, and the best evidence for transmission 
is direct citation.
2.2.3. Susceptibility of  Members of  the Population
I have defined my population and set out what constitutes infection of a member 
thereof with a norm.  I also hypothesized that there are four distinct ways in which 
a norm may come to infect a member of the population.  I have not, however, ex-
plained which members of the population are subject to  infection; that is, how the 
epidemiological notions of “susceptible” and “removed” are to operate in my 
model.  This subsection deals with precisely that question, which – as we shall see 
– also requires  a discussion of the epidemiological epochs of jurisprudential infec-
tion.
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Formally, a susceptible is a member of the population who is neither infec-
tive nor removed and a removed is a member of the population who is neither in-
fective nor susceptible.  Since we have a working definition of what counts  as in-
fection, we know that susceptibles and removeds  are all those decisions in the 
population that do not contain statements that refer to the U.S. norms.  We still 
need to divide this set into two distinct subsets.
The first subset is that of susceptibles.  The formal definition of the suscep-
tible population is a precise way of formulating the notion that a susceptible is a 
member of the population who is not infective, but who may become an infective in 
the future.  This appears difficult to apply to judgements, since once a judgement 
is rendered it is  not subject to change, or at least not the kind of change that would 
render it infective.53  Yet to say that a judgement has been infected with a norm 
seems to imply that there was some time t at which the judgement was not infec-
tive and some later time t+1 at which it became an infective.  How can this be?
The answer to this puzzle lies in delineating the different phases of judicial 
decision-making.  A norm may infect a judgement (that is, it is likely to be the 
source of a statement that refers  to it) only prior to the judgement being rendered. 
Thus, for instance, during litigation, the parties  may attempt to persuade the judge 
that a norm should be included in the judgement; this  is the nature of legal plead-
ing.  Similarly, during deliberation a judge may review existing caselaw and com-
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53  Some decisions can be changed in order to correct clerical errors or errors in calculation (see, e.g. 
Quebec Labour Code, supra note 26 at ss. 100.12(e) & 126), but these changes  are not of a nature such that 
they could affect the norms referred to. 
mentary, reflect upon the arguments made at trial and so forth.  The “decision-to-
be” is thus susceptible until the very moment at which the decision is  rendered. 
Obviously, there can be no “decision-to-be” until there is a dispute that has been 
set for trial.  We can therefore stipulate that the period of susceptibility runs from 
the first day of hearing until such time as  the decision was rendered.  It follows 
that only decisions available for citation will be infective during the same period. 
Decisions would pass  through a “latent period” that runs from the moment they 
are rendered to the moment of their publication.  This allows us to set out the 
epidemiological epochs of  infection within our population as in Figure 4-2.
Fig. 4-2.  Epidemiological epochs of  legal decisions.
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For completeness, I have included all of the epidemiological epochs,54  though 
some of these periods are of little interest for my purposes.  For instance, whereas 
the serial interval of a disease may be an important piece of evidence for deter-
mining its  mechanisms of action and transmission, tracking the serial interval of 
judgements is not one of my research objectives.  Certainly one could be inter-
ested in this question – we might want to know what the average “age” of deci-
sions cited is.  Similarly, data on the average susceptibility periods may tell us 
something about the efficiency of the judicial system.  These are interesting ques-
tions: they are just not my question.
There are also some stages of the judicial process that are not indicated in 
Figure 4-2.  For instance, I have not indicated a separate epoch covering the pe-
riod from the last day of pleadings to the date of decision.  In many jurisdictions, 
this period is set out in legislation55 – though from personal experience I can attest 
that it is often not followed.  Neither have I identified the phases of litigation that 
occur prior to the first day of trial.  Empirical research on these periods is impor-
tant; indeed, it informs many law reform efforts that try to implement Gladstone’s 
maxim that “justice delayed is justice denied”.  Again, however, this is not my field 
of  research.
The epoch I am interested in is the susceptibility period.  Defining it as I 
propose, however, may cause some confusion which I will endeavour to clear up 
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54 See Figure 3-4 (Relations between epidemiological epochs) in Chapter 3.
55 E.g. art.  465 C.C.P. (stating that “[a] judgement on the merits  must be rendered within six months 
after the case is taken under advisement…”).
here.  The potential confusion stems from the fact that I have defined my popula-
tion as being comprised of Canadian decisions and my susceptible population as 
being “decisions to-be”.  Since susceptibles are a subset of the population, it would 
seem that I have run into a problem, since “decisions to-be” are not (yet) decisions.
My solution to this problem is to retroactively dub “decisions to-be” as “de-
cisions” within the meaning of my basic population unit once they have been ren-
dered.  This  is  not such a strange bit of ad hoc metaphysics  as it may appear.  We 
can compare this to the question of whether foetuses should be included as suscep-
tibles  in study of the spread of disease across a human population.  In many cases 
we may want to include them, especially if – as is  analogously the case in my 
model – infection may occur in utero.  We might nevertheless want to exclude those 
cases where live birth did not occur.  In this case, we would include foetuses  in our 
population of susceptibles, but only retroactively after they have been born.  Since 
all people have been foetuses  at some point and since the average gestational pe-
riod of humans is well-known, this poses no problems for our population defini-
tion.  Incidentally, this is the same solution that is used in number of contexts  in 
Canadian law, such as inheritance,56 civil capacity,57 and civil liability.58
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56  E.g. 617 C.C.Q. (which provides that “…children conceived but yet unborn, if they are born alive 
and viable, may inherit”).
57 E.g. 192 C.C.Q. (providing that “The father and mother are… tutors to their child conceived but yet 
unborn and are responsible for acting on his  behalf in all cases where his patrimonial interests  require 
it”) and 1814 C.C.Q. (providing that “Fathers and mothers or tutors may accept gifts  made to minors 
or, provided they are born alive and viable, to children conceived but yet unborn”).
58 See, e.g., Montreal Tramways Co. v. Léveillé, [1933] S.C.R. 456; Duval v. Seguin, [1972] 2 O.R. 686 (H.C.), 
aff ’d (1973), 1 O.R. (2d) 482 (C.A.).   In both these cases it was held that an infant may sue for damages 
sustained while in the womb.  But see, Dobson (Litigation Guardian of) v. Dobson, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 753 (de-
clining to extend the principle of  liability for damage caused in utero to mothers).
Having defined infectives  and susceptibles, we are left with the question of 
how to account for the epidemiological category of removeds.  Recall that a re-
moved is a member of the population who is neither susceptible nor infective. 
This  covers a large number of possibilities: immune persons, people who die or 
emigrate during the study time, etc.  This set of decisions can thus be determined 
formally, by simply subtracting the susceptibles  and infectives from the total num-
ber of decisions  in a given time period.  However, in epidemiological terms, re-
moveds can also include members  who were infective at some point and then 
ceased to be.  For example, a person catches influenza and in whom the disease 
then runs its  course and is  totally cured starts as susceptible, becomes infective and 
then ultimately becomes removed.  The analogous category in my population 
would be “infective decisions that will not be cited”.  But there is  no decision about 
which we can confidently assert this.  Certainly decisions may be overturned, re-
voked, quashed, etc. but that does  not stop them from being members  of the popu-
lation.  Nor does it stop them from being cited in the future, either because they 
were overturned on questions  unrelated to the norms for which they are cited or 
because some enterprising judge has decided to revive them after a change in pub-
lic policy or social mores.
3. Conclusions and Hypotheses
I covered a lot of ground in this chapter, moving from a summary of the field of 
epidemiology to the application of some of its  key concepts to law.  The results of 
this mapping constitute an epidemiological model of legal norm transmission.  For 
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now though, the model is just a theoretical construct – a way of systematically 
cashing out the initial viral metaphor in (relatively) rigourous terms.  It still needs 
to be applied.
In Chapters 5 and 6, I  set out a methodology for applying the model – that 
is, for operationalizing its terms.  This allows me to formulate and test some hy-
potheses about the phenomenon that is  my object of study, namely the transmis-
sion of  U.S. employment drug testing norms to the Canadian jurisprudence.
Though the exact formulation of these hypotheses depends both on that 
methodology and the data set that it generates, I can now restate some of the ini-
tial intuitions set out in Chapter 1 within the somewhat more precise language of 
the model.  They are:
(1) The law in the United States forms a reservoir of norms, some of which 
were transmitted to Canadian jurisprudence through direct contact and 
some of  which were transmitted by vector;
(2) The norms initially contracted from the reservoir began to spread hori-
zontally across the Canadian jurisprudence through a process  of serial 
transfer;
(3) As the prevalence of cases of host-host transmission increased, the preva-
lence of cases of reservoir-host or reservoir-vector-host transmission de-
creased.
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I underscore that theses are hypotheses.  In Chapter 6, I test these hypotheses 
against the empirical data generated by the model.  First, however, we need a 
methodology to operationalize the model and a data set to work with.  It is to that 
task that I now turn.
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Introduction
In Chapter 1, I raised the problem of how to explain the transmission of 
employment drug testing norms from the United States  to Canada.  Chapter 2 
proposed an epidemiological explanation, the model for which was constructed in 
Chapters 3 and 4.  In this  Chapter –"which is  both methodological and descrip-
tive"– I begin to apply the model to the case of drug testing norms.  In the first sec-
tion I operationalize the concepts mobilized in Chapters 3 and 4 to generate a de-
tailed population profile.  In the second section, I operationalize the notion of in-
fection and then apply it to the profiled population.
1. Profiling the Population
In Chapter 3, I explained how drawing a population boundary is the first step in 
creating  a population profile.  In Chapter 4, I defined the primary population unit 
of my study as  legal texts  and described my population as Canadian jurispru-
dence, the boundaries of which were initially delimited by written decisions  ren-
dered by tribunals constituted by a federal, provincial or territorial statute or 
authorized by such a statute to render binding decisions.  I further restricted this to 
cover only such decisions that relate to the norms governing drug testing in the 
context of the employment relationship.  In this section, I operationalize this  defi-
nition and provide a complete population profile.
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1.1. Operationalizing the Population Boundary
From my overview of the development of the Canadian jurisprudence relating to 
drug testing in the employment context,1  some initial conclusions can be drawn 
that will help to profile the population.  First, it points  to a relevant survey period. 
There are no Canadian decisions – by any tribunal – that are related to drug test-
ing in the employment context and were rendered prior to 1987.2  Furthermore, 
since my principal hypothesis is that employment drug testing norms spread from 
the United States and it was in 1985 and 1986 that large scale employment drug 
testing began in that country, it makes sense to begin my data set shortly thereafter. 
Since a stable data set is needed to perform analysis, an end-date is  also needed. 
Twenty years  is  an adequate period to observe the spread of the norms, if propa-
gation there was.  Given that the decisions in 1987 were rendered towards the end 
of the year, I decided to extend the survey period through 2007.  My chosen popu-
lation boundary can thus be traced on a time axis  running from January 1, 1987 
through to December 31, 2007, inclusively. 
The overview also made me reasonably confident that the population is of 
manageable size and that there was therefore no need to resort to the use of sam-
pling, which adds  both methodological complexity and risks of error and distor-
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1 In Chapter 1.
2  The first decision is  Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. U.T.U. (Hutchinson grievance) (1987) 31 L.A.C. (3d) 179; 
[1988] C.L.A.D. No. 61, CROA Case No. 1703 (M.G. Picher) [Hutchinson cited to CROA], which was 
rendered on October 15, 1987.  But see text accompanying note 74 of Chapter 6 infra (discussion of an 
isolated earlier case as being part of  a unique Canadian strain).
tion.  The first step in profiling the population was thus to generate a data set con-
taining all members of  the population.
Data on my population was drawn from two sources: the online databases 
Quicklaw3 and Azimut.4  Two databases were required in order to cover decisions 
rendered by tribunals  in all of the Canadian jurisdictions and in both English and 
French.  My primary source for decisions rendered by tribunals from all of the 
provinces except Quebec and for decisions  rendered in English by federal tribunals 
was Quicklaw.  Azimut was my primary source for decisions  rendered by Quebec 
tribunals and federal decisions published in French.5  
1.1.1. Generating a Data Set From Quicklaw
Querying the Quicklaw database in order to generate a subset of decisions meet-
ing the population definition required a balance to be struck.  Too broad a query 
would result in a large pool of potential members of the population, requiring 
manual triage, which is both time-consuming and introduces risk of error.  Too 
narrow a query would risk missing some members of the population, causing dis-
tortions in the data.  
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3 Published by LexisNexis.  Available at www.quicklaw.ca (subscription required).
4Published by the Société québécoise pour l’information juridique (Soquij).  Available at 
http://www.azimut.soquij.qc.ca (subscription required).
5 Federal tribunals  are required by law to publish their decisions in both official languages (Official Lan-
guages Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 31 (4th Supp.) at ss. 3(2) (defining “federal court” as “...any court, tribunal or 
other body that carries out adjudicative functions and is established by or pursuant to an Act of Par-
liament” & 20 (federal courts  to render decisions,  orders and judgements  in both official languages)).  In 
practice,  however,  decisions of some tribunals are only available in one language.  This includes, nota-
bly, boards of  arbitration constituted or enabled by s.57 of  the Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2.
Constructing a query also required me to operationalize the notions of “re-
lating to” and “in the employment context”, which figure in my population de-
scription.  By jurisprudence “relating to” drug testing norms, I mean for my popu-
lation to include all decisions in which the practice of drug testing is  explicitly or 
implicitly evaluated in accordance with a standard.  A decision in which the results 
of a drug test are relied upon to come to a decision – but not explicitly discussed – 
would meet this criterion, since reliance on the results is  implicit acceptance of the 
validity of the practice.  Obviously, the paradigm case is a decision in which the 
primary issue at bar is the legality of a drug testing policy adopted.  By “in the 
employment context” I mean decisions in which a contract of employment or col-
lective agreement forms the basis for the legal relationship between the parties. 
Thus, though drug testing ordered by professional bodies6 or as  part of an im-
paired driving investigation7 may have an impact on one’s employment, they are 
not cases  that relate to drug testing “in the employment context” and are therefore 
not part of  the population studied.
With these clarifications in mind, one of the elements of the query that can 
evidently be restricted without running the risk of missing members of the popula-
tion is  the deciding tribunal.  Included in my Quicklaw search were the decisions 
of labour arbitration boards, labour relations boards, employment standards adju-
239
6 As in, e.g., Law Society of  Alberta v. Saltman, [1996] L.S.D.D. No. 301.
7 Provided for by s. 254(3.4) of  the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-4.
dication boards, human rights tribunals, courts  of general jurisdiction and courts 
of  appeal.8
My first attempt sought to find all decisions rendered by one or another of 
the listed tribunals between January 1, 1987 and December 31, 2007, and in 
which the word “drug” was found within five words of “test” or “testing”.  Using 
the truncation and automatic plurals function of Quicklaw, this would find deci-
sions containing the phrase segments “drug test”, “drug testing”, “test for drugs” 
and “testing for drugs”.  The query used was the following:
drug /5 (test!) AND DATE(>=1987) AND 
DATE(<=2007)
This  returned over 2000 results, which is an order of magnitude larger than the 
expected data set.  A quick survey of some of the cases returned revealed how the 
query was over-broad.  The decision rendered by the Supreme Court of Canada 
in R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.9 is widely cited in subsequent jurisprudence as setting 
out the various “tests” of the constitutionality of a law vis-à-vis the Canadian Char-
ter of Rights and Freedoms.  Thus, a massive array of decisions having nothing to do 
with drug testing had the words “drug” and “test” within five words of one an-
other!
One way to resolve this problem would have been simply to exclude those 
decisions citing the Big M Drug Mart decision.  I rejected this strategy because it 
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8 For a detailed description of  these sources, see Appendix 1: Data Sources.
9 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 [hereinafter Big M Drug Mart].
would exclude some – many, even – members of my population.  Many discrimi-
nation cases, including cases of employment discrimination based on drug addic-
tion in which drug tests play a role, cite Big M Drug Mart.  Therefore, my second –
"more refined – query sought to remedy this problem by narrowing the search to 
include only those decisions that referenced which drugs  were tested for.  The 
query used was the following: 
drug /5 (test!) AND (marijuana OR marihuana OR 
cannabis OR hashish OR cocaine OR heroin OR 
amphetamine) AND DATE(>=1987) AND 
DATE(<=2007)
This  query thus  included any decisions from the original results but added the ad-
ditional requirement that one of the named drugs be found somewhere in the deci-
sion.  The query returned 282 full text decisions, which were downloaded for fur-
ther analysis and eventual inclusion.
1.1.2. Generating a Data Set From Azimut
One difference between the two database services  used is the way in which they 
handle sources.  Like Quicklaw, Azimut has  a number of pre-set combined 
sources, but these databases are incomplete.  Soquij makes  editorial decisions as to 
whether to include cases  (though many more are included than are in paper re-
porters) and creates summaries thereof.  Since I wanted to search the raw unedited 
full text decisions, I could not use the combined sources.  Fortunately, in the 
screens  for querying the full text decision database Azimut allows for narrowing by 
tribunal through a simple check-box interface.  I used this  to restrict my results to 
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sources containing decisions of general law, labour and employment, and human 
rights from both provincial and federal jurisdictions.10
Having gone through the exercise once in Quicklaw, constructing a query 
in Azimut was  relatively easy.  I essentially used a direct translation of the keyword 
query adapted to Azimut’s search syntax, which yielded:
(depistage PRES5 drogue) ET (marijuana OU mari-
huana OU cannabis  OU haschisch OU cocaine OU 
heroine OU amphetamine) 19870101-20071231 
This  returned an acceptable 43 full text decisions, which were downloaded for fur-
ther analysis and eventual inclusion.
1.1.3. Refining the Data Set
After running both queries and downloading the resulting files, I was left with a 
total of 325 decisions.  There were two ways  in which this data set needed to be 
refined.  First, duplicate decisions needed to be removed.  In particular, decisions 
rendered by federal tribunals and published in both English and French were often 
(though not always) duplicated.  In removing these decisions, I retained the un-
translated version, when possible.  That is, when a decision was written in French 
and then subsequently translated into English and published in both languages, I 
retained the French version in my population, and vice-versa.  For those decisions 
where I was unable to deduce which language was the original, or which con-
tained both languages (e.g. a Federal Court of Appeal decision may have a major-
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10 For a detailed description of  these sources, see Appendix 1: Data Sources.
ity judgement written in French and a dissent written in English and thus each 
published version is partially translated), I retained the English version.
The other way in which the data set needed to be refined was by removing 
decisions that were caught by one or another of the queries, but which did not 
meet the criteria set out in the population definition.  This was done manually by 
skimming each individual decision in a word processor.  The search function al-
lowed me to quickly find where the keywords were located in the decision and ap-
praise whether it counted as being related to drug testing in the employment con-
text.
After removing the duplicates and those decisions that were not members 
of  the population, I was left with a data set of  187 decisions.11
1.2. Descriptive Analysis of  the Population
Having operationalized the population boundary and generated a stable data set 
to serve as my population, the next step was  to construct a descriptive profile of 
the population. 
Thus far, the population is an undifferentiated mass.  The criteria applied 
for tracing the boundary and deciding whether a given decision was included or 
not are unrelated to their infection status.  All we can say about this population is 
that it is composed of 187 Canadian decisions rendered over roughly 20 years and 
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11 Thus, I only retained 57.54% (187/325) of the decisions.  It could be argued that this is evidence of 
over-broad querying.  However, I believe there is  a higher potential for error introduced by an overly 
narrow query than by manual triage.  For a detailed description of these sources,  see Appendix 1: Data 
Sources.  For the complete list of decisions in the population, see Appendix 2: List of Decisions in the 
Population.
that each of them relates to drug testing in the employment context.  Given my 
objective of tracing the spread of norms through this population, I needed more 
detailed data that would allow me differentiate between members of the popula-
tion on the basis  of criteria related to spread.  This is similar to having a study 
population of “all Canadian teenagers” but wanting to count them using criteria 
such as gender, age, place of residence, etc., in order to both generate and test hy-
potheses about how a disease may spread across this population.
1.2.1. Using Mixed-Method Data Analysis Software
In describing my population, I wanted to be able to attribute particular properties 
to each decision and then look at the aggregate results.  Once the population was 
profiled I wanted to be able to perform detailed queries of the content of each of 
the decisions and to correlate the results with the decisions’ properties.  
It is conceivable that these tasks could be done by hand, for instance, by 
annotating decisions, putting them in different piles, etc., and then recording obser-
vations.  Indeed, in my experience, this is exactly the kind of thing that lawyers do 
when preparing jurisprudence before pleading a case.  A decision that is “on 
point” might go on top of the pile of decisions  to cite, but then get shuffled be-
cause it was rendered by a lower court, or a long time ago, etc.  Such a methodol-
ogy might be workable for up to twenty or so decisions, but with many more than 
that, there are simply too many variables and too many piles  to keep straight. 
Similar problems face the social scientist who wants  to analyse large quantities of 
documents:
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Traditionally, social scientists might write notes on 
document margins, and use tape flags or paper clips 
to identify passages or concepts central to their analy-
ses. While this enables researchers to extract content 
from (or more properly, add content to) source mate-
rials, the mechanical demands of the technique im-
poses limits  on both the complexity and scale of 
analysis.12
Fortunately, software programs exist that perform exactly this kind of func-
tion in an semi-automated way.  The software still requires the researcher to at-
tribute the properties, but it can then rapidly sort the decisions according to those 
criteria.    It can also be used to speed up the content analysis.
I chose to use the software package QDA Miner.13   QDA Miner is a 
“mixed-method” data analysis  software package; it is mixed because it allows for 
both quantitative and qualitative analysis of the same data set.14  In QDA Miner, 
one can import a large number of documents into a single project file.  Each 
document can be attributed properties and those properties  can be analysed quan-
titatively.  The content of the documents  can also be analysed qualitatively.  Other 
software packages that perform similar functions exist,15  however QDA Miner 
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12 Ken Cousins & Wayne McIntosh, “More than Typewriters, More than Adding Machines: Integrat-
ing Information Technology into Political Research” (2005) 39 Quality & Quantity 581.
13 Version 3.2, by Provalis Research.
14 R. Barry Lewis and Steven M. Ma, “QDA Miner 2.0: Mixed-Model Qualitative Data Analysis Soft-
ware” (2007) 19 Field Methods 87 [QDA Miner]. 
15 See Cousins & McIntosh, supra note 12 for an exhaustive list.
promised to do everything I needed16 and it is the only such software package for 
which the Université de Montréal has a licence.
1.2.2. Attributing Properties to Each Decision
All of the decisions were imported into a QDA Miner project file.  The following 
properties were added to the database:17
- Name of  the case as it appeared in caselaw reporter
- Name of  the adjudicator
- Citation references
- Tribunal that rendered the decision;
- Jurisdiction
- Last date of  hearing (if  indicated)
- Date the decision was rendered
- Industry of  the workplace subject to litigation
Each decision was then analysed and the appropriate information was added to 
the property fields associated with the decision.  This was done manually.  Each 
decision was skimmed on-screen, sometimes using the search function, to find the 
information and then that information was entered into the appropriate field.
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16  Based on Normand Péladeau. QDA Miner. Qualitative Data Analysis Software User’s Guide. (Provalis  Re-
search: Montreal, 2004), QDA Miner, supra,  and Piotr Chomczynski, “Software Review: QDA MINER – 
The Mixed Method Solution for Qualitative Analysis by Provalis  Research” (2008) 4:2 Qualitative So-
ciology Review 126.
17 For a detailed list including data types, see Appendix 3: Variables, Data Types, and Codes.
1.2.2.1. Jurisdiction, Tribunal and Industry
The majority of the decisions were rendered by tribunals  from one of three juris-
dictions: the federal jurisdiction (24.069%),18 Ontario (24.06%),19 and British Co-
lumbia (22.99%).20  Other well-represented jurisdictions were Alberta (12.30%),21 
and Quebec (9.63%).22  The remaining nine jurisdictions accounted for less than a 
tenth of the decisions rendered (6.95%), with no decisions from Saskatchewan, 
Prince Edward Island, nor the three territories.23
These results  seem to track population differences (i.e., the number of peo-
ple living under each jurisdiction), with some important exceptions.  British Co-
lumbia may be over-represented in the data set because of the structure of its  la-
bour relations adjudication.  In that province, the decisions of arbitrators can be 
appealed to the Labour Relations Board,24  and even, in some cases, to the Court 
of Appeal.25  Arbitrators  in British Columbia can also refer any “question of la-
bour relations policy or interpretation of [...the Labour] Code” to the Labour 
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18 n=45.  All percentages are rounded to two decimal points.
19 n=45.
20 n=43.
21 n=23.
22 n=18.
23 These include Manitoba (n=4), Nova Scotia (n=5), New Brunswick (n=3), and Newfoundland & Lab-
rador (n=1).  It is  unsurprising that there are no decisions from the territories,  since labour relations 
there are under the federal jurisdiction.
24 Labour Relations Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 244, s. 99.
25 Ibid., s. 100.
Board.26  The Labour Board’s decisions on appeals and references, as with all of 
its  decisions, are subject to an application for reconsideration.27  In contrast, arbi-
trators  in other jurisdictions  are covered by express28 or implied29 privative clauses 
that foreclose the possibility of appeal and do not allow for arbitrators to refer 
questions to labour boards.  Thus, ceteris paribus, an equal number of disputes will 
likely create more decisions in British Columbia than elsewhere.  The data con-
firms this in part,30 though the higher number of labour board decisions rendered 
in British Columbia does not entirely account for its disproportionately high num-
ber of  members of  the population.31
The federal jurisdiction also appears to be over-represented.  It represents 
over a quarter of the decisions rendered, whereas only about 6% of Canadian 
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26 Ibid., s. 98.
27 Ibid., s. 141.
28 See, e.g., the Quebec Labour Code, R.S.Q. c. C-27 (providing that “[t]he arbitration award is without 
appeal, binds the parties and, where such is the case, any employee concerned”).
29 See, e.g., s.  48 of the Ontario Labour Relations Act, 1995, S.O. 1995, c.  1, Sch.  A (providing that arbitra-
tors decisions are to be “final and binding”).
30 For instance, the arbitrator’s  award in Fording Coal Ltd. v. United Steelworkers of America, Local 7884 (Rec-
tor Grievance), (2001) 97 L.A.C. (4th) 289, [2001] B.C.C.A.A.A. No. 173, was appealed to the Labour 
Relations Board leading to the decision in Fording  Coal Ltd. (Re), (2001) BCLRB Decision No. B89/
2001, [2001] B.C.L.R.B.D. No. 89, which was in turn subject to an application for reconsideration, 
leading to Fording Coal Ltd. (Re), (2001) BCLRB Decision No. B173/2001, [2001] B.C.L.R.B.D. No. 
173.  Thus,  a single dispute led to three decisions in British Columbia, but would likely only have led to 
one decision if  rendered in another Canadian jurisdiction.
31 The only other jurisdiction from which labour board decisions appear in the population is  Ontario. 
This is  largely due to the fact that s. 133 of the Ontario Labour Relations Act, supra note 29 provides  that 
the labour board may act as a board of arbitration for unions and employers in the construction indus-
try.  
workers are employed in workplaces  under federal labour jurisdiction.32   As 
Table" V-I shows, however, there is  no clear explanation for this in terms of the 
structure of adjudicative bodies.  The bulk of the federal decisions (as with all of 
the other jurisdictions) were rendered by boards of  arbitration.
Table V-I:  Population by Jurisdiction and by Tribunal
BC AB MB ON QC NB NS NF Fed. Total
Labour Board
Public Service Board
Superior Court
Human Rights Tribunal
Arbitration
Court of Appeal
Employment Board
Total
4 4 8
1 2 3
7 2 3 3 2 17
3 2 4 9
35 15 4 37 12 2 2 1 31 139
1 1 1 1 4
2 5 7
43 23 4 45 18 3 5 1 45 187
The explanation for the overrepresentation of both British Columbia and the fed-
eral jurisdiction is found when we look at the industries  in which the dispute arose. 
Almost half of the decisions  from the forestry industry are from British Colum-
bia33 and – more significantly – almost all of the decisions from the mining sector 
are from that province.34  Together, these two industries  account for almost half of 
the decisions from British Columbia.35   Similarly, almost two-thirds of the deci-
sions rendered by tribunals  under the federal jurisdiction were from the transpor-
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32  Human Resources and Social Development, Profile of Workplaces Under Federal Labour Jurisdiction by 
Monique Bisaillon and Derek Z. Wang (Ottawa: HRDSC Policy Development Division,  Labour Pro-
gram, 2006).
33 45.5%, n=5.
34 88.3%, n=15.
35 46.5%, n=20.
tation industry,36  which is the second most strongly represented industry in the 
population.37  These correlations are apparent in Table V-II.
Table V-II:  Population by Jurisdiction and by Industry
BC AB MB ON QC NB NS NF Fed. Total
Construction
Forestry
Manufacturing
Mining
Oil & Gas
Public
Transportation
Other
Total
1 5 2 2 1 11
5 5 1 11
4 2 1 20 9 1 2 39
15 1 1 17
1 9 3 1 2 16
10 2 3 4 3 1 1 1 9 34
2 5 2 28 37
7 2 6 1 3 3 22
43 23 4 45 18 3 5 1 45 187
A number of hypotheses and conclusions can be drawn from the distribution of 
decisions by industry and by jurisdiction.  
First, other, than the categories “public” and “other”, all of the industries 
represented can be easily construed as having an important safety component. 
The risk that a workplace accident may have catastrophic consequences in the 
transportation, mining, and oil & gas industries in particular is self-evident.  My 
initial survey of the jurisprudence in Chapter 1 showed that safety was an impor-
tant part of the discourse around workplace drug testing, regardless of the actual 
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36  62.2%, n=28.  This is to be expected,  given the federal jurisdiction over both inter-provincial and 
international transport by virtue of s. 92(10)(a) (a contrario) of the Constitution Act, 1867.  See also, s. 2(b) 
of  the Canada Labour Code, supra note 5.
37  19.8% (n=37) of the population are decisions from the transportation industry; slightly less than 
manufacturing (n=39) and slightly more than the public sector (n=34).
empirical relationship between accidents and drug testing (which, recall, is  tenu-
ous).  The distribution of my studied population across industries tends to confirm 
this.  That is, regardless of whether the American norms are in fact adopted in 
any of these decisions (i.e. their infection status) the very fact that the question of 
drug testing arises  in them (i.e. their susceptible status) indicates  the importance of 
safety discourse in determining the legal outcomes.  Furthermore, it is unsurpris-
ing that the mining industry should be over-represented, since mines are the only 
Canadian employers authorized by legislation to search their employees for 
drugs.38
Second, the preponderance of decisions from the transportation industry 
supports the hypothesis that this industry is important in explaining the spread of 
the norms from the United States to Canada.  Again, this  property of the popula-
tion does  not in itself prove spread, since it says nothing of infection status.  Nev-
ertheless, it bolsters the hypothesis that the industry played a crucial role, since it 
represents an important part of  the susceptible population.
1.2.2.2. Adjudicator
All things  being equal, one would expect that, within a population, the statistical 
distribution by adjudicator should be relatively even.  This may be the case for 
large populations of jurisprudence, especially rendered by courts of general juris-
diction where no variable, other than the prolificacy of particular judges, is likely 
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38  See, e.g. s. 143 of the Coal Mining Occupational Health and Safety Regulations, SOR/90-97.  See also 
s."38(2) of  the Mines Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 293.
to correlate strongly with the number of decisions  rendered.39   However, where 
the adjudicator is  chosen by the parties, there is no reason to expect an even distri-
bution across a body of jurisprudence.  Indeed, two standard justifications for the 
consensual choosing of adjudicators tend to support the opposite view.  First, ad-
judicators may develop specializations – for instance in particular kinds of dis-
agreements or particular contexts – and parties  may call upon them to resolve 
these kinds of disputes  more often precisely because they are so specialized.  The 
content of the decisions in a body of jurisprudence may thus be correlated with ad-
judicator.  Second, parties may routinely call upon the same adjudicator to arbi-
trate their disputes, either because that adjudicator has developed a high level of 
trust through past decisions or simply to avoid the transaction costs of finding 
someone agreeable to both parties.    In these cases, the parties to a decisions in a 
body of  jurisprudence may be correlated with adjudicator.
The studied population confirms the hypothesis that adjudicators are 
evenly distributed across the jurisprudence where the parties do not choose their 
own adjudicator.  When arbitral awards are excluded from the population, adjudi-
cators  are exactly evenly distributed; each adjudicator has  rendered exactly one 
decision.40
252
39 Even in these cases, either the internal organization of the adjudicative body (e.g. distribution of cases 
by the chief justice) or strategic behaviour by litigants (e.g. choice of venue), may have some impact on 
the distribution of  decisions by adjudicator.
40 This assumes that, where a panel rendered a decision, every member thereof rendered it.  It does not 
account for divided judgements.  A more precise formulation is that there are 51 decisions rendered by 
tribunals  other than boards  of arbitration and that no adjudicator participated in rendering more than 
one decision.
The inverse is also true.  The distribution of adjudicators across  the arbitral 
jurisprudence is not even.  The 139 arbitration decisions were rendered by 90 dif-
ferent arbitrators, for an average of 1.5 decisions per arbitrator, with most arbitra-
tors  rendering one41 or two42 decisions.  Three arbitrators, however, accounted for 
a disproportionate share of the decisions: A.V.M. Beattie,43  H.A. Hope44  and 
M.G. Picher.45  These three comprise three percent of the arbitrators, yet their de-
cisions comprise 15.83% of the decisions  rendered by arbitrators.46  Of particular 
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41 70.0% of  arbitrators (n=63), which accounts for 45.3% of  the decisions.
42 21.1% of  arbitrators (n=19), which accounts for 27.3% of  the decisions (n=38).
43 3.60% (n=5).  They are: Construction Labour Relations (Carpenters Provincial Trade Division) v. United Brother-
hood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 1325 (Hewitt Grievance) (2001),  96 L.A.C. (4th) 343, [2001] 
A.G.A.A. No. 29; Muskeg River Contractors v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Pliska Grievance),  (2002) 
115 L.A.C. (4th) 419, [2002] A.G.A.A. No. 92; Construction Labour Relations (Alberta Assn. Operating Engi-
neers (Provincial) Trade Division) v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 955 (Graham Griev-
ance)"(2002), 129 L.A.C. (4th) 1, [2004] A.G.A.A. No. 40, Trace Canada Co. v. International Assn. of Heat and 
Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers, Local Union No. 110 (Young Grievance), [2004] A.G.A.A. No. 68;  Telus v. 
Telecommunications Workers Union (H.S. Grievance), (2004) 91 C.L.A.S. 67, [2007] C.L.A.D. No. 289.
44 4.32% (n=6).  They are: Canadian Pacific Railway (Mechanical Services) and C.A.W., Loc. 101 (Pollock) (Re), 
(1996) 59 L.A.C. (4th) 324, [1996] C.L.A.D. No. 1208;  Fording Coal Ltd. v. United Steelworkers of America, 
Local 7884 (Shypitka Grievance),[2000] B.C.C.A.A.A. No. 393 (Preliminary Award); Fording Coal Ltd. v. 
United Steelworkers of America, Local 7884 (Shypitka Grievance) (2000) 94 L.A.C. (4th) 354, [2001] 
B.C.C.A.A.A. No. 24;  Fording Coal Ltd. v. United Steelworkers of America, Local 7884, [2002] B.C.C.A.A.A. 
No. 9; Vancouver Shipyards Co. v. United Assn. of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Indus-
try, Local 170 (Moore Grievance), [2005] B.C.C.A.A.A. No. 296; Vancouver Shipyards Co. v. United Assn. of 
Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry, Local 170 (2005) 156 L.A.C. (4th) 213; 
[2006] B.C.C.A.A.A. No. 186.
45 7.91% (n=11).  They are: Hutchinson, supra note 2, Canadian National Railway Co., and United Transporta-
tion Union (Keeping Grievance), (1988) 6 L.A.C. (4th) 381, [1989] C.L.A.D. No. 4; Canadian National Railway 
Co. and U.T.U. (Re), (1990) 11 L.A.C. (4th) 364, [1990] C.L.A.D. No. 14; CP Rail and C.A.W., Loc. 101 
(Re), (1990) 22 L.A.C. (4th) 164, [1991] C.L.A.D. No. 22; Canada Post Corp. v. Canadian Union of Postal 
Workers (Larmon Grievance),  [1993] C.L.A.D. No. 978; Canadian National Railway Co. and B.M.W.E. (Ouel-
lette) (Re), (1998) 75 L.A.C. (4th) 300, [1998] C.L.A.D. No. 1003; Canadian National Railway Co. and Na-
tional Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada (CAW-Canada), (Re) (2000) 95 
L.A.C. (4th) 341, [2000] C.L.A.D. No. 465 [CN & CAW]; J.D. Irving Ltd. v. Communications, Energy and 
Paperworkers' Union, Local 104 and 1309 (Drug and Alcohol Policy Grievance),  (2002) 111 L.A.C. (4th) 328, 
[2002] N.B.L.A.A. No. 7; Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, Local 
900 (Lussier Grievance), (2005) 138 L.A.C. (4th) 122, [2005] O.L.A.A. No. 213; Canadian Pacific Railway 
Mechanical Services v. National, Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada (CAW-
Canada), Local 101 (Wolanicki Grievance), (2006) 87 C.L.A.S. 317, [2006] C.L.A.D. No. 449.
46 n=22.  This represents 11.76% of  the entire population.
note is Arbitrator Picher, who rendered eleven decisions related to drug testing in 
the employment context between 1987 and 2007.
Recall that Arbitrator Picher rendered the very first decisions that discussed 
the legality of employment drug testing, the first that linked safety to drug use, and 
the first that explicitly referenced the U.S. norms.47  Seven of the eleven decisions 
rendered by Arbitrator Picher applied to the transportation industry,48  to wit the 
railroad industry, which I have identified as a potential “point of infection”.  All of 
these details tend to strengthen the hypothesis that Arbitrator Picher acted as  an 
important vector and secondary host for the U.S. norms.
1.2.2.3. Plotting the Population Over Time
The population of decisions  differs from most populations in epidemiology in that 
there are no removeds.  A population of living individuals generally increases by 
birth and immigration and decreases  by death and emigration.  Over time, the 
size of the population can thus either remain stable, grow, or shrink.  In contrast, 
my population is  destined to a continual increase in size over time.49  In addition 
to this increase in absolute size over time, however, the data shows a general in-
crease in the rate of growth of the population.  That is, the number of decisions 
related to employment drug testing in Canada rendered during a given year of the 
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47 See s. 2.2.1.2 of  Chapter 1.
48 Arbitrator Picher thus rendered close to a third (29.73%) of  the decisions in this industry.
49 This is because, as we saw in s. 2.2.3 of Chapter 4, there are no decisions  about which we confidently 
state they will never be cited in the future..
study period tended to be greater than the number of decisions rendered in each 
of  the previous years.  Figure 5-1 illustrates this phenomenon.
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Fig. 5-1:  Number of  decisions rendered per year
What is evident here is that the question of the legality of drug testing in the 
employment context was not a major issue in the late 80s and early 90s, but that 
by 1997 it had become sufficiently important to generate upwards of one decision 
every month.
Since no decision was removed and since the rate of new decisions  ren-
dered tended to increase, the size of the population increased geometrically with 
the result that pleaders  had a larger and larger corpus of caselaw to plead.  On the 
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other hand, while the size of the population continued to increase, the proportion 
of susceptibles  decreased substantially.50   This is because a decision’s  infection 
status cannot change once it is rendered.  If it was infected, it will forever remain 
an infective; if it was not infected, then it will be forever immune.  The reduction 
of the relative size of the susceptible population, compared to the whole popula-
tion can be seen in Figure"5.2.
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5-2:  Total and susceptible population sizes over time
This  will be important to keep in mind while evaluating cumulative incidence, 
which, as we saw in Chapter 3, is distinguished from prevalence precisely in that it 
is a measure of the number of susceptibles  that become infected during a given 
256
50 This is the case despite the rate of  population growth.
time period, rather than the total number of infectives as a proportion of the en-
tire population.51
Plotting decision variables over time does not reveal any strong trends.  Af-
ter an initial period of instability, the proportion of decisions rendered in each in-
dustry remains relatively stable from the early 1990s onwards.  Consonant with the 
historical narrative set out in Chapter 1, the transportation sector accounts  for the 
vast majority of decisions at the beginning of the study period and decreases 
steadily to about on quarter of  decisions in 1993, where it remained.
When the proportion of decisions rendered in each jurisdiction is analysed, 
no clear trend emerges, with the exception of Quebec.  Whereas decisions from 
Quebec comprise almost a tenth of the total population,52 the first decision from 
Quebec was not rendered until 2003.53  The proportion of decisions from Quebec 
as a percentage of the total population is thus flat at zero and increases very 
sharply in 2003.
1.3. Conclusions
The general picture of the population is of one that is constantly growing and in 
which the number of members susceptible to infection increases  over time in abso-
lute terms but decreases relative to the overall population size.
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51 See notes 14 and 16 of  Chapter 3.
52 9.63%, n=18.
53 Union des chauffeurs de camions, hommes d'entrepôt et autres ouvriers, Teamsters Québec, section locale 106 c. Trans-
port Midland ltée (grief  de Metcalfe), (2003) D.T.E. 2004T-85.
In terms of tribunals, the profile of the population shows that arbitration 
awards comprise almost three quarters of the decisions rendered.54   Within this 
category, one arbitrator in particular stands out: Michel G. Picher.  Arbitrator 
Picher rendered the first infected decisions.  One variable that may thus  correlate 
to infection status is the tendency or not of a decision to cite one of Arbitrator Pi-
cher’s decisions.
The profile also shows that the transportation industry is  over-represented. 
This  variable thus present itself as a candidate for correlation with infection status, 
especially given the role of Arbitrator Picher in the transportation industry juris-
prudence.
In order to analyse the existence of such correlations, however, the infec-
tion status itself must be operationalized in such a way as it can be measured over 
time.  Doing so, and then testing the results against the hypotheses  set out above is 
the subject of  the next section.
2. Measuring Infection
One of the functions of the model is to test the hypothesis that the drug testing 
norms were transmitted from the U.S. to the Canadian jurisprudence.  Having op-
erationalized the notion of population in terms of the model, the next step is to 
operationalize the notion of infection.  This will provide the basis  for the meas-
urement of  spread over time.
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54 n=139 (74.33%).
2.1. Operationalizing Infection
Recall that in Chapter 4, I modelled the distinction between asymptomatic carri-
ers and full-blown cases.  Whereas both categories include decisions that refer to 
the studied norm, the former include those decisions  that only mention the norm, 
whereas the latter include those decisions in which the norm functions as an edict. 
In operationalizing infection I will remove this  nuance.  Evidently, “functions as  an 
edict” is a property of texts that is interpretatively ascribed.  That is, to  understand 
whether a tribunal has applied a legal norm or merely mentioned it, we must read 
the decision carefully.  Such careful reading is not possible using the methodology 
proposed here, which relies upon computer assisted text processing.
There is  a more important reason for jettisoning the carrier/case distinc-
tion however, which reveals  a way in which the epidemiological notion of infection 
resists a complete transposition to legal texts.  One aspect of this disanalogy can be 
teased out by looking at the role that precedent plays in adjudicative decision mak-
ing.  In its most orthodox  formulation, the rule of precedent is part of a fiction of 
legal immutability.  The doctrine of stare decisis goes hand in hand with the idea 
that judicial decisions are declaratory and not legislative and thus the common law 
is as it was and as it will be; the judicial decision is  merely an opportunity for dis-
covering the law or dissolving the illusions of its apparent contradictions.55 
Though this orthodox formulation is now rarely defended, precedent still plays an 
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55 For a discussion of the weaknesses, but also the strengths, of this approach, see Oliver Wendell Hol-
mes Jr. “The Path of the Law” (1897) 10 Harvard L. Rev. 457.   See also Benjamin N. Cardozo, The 
Nature of  the Legal Process (Yale University Press: New Haven, 1921) esp. at 27-28 and 138-61.
important role in adjudicative decision making, even in contexts  where its applica-
tion is not clearly mandatory.56
Regardless of whether the rule of precedent is taken as  an orthodoxy upon 
which rests the legitimacy of the law or simply as a guideline to be kept in mind by 
the responsible adjudicator, it conveys  an unrealistic conception of the constraints 
put on decision makers.  It is unrealistic from a psychological perspective, since 
adjudicators are bound to be motivated by conscious and subconscious forces that 
colour or even determine their interpretation of previous cases.57  It is  also unreal-
istic from a semantic perspective: no formulation of a norm is so clear as to con-
strain all further interpretations and application thereof.58
There is nothing particularly new in pointing out the contingency of deci-
sion making despite the rule of precedent; indeed it is a staple topic of every in-
troductory course on legislative interpretation.59   Highlighting the problem, how-
ever, allows us to think about the way infection is transposed in the model, and to 
understand why I limit infection status to mere appearance of  the studied norms.
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56 See,  e.g., Domtar Inc. v. Quebec (Commission d'appel en matière de lésions professionnelles), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 756, 
105 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 15 Admin.  L.R. (2d) 1 (Holding that consistency is an important principle of law 
even though “a certain lack of unanimity is  the price to pay for the decision‑making freedom and in-
dependence” afforded to administrative tribunals).
57 Cardozo, supra note 55 at 162 and ff.
58  A classic discussion of this  can be found in H. L. A. Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law 
and Morals” (1958) 71 Harvard L. Rev.  593 and Lon L. Fuller, “Positivism and Fidelity to Law – A 
Reply to Professor Hart (1958) 71 Harvard L. Rev. 630.  For a more recent discussion, see Ronald 
Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass., 1986).
59 See, e.g. Bernard W. Bell, “No Motor Vehicles in the Park: Reviving the Hart-Fuller Debate to Intro-
duce Statutory Construction” (1998) 48 J. Legal Educ. 88; Roderick A. Macdonald and Jason Maclean, 
“No Toilets in Park” (2005) 50 McGill L.J. 721.
In particular it underscores the fact that a case’s  infection status is an inter-
pretative ascription and not an intrinsic property.  What to me is a clear example 
of an adjudicator applying a norm may, to another interpreter, be an example of 
rhetorical flourish that is contradicted by a statement elsewhere in the decision 
that is its “true” ratio decidendi.  This is not necessarily a bad thing; indeed, the same 
can be said of disease.60  My intention here, however, is  to attempt to measure ap-
pearance of the norms quantitatively, and not to make arguments about legal eti-
ology (i.e. the standard kind of close reading associated with doctrinal caselaw 
analysis).  All decisions in which the norms are expressed will therefore be counted 
as infected.
The norms that" – by hypothesis – have infected the Canadian jurispru-
dence relating to drug testing in the employment context (i.e. the studied popula-
tion) are the U.S. norms, which I described in Chapter 1.61   These norms allow 
employers  to require their employees to undergo drug testing – on pain of 
discipline for refusal – where (1) the employer has reasonable grounds to believe 
the employee was impaired by drugs at work, or (2) the employee was involved in a 
workplace accident.  Furthermore, an employer may require ongoing random test-
ing when (3) an employee has been reinstated after an absence occasioned by drug 
use.  Operationalizing infection requires us to stipulate criteria for sorting decisions 
into those that contain statements that refer to these three norms.
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60 Georges Canguilhem, Le normal et le pathologique, 10th ed. (Paris: P.U.F., 2006).
61 See text accompanying note 126 in Chapter 1.
2.1.1. Decision Properties and Decision Contents
As I discussed above,62 QDA Miner allows for the analysis of both properties of de-
cisions (through the attribution of variables) and their contents.  Profiling the popu-
lation was a matter of attributing variables  and then analysing their distribution. 
Identifying infectives, on the other hand, requires an analysis  of the actual text of 
each decision.  
This  distinction between properties and contents  of decisions  can be seen 
as tracking the distinction between quantitative and qualitative data analysis.  On 
this view, profiling the population is a quantitative matter and determining the in-
fection status of its members is qualitative.  This  is true in the sense that there is no 
room for the researcher’s interpretation in determining the values of the variables 
used to profile the population.  A decision was rendered on a definite date by a 
particular tribunal with authority over a specific parties  in a given jurisdiction. 
Conversely, whether to count a phrase as “referring to” or “expressing” a norm is 
a paradigmatically interpretative exercise.  
There is, however, a sense in which the counting of infectives is  not qualita-
tive data analysis.  This  is because once the interpretative work of determining in-
fection status is  done, the results are to be analysed quantitatively.  Some research-
ers would exclude such a practice from their definition of qualitative analysis.  For 
instance, one standard textbook defines qualitative research as follows:
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62 See s. 1.2.1.
[A]ny type of research that produces  findings not ar-
rived at by statistical procedures or other means of 
quantification…  Some of the data may be quantified 
as with census or background information about the 
persons or objects studied, but the bulk of the analy-
sis is  interpretative.  Actually the term “qualitative 
research” is  confusing because it can mean quite dif-
ferent things to different people.  Some researchers gather 
data by means of interviews and observations, techniques nor-
mally associated with qualitative methods.  However they code 
the data  in a manner that  allows them to be statistically ana-
lyzed.  In speaking about qualitative analysis, we are referring 
not  the quantification of qualitative data but rather to a non-
mathematical process of  interpretation…63
My intention here is not to favour any particular demarcation of the line between 
quantitative and qualitative research.  The point I wish to make is that the deter-
mination of infection status requires  a methodology somewhat different from the 
methodology used in profiling the population.
One way to discover infection status would be to read each of the decisions 
individually.  A variable representing each of the three norms could be associated 
with each decision and then the value for that variable could be manually entered. 
The obvious  drawback to this approach is the time required to read over the thou-
sands of pages  of text that comprise the 187 different decisions of the population. 
Such time constraints  represent more than just an inconvenience.  In order to 
properly count infectives, the criteria for determining infection status  may have to 
be refined several times.  With each refinement, the decisions must be analysed 
anew and with each reading a new refinement is  possible.  In other words, qualita-
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63 Anselm Strauss  & Juliet Corbin, Basics of Qualitative Research,  2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks Ca: Sage, 1998) 
at 10-11 [emphasis added].
tive data analysis is  iterative and thus virtually impossible to do manually on a 
large corpus.
Furthermore, manual treatment of the data runs the risk of introducing 
error.  For instance, there is the risk that instances of infection will simply be over-
looked.  As with any manual data entry process, there is also the possibility of 
transcription errors.   
For these reasons, I chose to use the qualitative analysis  functions of QDA 
Miner to assist me in assigning infection status to each of the members of the 
population.  
2.1.2. Coding Decisions Using Keyword Retrieval
Coding is a process whereby variables (“codes” or “tags”) are assigned to segments 
of text of a fixed or variable length.  The assigned codes can then be taken as 
proxies for the text segments to which they have been assigned.  Analysis of the 
codes  ought thus  to apply also to the texts.  For instance, codes can be analysed in 
terms of their relative or absolute frequency or their correlation with other codes 
or with case variables.  Coding is a common technique used in content analysis, a 
form of qualitative data analysis often used to assess interview data and observa-
tion reports,64  but which can be more generally defined as  “any technique for 
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making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified character-
istics of  messages.”65 
There are multiple ways to create and assign codes  to the elements  of a text 
corpus  using QDA Miner.  I chose to manually create codes representing each of 
the three elements of infection: (1) FOR_CAUSE, (2) POST_ACCIDENT, and (3) 
REINSTATEMENT.  I then assigned keywords to each of the codes.66  The QDA 
Miner User’s Guide explains the utility of  this approach as follows:
QDA Miner allows one to attach to any code in the 
codebook a list of words, word patterns and key 
phrases that are likely to be found in segments where 
such a code may apply. For example, if you have a 
code named Globalization, you may enter words like 
“Free Trade”, “World Trade”, “NAFTA”, or 
“WTO”. Once these keywords have been entered, 
the Keyword Retrieval feature may be used to search 
for any text segment that contains  any one of those 
words.  In a sense, a list of keywords is  a kind of pre-
defined search that is stored with a code within the 
codebook.67
Thus, once the keywords were associated with the codes, the entire corpus  could 
be searched to generate a list of  text segment candidates for coding.  
Though QDA Miner can automatically assign codes to the text segments 
retrieved using the associated keywords, I chose to assign the codes  manually. 
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65 Ole R. Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1969) 
at 14.  For an overview, see Robert P. Weber, Basic Content Analysis (Thousand Oaks Ca: Sage, 1990).
66  For a list of the keywords associated with each code, see Appendix 3: Variables, Data Types and 
Codes.
67  QDA Miner Qualitative Data Analysis Software User’s Guide (Montreal: Provalis Research, 2009) at 79 
[QDA Miner Guide].  “codebook” is the term used to describe the collection of codes associated with a 
given project file.
This  sacrifices some speed to ensure greater accuracy.  QDA Miner facilitates the 
task by generating a “Coding Table View”, which consists of a table two columns 
wide (one for the retrieved segment and one for the applied code) containing as 
many rows as retrieved text segments (see Figure 5-3).  The codebook is displayed 
on the same screen as  the coding table.  Each returned segment can thus be easily 
and rapidly verified (the keywords are highlighted) and then coded with a single 
click.
Fig. 5-3.  The QDA Miner coding table view
The Coding Table View provides a keyword-in-context list (a so-called “KWIC 
list”) which provides  an inventory of the “linguistic environment” in which the 
keywords are found.68   The KWIC list can not only be used to verify that the re-
trieved segments effectively represent the desired textual characteristics prior to 
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68  Klaus Krippendorff, Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks Ca: 
Sage, 2004) at 266.
assigning codes, it can also lead to refinement of the chosen keywords for subse-
quent coding.69   For example, consider the three following elements70 from the 
KWIC list returned by a query for “reasonable grounds”, which is one of the key 
phrases attached to the code FOR_CAUSE:
Where there are no REASONABLE GROUNDS to suspect impairment or drug 
dependency, the employeeʼs privacy rights must take precedence.
The effect of the requirement  that an employer must have REASONABLE 
GROUNDS to suspect impairment is  to require objective evidence of impairment 
before testing is justified.
The arbitrator found that while a dismissal is  a very serious matter and that this 
consideration favoured the extension,  the other factors  favoured the Employer. 
Without more, he reasoned, consideration of these factors would not  provide 
REASONABLE GROUNDS for extending the time.
At a glance, we can tell that the first two segments are genuine candidates for the 
FOR_CAUSE code, whereas the third one is  not.  Furthermore, the second seg-
ment suggests that “evidence of impairment” might be useful to add to the list of 
key phrases attached to the FOR_CAUSE code.
Each of the text segments in the KWIC list above is one paragraph long 
(though evidently the length of the paragraphs varies).  The keyword retrieval 
function of QDA Miner allows one to choose the length of the text segments  re-
turned by a query.  This  is  called the “search unit” and the options are “docu-
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69 Ibid.
70  The text segments are respectively from Trimac Transportation Services - Bulk Systems v. Transportation 
Communications Union, (1999) 88 L.A.C. (4th) 237, [1999] C.L.A.D. No. 750 [Trimac Transport];  Fording 
Coal Ltd. v. United Steelworkers of America, Local 7884, [2002] B.C.C.A.A.A. No. 9;  Halifax Employers Assn. 
v. International Longshoremen's Assn., Local 269 (Halifax Longshoremen's Assn.), 2003 NSSC 234, [2003] N.S.J. 
No. 439.
ment”, “paragraph” and “sentence”.71   Though my objective was to identify 
documents (that is, individual decisions) containing references to the U.S. norms, I 
set the search unit to “paragraph”.  The reason for choosing text segments  of 
paragraph length rather than document length is to generate a KWIC list.  This 
cannot be done if the query returns documents, since the returned segments are as 
long as the document itself and there would thus be no opportunity for verification 
and refinement of the key words as a function of the norm for which I wanted to 
code.
On the other end of the scale, sentence-level data risks being too fine-
grained.  A KWIC list containing only single sentences  may not provide sufficient 
linguistic context to determine whether a given fragment is a genuine code candi-
date or not.  Though such data might be useful for very short documents,72 there is 
no obvious advantage in the context of the legal texts that comprise my popula-
tion.
2.1.3. Results: Prevalence of  Infection in the Study Population
After running the keyword retrieval function and verifying the results using KWIC 
tables, the decisions were coded.  A numeric variable was then created for each 
code, representing the number of corresponding segments in each decision. 
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71 QDA Miner Guide, supra note 67 at 112.
72  “Help wanted” ads, for instance.  See e.g., M. Sodhi and B.  Son, “What Industry Employers Want 
from OR/MS Graduates” (2005) 32:4 OR/MS Today 32 (Using QDA Miner to return sentence-
length KWIC lists).
These variables  were then computed using QDA Miner.73  Thus, for each member 
of the population, the numeric variable FOR_CAUSE contains an integer equal 
to the number of times the code FOR_CAUSE is found in the decision, and so 
on, for each of the three infection codes.  A query was then run on the entire 
population for each of these codes, retrieving all decisions in which the corre-
sponding numeric variable was >0.  The results were as follows:
Table V-III: Code Frequencies (Number of  Documents)
Code representing infection Decisions containing code
FOR_CAUSE
POST_ACCIDENT
REINSTATEMENT
Total
67
31
81
179
The sum of the coded decisions  appears  to give a total infection rate of 95.72%. 
This  is misleading, however, since many decisions contain codes  from more than 
one category.  A query designed to identify any decision containing at least one of 
the infection codes,74  returned 127 unique decisions, giving an infection preva-
lence of  67.91%.  Further queries revealed the pattern illustrated in Figure 5-4.
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73 A detailed explanation of this  function is in QDA Guide, supra note 67 at 178 (“Storing Code Statistics 
in Numeric Variables”).
74  That is,  a boolean query expressing FOR_CAUSE>0 OR POST_ACCIDENT>0 OR REIN-
STATEMENT>0.
Fig. 5-4.  Venn diagram of  infected decisions by norm
As we can see, there are only nine decisions that contain expressions of or 
references to all three U.S. norms and a total of 34 that contain two.  The majority 
of  the infected decisions (84 or 66.14%) are only coded for a single norm.
3. Conclusions
We now have a good overview of our population.  Some of its attributes – notably 
the overrepresentation of federal and transportation decisions at the beginning of 
the study period and the striking number of decisions rendered by Arbitrator 
Picher relative to the mean – provide clues of where to look for infection and 
spread.  We also have a quantified concept of infection that can be related to the 
other properties of individual members  of the population.  We thus have many of 
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the tools in hand that we need to test the various transmission hypotheses.  Such 
measurement of the spread of the drug testing norms, first indirectly using epi-
curve analysis, then directly using outbreak investigation techniques, is the subject 
of  the next chapter.
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Introduction
In Chapter 5, I operationalized the concepts of population and infection and pre-
sented a picture of my study population.  This presentation of the population and 
the number of infectives was static in that it did not show variation over time.  To 
fully account for the concept of contagion that is  the basis of the epidemiological 
model, however, we must analyze the spread of the infectious condition, that is, the 
movement over time of members from the susceptible to the infective set.  That is 
the subject of  this chapter.
In the first section, I attempt to measure spread indirectly.  This is a standard 
approach in epidemiology.  By measuring variations in prevalence over time we 
can learn about the dynamics of an epidemic as a whole.  It also allows us to crys-
tallize our intuitions and refine hypotheses about the mode of transmission.  In 
turn, these hypotheses can be verified in outbreak investigations.  The results set 
out are consistent with a propagating epidemic, which may be indicative of a 
common reservoir epidemic or a serial transfer epidemic, or both.
The second section comprises an outbreak investigation, in which I meas-
ure spread directly.  The data confirms the hypothesis  that the propagation of U.S. 
drug testing norms started as a common reservoir epidemic and then spread 
across the population by serial transfer.  I also show evidence implicating Arbitra-
tor Michel G. Picher as a vector of  transmission for the U.S. norms.
In the third and final section I look at two circumstances  where propaga-
tion is not  observed.  The first is where members of the population have come into 
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contact with the source of the norms, but failed to become infected.  I call this re-
sistance.  The second is where members of the population have become infected 
without any apparent contact with the source of the norms.  I call this an alternate 
strain.
1. Measuring Transmission Indirectly
Recall that the standard way to illustrate infection over time is by tracing an epi-
demic curve; a histogram showing the development of new cases over time.  So 
called “epicurve analysis” is a way to indirectly measure transmission.  The shape 
of the curve may either generate hypotheses about mode of transmission or serve 
as evidence tending to support or falsify such a hypothesis.  As I explain in this sec-
tion, the epicurve of the studied population is  consistent with a propagating epi-
demic, though these results  must be nuanced by taking into account particular fea-
tures of  the chosen population units. 
1.1. Tracing an Epidemic Curve
As I mentioned in Chapter 3, the time intervals along the X-axis  of the histogram 
have an impact on the shape of the curve and the Centres  for Disease Control and 
Prevention suggest using a time interval of between one-eighth and one-third of 
the mean incubation period.1   The incubation period for the members of my 
population is the time between the last day of hearings and the date the decision 
was rendered.2  The average incubation period for the decisions in my population 
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1 See s. 3.6.1 of  Chapter 3.
2 See s. 2.2.4 of  Chapter 4.
for which the relevant data is available3 is  approximately three months.4   I thus 
initially chose a time interval of two weeks for my epidemic curve, which falls 
within recommended range.5  The resulting histogram is illustrated in Figure 6-1.
Fig. 6-1.  Epidemic curve of  infection by U.S. drug testing norms (biweekly)
Though the tendency is  not conclusive, the histogram shows a general upwards 
trend.  No interval period prior to 1998 presents more than a single case.  From 
mid-2000 onwards, this becomes a regular occurrence and from 2004 onwards we 
begin to see interval periods with three and even four cases.  In addition to the in-
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3 Hearing dates are available for 79.68% of  the decisions (n=149).
4 89.2 days.
5 14 days is 1/6.4 of  89.2.
creasing numbers of cases in each interval period, we can also see an increase in 
the density of time-periods containing new cases.  In other words, as we move 
along the X-axis (forward in time) the number of time intervals presenting at least 
one case increases.  The moving average (red line) illustrates this  trend, showing a 
gradual increase.  This  suggests that –  despite having based the time-interval on 
the average incubation period – the units on the X-axis  are too small to represent 
this aspect of the curve, and they are distorting the results.  This is  confirmed 
when we trace the same data using years  as  the time-interval, as in Figure 6-2, 
where the upward trend is much more pronounced.
Fig. 6-2.  Epidemic curve of  infection by U.S. drug testing norms (yearly)
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An upward trend in an epidemic curve can be indicative of several scenarios.  It 
may be consistent with either a sporadic or point epidemic in its  initial phases, in 
which case we would expect the number of new cases to begin decreasing some-
time in the next few time-intervals.  Recall, however, that sporadic and point epi-
demics are isolated outbreaks generally associated with either random variations in 
incidence or specific triggering events.6  This is not consistent with the data pre-
sented here, as the number of time intervals covered is very high.7   Given the 
study period, the curve is more consistent with a propagating epidemic, which is 
associated with either continued exposure to a common reservoir or serial transfer. 
This  lends plausibility to my working hypothesis that the drug testing norms were 
drawn from a common reservoir of American sources and then transmitted across 
the Canadian jurisprudence.
1.2. Limits of  Epicurve Analysis of  the Studied Population
This  tentative confirmation of my working hypothesis by the shape of the epi-
demic curve requires a number of clarifications  that render it less robust.  First, 
there is  no way to determine, simply from looking at the histogram, which of the 
infections are ex hypothesi the result of exposure to the common reservoir and which 
were caused by contact with an infective.  Since the curve of a propagating epi-
demic may be consistent with both common reservoir and serial transfer modes of 
transmission, the curve itself cannot be used to be distinguished between the two. 
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6 See text accompanying note 92 in Chapter 3.
7 Based on approximately one-sixth of  the 14 day incubation period (n=273).
Testing both the common reservoir and serial transfer scenarios is  the subject of 
Section 3.2 below.
The second clarification that undermines the robustness of any conclusions 
drawn from the shape of the curve is the nature of the population itself.  As I dis-
cussed above, the number of new decisions rendered every year increases steadily 
over the period studied.8  Furthermore, since a decision is  only susceptible during 
the year it was rendered,9 the size of the susceptible population varies directly with 
the increase in the number of new decisions.  When we look at the rate of new 
decisions rendered it, the shape of the resulting histogram appears to match that 
of the epidemic curve.  The most likely conclusion to draw from this  is that the 
shape of the epidemic curve is not wholly a consequence of the mode of transmis-
sion but at least partially a reflection of a change in the size of the susceptible 
population.
As I suggested in the previous chapter,10 one way to palliate this is to con-
trol for the variation in the number of susceptible in order to get a clearer picture 
of the underlying dynamics  of the epidemic.  The clearest way to control for such 
variation is to track cumulative incidence,11 which is a measure of the risk that any 
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8 See Figure 5-2 (Total and Susceptible Population Sizes Over Time) in Chapter 5.
9 More precisely; for the period running from the first day of trial until the decision is  rendered.  See 
Figure 4-2 (Epidemiological epochs of  legal decisions) in Chapter 4.
10 See text accompanying note 51 of  Chapter 5.
11 Note that in my population the “cumulative” incidence rate is not cumulative at all, since no member 
of  the population is susceptible for more than one time interval.
given susceptible will become an infective during a given period of time.12   The 
cumulative incidence for the study population is illustrated in Figure 6-3.
Fig. 6-3. Cumulative incidence rate
This  histogram shows the risk, in any given time-period that susceptible member 
of the population will be infected.  In terms of the study population, this can be 
expressed as the probability that a decision rendered will be infected with one of 
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12 This is sometimes  called “attack rate” in the case of food-borne outbreaks.  A time period of exactly 
one unit is  generally implicit in the use of the notion of attack rate, since all of the cases  in most food-
borne outbreaks appear within hours or days.  Technically then, the “attack rate” is a proportion and not 
a rate.  See Leon Gordis, Epidemiology, 4th ed. (Saunders Elsevier: Philadelphia, 2009) at 39-42.
the U.S. norms.  Evidently, this graph gives a different picture from the epidemic 
curve, whereas, ceteris paribus, the two curves should have the same shape.13  
On the other hand, if  the upward trend in the epidemic curve was entirely 
due to the corresponding increase in the number of susceptibles, then we would 
expect the cumulative incidence rate to be constant.14   Unfortunately, the low 
number of cases  just doesn’t allow us to determine whether the variation in cumu-
lative incidence is due to a genuine change in the epidemic.  For instance, there 
was only one decision rendered in each of 1987, 1990, 1992 and 1995 and these 
four decisions happened to be infected, giving an incidence of 100% for each of 
those years.  This gives the same results on the graph as if there had been twenty 
decisions rendered and all twenty were infected.  Whereas the latter case would 
indicate propagation, it is  not possible to deduce this from the former case.  The 
numbers are simply too small.15
Having generated a curve that – at the very least – appears to be consistent 
with a propagating epidemic, but being unable to confirm this using the change in 
incidence rates, the best strategy is  to attempt to further confirm or falsify the 
propagation hypothesis by direct measurement of  transmission.
281
13 This  is because – in a stable population with homegeneous mixing – the risk of being infected varies 
with the number of  infectives in the population.
14 The graph would then be flat at 65.8%, which is the prevalence of  infection.
15 These features  make tracing curves for any of the subsets  of the population superfluous.  Clearly if 
the numbers are too small to provide solid ground from which to draw conclusions for the entire popu-
lation, the problem will be exacerbated in the case of subsets of the population, which are even smaller 
by definition.
2. Measuring Transmission Directly
Although the indirect measurement of spread by epicurve analysis  was not conclu-
sive, it did lend some support to the hypothesis that the spread of the U.S. norms 
through the Canadian jurisprudence during the study period was a kind of propa-
gating epidemic.  This is  consistent with both the common reservoir and serial-
transfer modes of transmission, each of which can occur through direct contact or 
through vectors.  
In this  section, I measure spread directly in order to further test these hy-
potheses.  The results show that contact with the reservoir is strongly correlated 
with infection status.  Contact with infected members of the population by mem-
bers  who did not have contact with the reservoir is also correlated with infection 
status, which shows that serial transfer occurs.  Furthermore, the number of serial 
transfer infectives, proportionate to common reservoir infectives, increases over 
time.  This is  consistent with the claim that the U.S. norms were first transmitted 
directly and then spread across the Canadian jurisprudence.
2.1. Outbreak Investigation Using References and Citation Patterns
As I explained in Chapter 4,16  the most promising evidence of effective contact 
(i.e.!the kind of contact that would result in transmission) is citation and reference. 
Thus, ceteris paribus, when faced with an infective decision that cites a source of in-
fection, we can deduce that the infection was transmitted from the cited source to 
the decision.  Citation to an American source would indicate direct contact with 
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16 See s. 2.2.2.1 of  Chapter 4.
the reservoir of U.S. norms.  Citation to an infected member of the population (i.e. 
another decision rendered by a Canadian tribunal) would indicate a case of serial 
transfer.   
Measuring citations turned out to be somewhat harder than I first believed. 
My initial intention was  to use the citation and cross-referencing systems of the 
legal databases that served to generate my dataset in order to identify patterns of 
citation between them.17   Legal citation indexes have grown from their humble 
origins  as  part of the tables of contents of eighteenth century case reporters into 
quite powerful and complex tools.18   However, despite their sophistication, the 
tools available proved to be insufficiently reliable for my particular purposes.  This 
is because the built-in case citator in Quicklaw (called “Quickcite”) does not con-
tain administrative tribunal decisions unless they have been judicially considered 
by a court.19   Since the overwhelming majority of the members of the studied 
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17 The citator tool in Quicklaw is called Quickcite.  The tool in Azimut is  called Le citateur.   Though they 
differ somewhat in implementation, they both allow one to track future citations of a case as well as list 
the cases that it cites.
18  Fred. R. Shapiro, “Origins  of Bibliometrics, Citation Indexing, and Citation Analysis: The Ne-
glected Legal Literature” (1992) Journal of  the American Society for Information Science 337.
19 The Quicklaw help file at http://www.lexisnexis.com makes the promising claim that the Quickcite 
database contains  the “more than 380,000 board and tribunal decisions reported on Quicklaw,” only to 
qualify it with “[these] decisions are cited only when judicially considered by a court.”!
population were rendered by administrative tribunals,20  it is impossible to get a 
useful picture of  its citation networks using Quickcite.21
Another way of measuring citation networks would be to use the QDA"Mi-
ner keyword retrieval function to seek references  to individual decisions within the 
decisions that are included in the population.  The results  could then be coded and 
the codes could be analyzed to establish any citation patterns.  Again, however, I 
found myself confronted by the limits of the data and of the tools I have to ana-
lyse it.  A few test queries rapidly revealed that citation practices are so varied and 
of such uneven quality that producing a single reliable query is impossible.  This is 
particularly evident with arbitration decisions, since there is no institutional infra-
structure that could apply a stable set of citation practices.22  Though I managed 
to construct a patchwork of queries that allowed me to test for the citation to 
American sources and to one set of Canadian decisions,23 I ultimately abandoned 
this approach.
284
20 88.78% (n=166).
21 Whether a decision rendered by an administrative tribunal has been reviewed by a court may have 
some role to play in determining its  place in a citation network.  For instance, one would expect that an 
arbitration decision that was subject to judicial review (and a fortiori at the level of a court of appeal) 
would be more likely to be cited than a decision that had not been.   However,  it does not follow that 
decisions  that have not been judicially considered by a court are not relevant,  or even crucial, to under-
standing the network of  citations that allows a legal norm to spread.
22  One can contrast single arbitrator who writes his  or her own decisions to the Supreme Court of 
Canada, which has an extremely uniform and predictable citation style that is  known by the judges and 
their clerks and enforced by the editors of the Supreme Court Reports.  The relative inconsistency of 
citation practices in administrative tribunals is also no doubt one of the reasons  they are not fully in-
dexed by Quickcite.
23 Those decisions rendered by Arbitrator Picher.  See s. 2.4.1, below.
For the remainder of the citation networks that I wanted to explore, the 
chosen measurement methodology was reading the decisions and then manually 
entering the citation data in QDA Miner.  Thus, when I wanted to quantify the 
citation relationships  between two sets  of decisions, I set up a table with the poten-
tially cited decisions as rows and the potentially citing decisions as columns.  Each 
decision was then read and a check-mark was put in the cell representing the in-
tersection between a cited decision and a citing decision.  Cells  containing a check-
mark thus indicated citation and empty cells  indicated the absence of citation. 
Once complete, the data from each of these spreadsheets  was compiled and then 
manually re-entered into QDA Miner so that it could be correlated with other 
properties of  the decisions, notably infection status.
2.1.1. Measuring Contact With the Reservoir
One way to interrogate the claim that the Canadian jurisprudence was infected by 
the U.S. norms is  to correlate infection status with direct reference to the United 
States.  A positive correlation is  evidence supporting the common reservoir hy-
pothesis.  To measure this, I  constructed a code representing citation to or quota-
tion from American sources.24   To effect this, I used a keyword query and then, 
using a KWIC list, hand-coded each returned segment that was an actual quote or 
citation.  These segments  could then be automatically correlated with the codes 
for infection status.
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24 Appendix 3: Variables, Data Types  and Codes.  Note that the American sources  are not necessarily 
formal state law instruments.  I have included reference to American policies, academic commentary, 
expert testimony by human resources consultants describing the U.S. experience, etc.
There were 26 infected decisions that cited American sources.  Thus over 
one-fifth of all infected decisions cite American sources,25  whereas only one-
twentieth of uninfected decisions do.26   In other words, infected decisions were 
over three times more likely to cite American sources  than uninfected ones.  This 
data, illustrated in Figure 6-4, supports the claim that direct citation of American 
sources was a source of  infection.
Fig. 6-4. Citation rate (U.S.) by infection status
The data are very clear when we compare prevalence between those decisions  that 
cite American sources and those that don’t.  There were a total of 29 decisions 
that cite American sources and thus the prevalence of infection in the citing popu-
lation is 89.66%.  This is 21.75 percentage points  higher than the general popula-
tion and 25.74 points higher than the population of decisions that don’t cite 
79.53%
20.47%
Infected
Cite U.S. sources Don’t cite U.S. Sources
95.00%
5.00%
Uninfected
286
25 26 out of  the 127 infectives or 20.47% cited American sources.
26 3 out of  the 60 uninfected decisions or 5.00% cited American sources.
American sources.  This  data, illustrated in Figure 6-5, further supports  the rela-
tionship between citing American sources and infection with the U.S. norms.
 Fig. 6-5. Infection status by citation (U.S.)
It is important to distinguish between these two measures and understand how 
they each contribute to confirming the transmission hypothesis.  In the first case, 
we are measuring the likelihood of transmission based on infection.  This is  like 
asking “how many people who got Salmonella ate at the picnic where the egg 
salad was served?”  In the second case, we are measuring the likelihood of infec-
tion based on opportunity for transmission.  This is  like asking “how many people 
who were at the picnic where the egg salad was served got Salmonella?”  In each 
of these two cases, a positive correlation indicates  that the egg salad may have con-
tributed to the Salmonella outbreak.  If both indicators are positive, the evidence 
implicating the egg salad is strong.
It might appear rather obvious that decisions that cite American sources 
should mention the U.S. norms.  We must remember, however, that the way I de-
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scribed the norms for the purposes of determining infection status is not depend-
ant on their origins.  I have been claiming that norms of type X, Y, and Z  appear 
first in the United States and thereafter in Canada.  The fact that Canadian deci-
sions that cite American sources are very likely to refer to such norms is evidence 
that we are faced with a phenomenon of transmission, rather than just develop-
ment of  similar rules to govern similar situations.
Having established a positive correlation between infection and direct cita-
tion to American sources, the common reservoir hypothesis  is  provisionally con-
firmed.  Further analysis is necessary, however.  The intuition behind the viral 
metaphor set out in Chapter 1 was that after contact between the Canadian juris-
prudence and the U.S. norms, the latter continued to spread to members of the 
population who were not themselves exposed to the reservoir.
2.2. Measuring Subsequent Propagation
If, as I predicted, the U.S. norms spread from the initially infected members  of the 
population to other members  through a process of serial transfer, then – according 
to the model – the evidence for such spread would be a positive correlation be-
tween infection status and citation to a decision that itself cites an American 
source.27  The data exhibit a positive correlation and thus confirm the spread hy-
pothesis.  What’s more, there is  also  a positive correlation between infection status 
and citation to this second set of  decisions, which provides further confirmation.
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27 This process  of measuring “citation distance” is the same process  as that by which mathematicians 
can be assigned an Erdös number.  See Casper Goffman, “And What Is Your Erdös Number?” (1969) 
76(7) American Mathematical Monthly 79.
To measure the correlation, I started with a subset of the population com-
posed of the 26 infected decisions that cite U.S. norms directly.  I excluded the 3 
uninfected decisions that cite U.S. norms for the obvious reason that citation to 
those decisions could not be indicative of spread.  For ease of exposition, let’s  call 
this sub-population of infected American-citers  “US(1)”.  I then examined the re-
maining decisions.28  If one of these decisions cited a member of US(1), then it was 
flagged as being a member of a second set of decisions, which I call “US(2)”. 
There turned out to be 40 decisions in US(2) – that is, decisions that do not them-
selves  cite an American source but that cite an infected decision that in turn cites 
an American source.  I created a variable in QDA Miner to represent membership 
in US(2) and entered the corresponding data.
In the software, infection status was then correlated with membership in 
US(2): of the 40 decisions, 35 were infected.  The prevalence of infection of that 
sub-population was thus 87.50%, which is  slightly lower than the rate for US(1), 
but still well above the rate of the general population.  Furthermore, when we look 
at the decisions that neither cite U.S. sources directly (US(1)) nor indirectly (US(2)) 
the prevalence of infection in the remaining decisions drops to 53.38% – a differ-
ence of over one-third.29   Since, by definition, the only difference between the 
members of US(2) and these remaining decisions is that the members of US(2) cite 
infected decisions that cite American sources, it follows that the fact of citation is 
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28 n= 158 (187 minus the 29 that cite American sources).
29 The remaining population has 118 members (187-29-40) of  which 63 are infected.
the explanation for the difference in infection rates between the two groups.  In 
other words, the reason that there is  a difference in infection rates between the 
members of US(2) and these remaining decision is that the U.S. norms were trans-
mitted from the members of US(1) to the members of US(2).  This is strong evidence 
in favour of  the serial transfer hypothesis.
The results  of iterating this measurement of citations lends even more sup-
port to the serial transfer hypothesis.  Turning my attention to the remaining 
population, I once again counted the number of citations to infected decisions  that 
are members of US(2).  The resulting sub-population – “US(3)” – is  thus comprised 
of decision that cite infected decisions, which in turn cite infected decisions that 
cite American sources.  This  small population30 comprised 9 members, of which 8 
(88.89%) were infected.  Once again, the prevalence is  well above the general 
population.31  
When we combine all of the decisions  that can be traced directly or indi-
rectly to American sources, the prevalence of infection is  88.46%,32 compared to 
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30 Given the branching nature of serial transfer, one would expect each successive generation to have 
more members than the previous one.  It might therefore seem surprising that US(3) has so few mem-
bers.  There are two explanations  for this.  First,  it takes a while for such removed citation networks to 
emerge.  The first member of US(3) appears in 2001, a mere 6 years  before the study end-date.  Second, 
given the foundationalist reflex embodied in the rule of stare decisis, adjudicators tend to cite the first in 
a line of cases, even when it has  been confirmed repeatedly in more recent cases.  Since I have con-
structed the generations such that no decision can be a member of more than one generation,  the 
number of decisions  is bound to slope off.  (This is tantamount to presuming that infection passed from 
the closest member to have been in contact with the source.  For example, if Alice were infected with 
mononucleosis and Bernard and Charley both kissed Alice and each other, then my model presumes that 
Bernard and Charley were infected by Alice and not by each other).
31 Given the small sub-population size, however, this  data must be viewed as less robust than in the pre-
vious generation.  If only two fewer decisions in US(3) had been infected, the prevalence for that group 
would have been in the same range as the general population.
32 n=69 (out of  a population of  78).
53.21% for the remaining 109 decisions (i.e. those that are neither members of 
US(1), US(2), nor US(3)).33 
Clearly, traceability to an American source is  a determiner of infection 
status.  Furthermore, these three sets  of decisions show that (1) direct contact with 
the reservoir of U.S. norms is a source of infection and (2) infection spread across 
the jurisprudence serially for much of the population that was not in direct contact 
with the reservoir.  In the following subsection, I will present the data related to the 
trends of  these two phenomena over time.
2.3. Complex Transmission and the Relationship Between Infection Routes
The initial narrative that I used to describe the development of the employment 
drug testing caselaw in Canada was that first there was contact with the American 
norms and then there was subsequent spread across the jurisprudence.  Call this 
“the temporal hypothesis”.  In the more precise terminology of the epidemiologi-
cal model, the hypothesis  was refined to state that the transmission of the drug 
testing norms began as a common reservoir epidemic and then continued as  a se-
rial transfer epidemic.
In part, the aggregate citation data supports  this temporal hypothesis in it-
self.  Since a decision can only be cited after it is rendered, it stands to reason that 
the second and third generation decisions that confirm the serial transfer hypothe-
sis (i.e. the members  of US(2) and US(3)) came after the first set of decisions that 
confirm the common reservoir hypothesis (US(1)).  This supports the temporal hy-
pothesis only in part though, since contact between the Canadian jurisprudence 
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33 n=58 (out of  a population of  109).
and the common reservoir continued throughout the study period.34  The dynam-
ics of the epidemic are thus analogous to a cholera outbreak that started with a 
contaminated well and then began to spread across the population, but where the 
well was still occasionally used.35
Better confirmation of the temporal hypothesis  is found in the increasing 
proportion of decisions in US(2) and US(3) relative to the number of decisions in 
US(1) during the same time period.  This is illustrated in Figure 6-6:
Fig. 6-6. Infection route of  new cases over time
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34  In fact, there were many more decisions in US(1) rendered in the period from 1998 to 2007 (n=19) 
than in the period 1987-1997 (n=7).
35 On common reservoir and serial transfer modes of transmission of cholera, see ss. 3.3.2 and 3.3.4 of 
Chapter 3.
In this figure, the increasing demographic importance of decisions infected by se-
rial transfer (blue and violet) as  compared to those infected by direct contact with 
the reservoir (green) is  clear despite the persistence of the reservoir infection route. 
The same trend is even more striking when we look at the relative numbers  on a 
cumulative basis, as in Figure 6-7.
Fig. 6-7. Relative demographic importance of  different infection routes
Here we can see that the total number of decisions  infected by serial transfer even-
tually caught up with the number of cases  infected by direct contact with the res-
ervoir in 2002.  Thereafter, the proportion of reservoir-based infections decreases 
relative to the serial transfer cases, despite a continued increase in absolute terms.
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The temporal hypothesis is thus confirmed by the data.  The transmission 
of the U.S. norms was initially a kind of common reservoir epidemic where cita-
tion to American sources was the primary source of infection.  The norms began 
to propagate serially as a body of Canadian jurisprudence emerged and was cited 
to.  As time went on, more and more of the newly infected decisions were the re-
sult of serial transfer from other Canadian cases.  In colloquial terms, the U.S. 
norms “went viral”.
2.4. Investigating a Point of  Contact: The Transportation Industry
Another element in the intuitive description of the epidemic described in Chap-
ter"1 is  the important role of the transportation industry – railroads in particular – 
which appeared to act as a point of contact allowing the U.S. norms to enter the 
Canadian jurisprudence.  The data confirms this.
To test the hypothesis  that the transportation industry acted as a point of 
infection, I tracked the distribution of decisions by industry within the various sub-
sets of infected decisions known to be traceable to American sources.  The distri-
bution roughly tracked that of the general population, with one important excep-
tion.  In US(1) almost half  of the infected members were decisions from the trans-
portation industry,36 a proportion that is more than triple its demographic weight 
in the remaining infected decisions.37   Conversely, the infectives in almost every 
other industry are more likely to have been infected by serial transfer than direct 
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36 46.15% (n=12).
37 13.86% (n=14 out of  the 101 infected decisions that do not cite American sources).
citation to American sources.38   In other words, decisions that directly cite U.S. 
norms were much more likely to be from the transportation industry than from 
any other industry, whereas infected decisions from other industries were likely in-
fected by serial transfer rather than contact with the common reservoir.
A more fine-grained analysis of the role of the transportation industry re-
moves any doubt that it was an important point of infection and further transmis-
sion.  The three most widely cited decisions in US(1) – which together are cited di-
rectly or indirectly by almost two-thirds of  subsequently infected decisions – are all 
from the transportation industry.39   Two of them are from the railroad industry 
and were rendered by Arbitrator Michel G. Picher; these two decisions were im-
plicated in the subsequent infection of almost two-thirds of decisions that can be 
traced to American sources.40
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38 The only exception is the Oil & Gas industry, which has  a relatively high rate of infection by contact 
with the common reservoir (n=5 or 19.23% of infected US(1) decisions) compared to infection by serial 
transfer (n=5 or 11.63% of  infected US(2) and US(3) decisions).
39  Those decisions are Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. U.T.U. (Hutchinson grievance) (1987) 31 L.A.C. (3d) 179; 
[1988] C.L.A.D. No. 61, CROA Case No. 1703 (M.G. Picher) [Hutchinson cited to CROA], Canadian 
National Railway Co. and National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada 
(CAW-Canada),  (Re) (2000) 95 L.A.C. (4th) 341, [2000] C.L.A.D. No. 465 [CN & CAW],  and Trimac 
Transportation Services - Bulk Systems v. Transportation Communications Union, (1999) 88 L.A.C. (4th) 237, 
[1999] C.L.A.D. No. 750 [Trimac Transport].  Hutchinson is cited by 14 different decisions and each of the 
other two is cited by 12 different decisions,  some of which cite two or all three, for a total number of 23 
individual members of US(2).  One or another of those 23 decisions is in turn cited by one or another 
of 5 individual members of US(3), giving a total of 28 distinct decisions out of the 43 that comprise the 
class of  decisions infected by serial transfer (65.12%).
40 Hutchinson, ibid. and CN & CAW, ibid.  Together, these two decisions were cited by a total 20 individual 
members of US(2).  One or another of those decisions  were in turn cited by one or another of 8 indi-
vidual members of US(3), giving a total of 28 distinct decisions out of the 43 that comprise the class  of 
decisions  infected by serial transfer.  Together, they thus are implicated in 65.12% of infections trace-
able to American sources.
The impact of these decisions from the transportation industry is visible 
when we map the citation network through which infection propagated, as  in Fig-
ure 6-8.  In this map, the nodes are infected cases from the US(1), US(2) and US(3) 
sub-populations and the black lines indicate citation.  The impact of the three 
transport decisions can be seen in red.
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Fig. 6-8. Citation map (impact of  three most-cited decisions)
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The map clearly shows that the transport industry decisions citing Ameri-
can sources acted as an important point of initial infection, after which they were 
widely cited by members of the US(2) and US(3) sub-populations.  The impact of 
the two decisions rendered by Arbitrator Picher is also evident.
In profiling the population, I noted that Arbitrator Picher rendered a dis-
proportionately large number of decisions in the population and that he rendered 
the very first infected decision.  I hypothesized that one variable that might corre-
late to infection status is the tendency or not of a decision to cite one of Arbitrator 
Picher’s  decisions and thus that he acted as an important vector and secondary 
host for the U.S. norms.  The data on spread set out here – and illustrated in the 
citation map – supports  these hypotheses.  In the next subsection, I test them di-
rectly.  
2.4.1. Testing a Vector: Arbitrator Picher
In Chapter 1, I hypothesized that the railroad industry played an integral role in 
the transmission of drug testing norms from the United States to Canada.  I de-
scribed how the Canadian Office of Railway Arbitration & Dispute Resolution 
(the CROA) rendered the first decisions applying the American norms in Canada. 
All of the CROA decisions cited were rendered by the Arbitrator Michel G. 
Picher, who has been the permanent arbitrator at that tribunal since 1987.41  Arbi-
trator Picher also rendered the Imperial  Oil decision that purports  to exhaustively 
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41  Dennis W. Coughlin, “By Land and by Air: Two Models of Expedited Grievance Resolution” in 
Joyce M. Najita,  ed., Arbitration 1997 the Next Fifty Years: Proceedings of the Fiftieth Annual Meeting: National 
Academy of  Arbitrators, Chicago, 1997 (Edison, NJ: BNA Books, 1999) 110 at 119.
set out the “Canadian model” on drug testing.42  Furthermore, as  I set out above, 
decisions by Arbitrator Picher are disproportionately represented in the popula-
tion.  For all of these reasons, I chose to track the impact of Arbitrator Picher’s 
decisions through their subsequent citation.
A first analysis  of the decisions rendered by Arbitrator Picher himself 
(“Picher(1) decisions”) revealed an infection prevalence of 100%.  Of the 11 in-
fected decisions, 5 are members of US(1) and one is  a member of US(2).  In other 
words, Arbitrator Picher cited American sources or sources that themselves cited 
American sources.  Thus, there is a clear point of contact between our hypothe-
sized vector and the reservoir of infectious norms.  This quantitative description of 
the Picher(1) reflects the conclusions that I drew in Chapter 1, where I discussed 
the extent to which Arbitrator Picher relied heavily on American sources to justify 
the application of  the U.S. norms.43
Using the same methodology as with the citation to American sources, I 
constructed a code representing citation to a decision rendered by Arbitrator 
Picher (i.e. citation to a Picher(1) decision).44  As before, I used a keyword query and 
then, using a KWIC list, hand-coded each returned segment that was an actual 
quote or citation.  
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42 Re Imperial Oil and C.E.P. Local 900, (2006) 157 L.A.C. (4th) 225, 88 C.L.A.S. 273.
43 See the discussion in s. 2.2.1.2 of  Chapter 1.
44 Appendix 3: Variables, Data Types and Codes.
The resulting population – “Picher(2)” –  contained 42 infected decisions out 
of a total of 51.  Thus, well over a third of the total infected cases in the study 
population cite a decision that was rendered by Arbitrator Picher,45  whereas only 
15% of uninfected decisions do.46   In other words, infected decisions were over 
twice as likely to cite a decision rendered by Picher than uninfected ones.  This 
data, illustrated in Figure 6-9, supports the claim that Picher served as a vector of 
infection for the U.S. norms.
Fig. 6-9. Citation rate (Picher) by infection status
The data is even more striking when we compare prevalence between the deci-
sions that cite Arbitrator Picher and those that don’t.  The prevalence of infection 
with the U.S. norms in the total Picher citing population is 82.35%.  This is over 
63.79%
36.21%
Infected
Cite Picher Do not cite Picher
85.00%
15.00%
Uninfected
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45 42 of  the 116 infectives (127 minus the 11 rendered by Picher) equals 36.21%.
46 9 of  the 60 uninfected decisions cite Picher (15.00%).
14 percentage points  higher than the general population47 and more than 23 per-
centage points higher than the population of decisions that were neither rendered 
by Picher nor cite a decision that was rendered by him.48  This difference in preva-
lence between decisions that cite Picher and those that don’t is  represented in Fig-
ure 6-10.
Fig. 6-10. Infection status by citation (Picher)
Citation of a decision by Arbitrator Picher is thus  almost as good a predictor of 
infection as reference to a decision that cites American sources.
The same is  true of “second generation” decisions.  Using the same man-
ual system of citation tracking that I used to trace decisions that cite American 
sources, I constituted “Picher(3)”, which comprises 23 decisions that cite decisions 
that in turn cite decisions rendered by Arbitrator Picher.  The prevalence of infec-
17.65%
82.35%
Cite Picher
Infected Uninfected
40.80%
59.20%
Don’t Cite Picher
32.09%
67.91%
Entire Population
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47 The prevalence of infection of the entire population is 127/187 or 67.91%.  The difference is thus 
14.44 percentage points.
48 The prevalence of infection of the population excluding decisions by Picher or that cite him is 74/
125 or 59.20%.  The difference is thus 23.15 percentage points.
tion for Picher(3) is 82.61%,49 compared to 53.92% for the population that cannot 
be traced to a Picher decision.50
The higher prevalence of infection in the decisions rendered by Arbitrator 
Picher or traceable to him is evidence that he was an effective vector.  We can say 
that he acted as a secondary host for the U.S. norms, transmitting them even to 
decisions he rendered that did not directly cite American sources.51
In assessing Arbitrator Picher’s effectiveness as a vector, we must take into 
account that members  of Picher(2) and Picher(3) may also be members of any of 
US(1), US(2), or US(3).  This is because decisions that cite decisions by Arbitrator 
Picher might also cite an American source, or some other source.52  Decisions that 
cite a decision by Arbitrator Picher that is  itself one of the five decisions by him 
that cite American sources are, by that citation alone, members both of Picher(2) 
and US(2).53  This raises the question of whether the mere fact of citing a member 
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49 n=19.
50 n=55 (out of  a population of  102).
51 Though one must be careful not to psychologize the adjudicative process, two characteristics  of Arbi-
trator Picher may have some relation to this  role of secondary host.  First, he pursued his master’s  de-
gree in law at Harvard University.  This may have made him more comfortable accepting the reason-
ing set out in American sources of law.  Second, he has long been involved in sports arbitration,  both 
professional and amateur.  As I mentioned in Chapter 1, athletes were among the very first populations 
subject to drug testing.   This familiarity with a milieu in which drug testing was accepted may have 
made Arbitrator Picher more amenable to the U.S. norms than other arbitrators.  See the curriculum 
vitae of Michel G. Picher, posted on the Sport Dispute Resolution Centre of Canada, online: 
<http://www.crdsc-sdrcc.ca/documents/eng/2008MichelPicherFullCV.pdf>.
52 Among the members  of US(1), 13 decisions are also member of Picher(2) and 2 decisions are members 
of  Picher(3).
53  Among the members of US(2), 23 decisions are also member of Picher(2) and 7 are members of 
Picher(3).
of Picher(1) or Picher(2) –"even in the absence of traceability to an American sour-
ce"– is positively correlated with infection status.
The data shows that there is indeed such a “Picher effect”, though it is  not 
as pronounced as the other indicators of infection.  There are 21 decisions in 
Picher(2) and Picher(3) that cannot be traced to American sources and of those, 13 
are infected, which gives  a prevalence of 61.90%.  The prevalence among the re-
maining decisions (that is, those that cannot be traced to either a decision by Arbi-
trator Picher, nor an American source) is almost eight percentage points  lower, at 
49.41%.54  What this tells us is that –"quite apart from the decisions in which he 
cites American sources"– Arbitrator Picher acts as a source of  infection.
3. Accounting for Resistance and Alternate Strains
In the first section of this  chapter, I traced an epicurve that was consistent with a 
propagating epidemic.  In the second section, I measured this  propagation directly 
and confirmed a number of hypotheses about the infection routes taken by the 
U.S. norms.  Though the correlations between traceability to a source of infection 
and infection status were positive, the data still left us with two unanswered ques-
tions.  First, how is it that some decisions that were in contact with a source of in-
fection managed to remain uninfected?  Second, where did the infected decisions 
that could not  be traced acquire their infection?  In this section, I attempt to an-
swer these questions.
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54 n=42 (out of  a population of  85).
3.1. Resistance
I call “resistant” any decision that has been in contact with a source of infection 
and nevertheless stays uninfected.  In the study population, 6.42% of the decisions 
were resistant in this way.55  
It should be noted that these are not decisions in which the U.S. norms that 
I identified as spreading epidemically in Canada were considered and then re-
jected.  Recall that the operationalized notion of infection covers cases of mere 
mention, and thus  such decisions would be counted among the infectives.56  Resis-
tant decisions are thus decisions related to drug testing that are traceable to U.S. 
sources (or to those decisions that cite U.S. sources) and yet do not mention the 
U.S. norms.
The distribution of properties of the resistant decisions (e.g. industry, juris-
diction, tribunal) was not so different from the general population as to generate 
hypotheses to explain their resistance.  I therefore investigated the contents of the 
decisions.
Reading the resistant decisions revealed that, in some cases, the question of 
drug testing was incidental or ancillary to the matter at bar.  Those decisions in 
which drug testing was a central issue looked at forms of drug testing that were 
identified as not having been transmitted to Canada.  These included mass-testing 
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55 n=12.
56 See s. 2.1 of  Chapter 5.
for all employees,57 random or periodic drug testing of employees in particular job 
categories,58 and mandatory pre-employment screening of  job candidates.59
Recall that from the very beginning of the Canadian jurisprudence, adjudi-
cators  have rejected both mass testing and random testing.60  For example, in the 
Hutchinson decision, Arbitrator Picher stated:
[I]t is  not within the legitimate business purposes of 
an employer, including a railroad, to encroach on the 
privacy and dignity of its employees by subjecting 
them to random and speculative drug testing.61
Similarly, pre-employment testing, though widespread in the United States, did not 
form part of the model that spread across the Canadian jurisprudence.  First, be-
cause labour arbitrators, who rendered the earliest decisions and who rendered the 
bulk of the decisions in the population, do not have jurisdiction ratione personae over 
workers until after they are hired, and second because it was rejected by Canadian 
courts.62
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57 See e.g. Dichiara v. Anwest Transport [2001] C.L.A.D. 43 (Quicklaw).
58 See e.g. Walker v. Imperial Oil Ltd., (1998) 560 A.R. 325, 1998 ABQB 785, [1998] A.J.  No. 1252; Auto-
cars Orléans Express inc. c. Union des employés et employées de service, section locale 800 (grief de Croteau),  D.T.E. 
2004T-3,-[2004] C.L.A.D. no 325.
59  See e.g. Weyerhaeuser Co. (c.o.b. Trus Joist) v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission), (2007) 279 D.L.R. (4th) 
480, [2007] O.J. No. 640.
60 See generally s. 2.2.1.2 of  Chapter 1.
61 Hutchinson, supra note 39 at 5.  This position was later confirmed by several courts  of appeal, notably 
in Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v. Toronto Dominion Bank (re Canadian Civil Liberties Assn.), 
[1998] 4 F.C. 205, [1998] F.C.J.  No. 1036; Entrop v. Imperial Oil Limited,  2000 CanLII 16800 (On. C.A.), 
50 O.R. (3d) 18, 189 D.L.R. (4th) 14, 2 C.C.E.L. (3d) 19, 37 C.H.R.R. 481, 137 O.A.C. 15; and Section 
locale 143 du Syndicat canadien des communications, de l'énergie et du papier c. Goodyear Canada inc., 2007 QCCA 
1686.
62  Entrop, ibid.  But see Alberta (Human Rights and Citizenship Commission) v. Kellogg Brown & Root (Canada) 
Company, 2007 ABCA 426 (CanLII).
These factors go some way to explaining the perceived “resistance” of 
some decisions.  They form part of the citation network that was  the mechanism 
propagation of the U.S. norms, but their subject matter was outside of the set of 
norms that came to be accepted in Canadian law.  Without bringing the entire 
conceptual apparatus of the model to bear on this question, we can say that the 
resistant decisions were infected with other norms, and that those norms failed to 
propagate.
3.2. Infection by a Local Strain
The obverse of the resistant decision –"which cites without infection"– is the deci-
sion that shows signs of infection without being implicated in the citation network 
of propagation. Such decisions comprise almost one-third of the infected 
population.63  The question that arises is thus how such a significant percentage of 
the population could be infected without having been in contact directly or indi-
rectly with the original reservoir.
The answer lies  in the type of infection.  Of the infected but non-citing 
population, 90.47% were only coded for REINSTATEMENT.64   Furthermore, 
the absence of citations in the remaining four decisions  exhibiting a different in-
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63 n=42 (33.07%).
64 n=38 (this subgroup thus accounts  for 65.52% of all of the decisions  that are coded uniquely for re-
REINSTATEMENT).
fection code can be accounted for individually.65   There appears  to be thus a 
uniquely “local strain” – consisting of decisions in which drug testing is allowed in 
the context of  reinstatement"– that is unrelated to the epidemic of  U.S. norms.
This  is consistent with the jurisprudence and commentary on so-called 
“conditional reinstatement” or “last chance” agreements.  A close look at the 
authorities in which such agreements are discussed show that there are in fact two 
different types, of which one is not an “agreement” per se.  What they share, how-
ever, is  a history of application in Canada in cases of discharge related to alcohol 
abuse.  It is this alcohol-related jurisprudence that forms the basis  of the local 
strain of  the drug testing virus.
The first kind of last-chance agreement is  negotiated by the union and the 
employer as  an alternative to the discharge of an employee for misconduct such as 
chronic absenteeism.  The employer literally gives the employee “one last chance” 
to reform his or her conduct.  In exchange, however, the employee must agree to 
be governed by working conditions that are not found in the collective 
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65 CHEP Canada Inc. and Teamsters Local Union No. 31 (Finnigan Grievance), [1997] B.C.C.A.A.A. No. 715 
(coded FOR_CAUSE, but legitimacy of testing not at bar because employee caught red-handed smok-
ing marijuana prior to being tested); Desjardins v. Gonnelly, 2005 BCHRT 190, [2005] B.C.H.R.T.D. No. 
190 (coded POST_ACCIDENT, but legitimacy of testing was admitted by the parties); Neufeld (Re), 
(2005) BCLRB Decision No. B42/2005, [2005] B.C.L.R.B.D. No. 40 (coded POST_ACCIDENT, but 
testing jurisprudence not relevant since it was  a duty of fair representation complaint where the em-
ployee argued the union should have grieved his dismissal on purely factual grounds); Métallurgistes unis 
d'Amérique, section locale 8428 et Systèmes et câbles d'alimentation Prysmian Canada ltée (grief syndical), [2006] 
R.J.D.T. 1273, AZ-50380090 (coded both POST_ACCIDENT and FOR_CAUSE, but testing juris-
prudence was not cited as it was a preliminary award on a safeguard order where only legislation was 
pled).
agreement.66   Often, these conditions will include a commitment to address the 
underlying cause of the misconduct, such as alcoholism.67  Thus, for instance, an 
employee may be required to stay sober and provide the employer with evidence 
of treatment.68  Though there was no jurisprudence on the matter prior to the late 
1980s, commentators argued that similar reasoning should apply in the case of 
addiction to drugs other than alcohol.69
The second kind of conditional reinstatement is that ordered by the arbi-
trator at the outcome of the arbitration.  These may not properly be “agree-
ments”, though often the arbitrator’s  order is in fact a ratification of a settlement 
negotiated by the parties and submitted to him or her.70   As with “true” last-
chance agreements, the jurisprudence on conditional reinstatement orders apply-
ing to alcoholic employees endorses requirements for treatment and monitoring.71
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66  See Donald J. M. Brown & David Beatty, Canadian Labour Arbitration,  4th ed. looseleaf (Aurora ON: 
Canada Law Book, 2009) at s. 2:3232 (“Last-chance” agreements are a type of settlement agreement 
whereby discipline is  withdrawn and the grievor returned to work subject to compliance with certain 
conditions”).  See also Claude D'Aoust & Sylvain St-Jean. Les manquements du salarié associés à l'alcool et aux 
drogues étude jurisprudentielle et doctrinale (Montréal: École de relations industrielles de l'Université de Mon-
tréal, 1984) at 155-57).
67 See Brown & Beatty, ibid. at s.  7:6122 (last chance agreements are “…recognized as  a legitimate and 
appropriate part of an employer’s  efforts to meet its duty to accommodate the needs of its  disabled 
workers”).
68 See e.g. Kelsey-Hayes Canada Ltd. and C.A.W., Loc. 199, Re, (1990) 12 L.A.C. (4th) 377,  [1990] O.L.A.A. 
No. 73 (R.H. McLaren) in which the arbitrator upheld an agreement requiring attendance at Alcohol-
ics Anonymous meetings [Kelsey-Hayes].
69 D'Aoust & St-Jean, supra note 66 at 157-58.
70 See e.g. Ivaco Rolling Mills and U.S.W.A., Local 7940 (Re) , [1992] O.L.A.A. No. 636, 26 C.L.A.S. 410 
(Daniel Lavery).
71 See e.g. Molson’s Brewery (Ontario) Ltd. and United Brewery Workers, Local 304 (Re), (1983) 12 L.A.C. (3d) 
313, [1983] O.L.A.A. No. 67 (B. L. Adell), in which the arbitrator ordered the grievor to refrain from 
drinking entirely and to provide documentation from a treatment clinic demonstrating his  ongoing 
participation in a rehabilitation programme.
From this longstanding caselaw, it was but a small and logical step to in-
clude drug testing as part of the ongoing treatment and monitoring that forms 
part of the conditions of reinstatement (whether ordered or agreed upon).  There 
is even one decision from prior to the study period that takes this step.  In Steinberg 
v. Teamsters,72  the grievor was discharged due to excessive absenteeism related to 
marijuana use.  In that decision, the board of  arbitration noted:
We were not advised of any previous  arbitration 
award involving an employee who has apparently 
freed himself from an addiction to marijuana. There 
are, however, a number of reported arbitration 
awards where individuals whose alcoholism had re-
sulted in excessive absenteeism were conditionally 
reinstated because they had apparently freed them-
selves from their alcohol addiction.73
The conditions under which the board went on to reinstate the grievor included 
the following:
[T]he grievor must at all times refrain from using 
marijuana or other derivatives  of the cannabis  plant. 
This  condition recognizes that the grievor's past fail-
ure to attend at work regularly was the result of his 
inability to restrict his  intake of the drug to small 
amounts which would not impact on his responsibili-
ties to his employer. So as to enable the company to ensure 
compliance with this requirement, should it suspect  that  it  is not 
being met, the company can require the grievor to supply it, as 
quickly as is reasonably possible, with a urine sample for analy-
sis. The company is not to require such a sample more fre-
quently than once a month.74
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72  Steinberg Inc. v. Teamsters Union, Local 419 (Discharge Grievance), (1985) 23 L.A.C. (3rd) 193, [1986] 
O.L.A.A. No. 2 (I. Springate) [Steinberg cited to O.L.A.A.).
73 Ibid. at ¶ 21.
74 Ibid. at ¶ 23.
The Steinberg decision is rarely cited in the study population, but of the three in-
fected decisions coded for REINSTATEMENT that do cite it, one is  from the “lo-
cal strain” group.75  The other decisions in the line of conditional reinstatement 
cases are also rarely cited, but when they are, the “local strain” group is 
over-represented.76
The evidence is thus fairly strong that there developed in Canada a juris-
prudence treating the issue of drug testing as a condition of reinstatement and 
that this development was independent from the epidemic norms that spread from 
the United States.  This jurisprudence was occasionally cited by those decisions 
infected with the American reinstatement norms, though it was generally thought 
that the Canadian last-chance agreement jurisprudence was not relevant to  the 
question of  the legality of  drug testing in general.77
The existence of a local strain explains  the remaining question raised by 
the analysis  of the data on propagation, namely the existence of a set of decisions 
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75  Fiberglas Canada Inc. v. Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers, Local 1305 (Contini Grievance), (1989) 5 
L.A.C. (4th) 302, O.L.A.A. No. 1.
76 Kelsey-Hayes,  supra note 70 is  cited by two infected decisions, of which one is outside of the citation 
network entirely (Norbord Industries Inc. v. Industrial Wood and Allied Workers of Canada, Local 1-2995 (Gravel 
Grievance), (1997) 67 L.A.C. (4th) 205, [1997] O.L.A.A. No. 825) and the other has no connection to the 
U.S. decisions (Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada and Bell Canada (Vanroessel Griev-
ance),  [1996] C.L.A.D. No. 1093), which cites one of Arbitrator Picher’s  decisions that does not cite 
American sources).
77 See, e.g Perreault, Réaume & Simon-Pierre Paquette. “Le dépistage d'alcool et de drogues en entre-
prise : où en sommes-nous?” in Développements récents en droit du travail, vol."267 (Cowansville,  QC: 
Yvon Blais, 2007) 3 at 23-24 (claiming the last-chance jurisprudence “…est d’une utilité toute rela-
tive… puisque le salarié se trouvait à consentir expressément à subir ces tests  pour garder son em-
ploi.”).
that appear to have not had opportunity for the kind of contact that causes infec-
tion and yet demonstrate an apparent symptom.
4. Conclusions
In this chapter, I have shown how the propagation hypotheses set out in terms of 
the epidemiological model can be refined and tested against real world data.
The results of this exercise are positive.  The intuitions about contagion 
and spread that underpinned the viral metaphor in Chapters 1 and 2, and which 
were refined into quite specific hypotheses in the modelling process in Chapters 3 
and 4, were confirmed by an analysis of  the data set constructed in Chapter"5.
To recap: the data generated by the model strongly supports the following 
hypotheses:
(1) The law (broadly understood) in the U.S. forms a common reservoir of 
employment drug testing norms, some of which were transmitted to Ca-
nadian jurisprudence, and citation is evidence of  this process.
(2) Those norms transmitted from the U.S. then propagated across the Ca-
nadian jurisprudence through a process of serial transfer – that is, by Ca-
nadian decisions citing other Canadian decisions without direct reference 
to American sources.
(3) The number of Canadian decisions infected with the U.S. norms by serial 
transfer increased relative to the number of decisions infected by direct 
citation to American sources.  The “tipping point” occurred in 2002, 
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when the total number of serial transfer infections surpassed the total 
number of  reservoir contact infections.
(4)  The transportation industry and notably the railway industry was an im-
portant point of contact between the reservoir and the Canadian popula-
tion.  Decisions from that industry thus  acted as a kind of vector popula-
tion.
(5) Arbitrator Michel G. Picher was an important vector of transmission 
from the U.S.  Even decisions  rendered by Arbitrator Picher that did not 
directly cite American sources were implicated in cases of  serial transfer.
(6)  Resistant decisions – those that cited American sources without becom-
ing infected with the studied norms – are evidence of the failure of some 
other U.S. norms to take hold in Canada.
(7) There is an autonomous local strain of Canadian drug testing norms that 
is concerned with drug testing as part of the process  of rehabilitating 
terminated employees, but not with the right for employers to require 
drug testing per se.
Taken together, these statements  explain how the U.S. norms were trans-
mitted to Canada, despite the absence of co-ordinated harmonization efforts  and 
the failure of  Canadian authorities to effect a legal transplant.
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CONCLUSION
This  thesis started with a problem: how to explain the unintentional transmission 
of legal norms across  jurisdictional boundaries.  The solution that I proposed to 
this problem was to expand the roster of metaphors of legal norm transmission to 
include viral or epidemic transmission and then to construct and test a model de-
rived from that metaphor.  The results produced by the model support the claims 
that I set out to demonstrate.  
First, I showed unequivocally that the norms that comprise the so-called 
“Canadian model” of employment drug testing were transmitted here from the 
United States and then spread across  the jurisprudence.  The empirical data gen-
erated by operationalizing the model confirmed that the initial point of contact 
was the transportation industry.  In every single test, the probability that a decision 
contained references to the U.S. norms was higher if that decision could be traced 
to American sources.  Of particular note is the evidence that the norms spread 
epidemically: the probability of infection was significantly higher even in decisions 
that did not directly cite American sources, but which cited decisions that in turn 
cited those sources.  Furthermore, the hypothesis that Arbitrator Michel G. Picher 
acted as a vector of transmission was confirmed.  As predicted, citation to deci-
sions rendered by Arbitrator Picher was positively correlated with infection even 
when no other link to American sources was apparent.  The data generated by the 
model also led to unanticipated discoveries, notably the existence of a distinct 
strain of Canadian drug testing norms that developed without reference to those 
transmitted from the United States.
Second, I validated the pertinence and robustness  of an epidemiological 
model of legal norm transmission.  Besides  allowing me to test and confirm spe-
cific hypotheses, the process of modelling and the operationalization of the result-
ing model clarified what might be meant by spread of legal norms as well as some 
of the difficulties involved in identifying whether a legal norm was or was  not 
transmitted.  Such conceptual clarity has the advantage of putting us in a much 
better position to evaluate claims that a norm spread from one jurisdiction to an-
other.  Having transposed some epidemiological concepts to the legal realm and 
having seen both the possibilities  and the limits of such transposition equips us to 
critically appraise other purported instances of  norm transmission.
Some of the richness of the viral spread metaphor was lost in the model-
ling process.  In particular, my decision to drop virology as a secondary domain in 
order to focus on epidemiology restricted the scope of the model.1  As I argued in 
Chapter 2, much of the persuasiveness of metaphors comes from the fact that 
they rely on “proverbial” knowledge of the primary domain.  Thus, part of the 
initial attractiveness of the viral spread metaphor came from how we imagine a 
virus to act.  Viruses, bacteriophages  in particular, hijack the cells  of the host or-
ganism to serve as the means for reproducing more virus.  We might say the same 
thing about the drug testing virus, which appears to have hijacked pre-existing 
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1 See the introduction to Chapter 3.
structures of justification in Canadian labour and human rights jurisprudence for 
its  own reproduction.2  This, and the other analogies  that spring to mind such as 
legal antibodies (pre-existing features of the host legal system that render it less 
susceptible to infection by particular norms), vaccines (features intentionally intro-
duced into the host legal system to immunize it from hostile norms), and so forth, 
were not systematized in the model.  This is not to say that these intuitions about 
how thinking about viruses can be transposed to thinking about legal phenomena 
must necessarily be jettisoned; simply that their exclusion from the modelling 
process was part of  the price to pay for its robustness and precision.
Indeed, the success of the epidemiological model combined with the array 
or intuitions that were not systematized is  evidence for the richness of the viral 
metaphor.  Mapping just one subset of the concepts brought to mind by the viral 
metaphor to the legal domain generated useful data and explanations.  This sug-
gests that other elements of the viral metaphor could also be extended into mod-
els.  As I maintained in Chapter 3, a model calling on the base domain of virology 
rather than epidemiology may provide a rigorous account of how exactly trans-
mitted norms take hold in a host.  It might then be possible to integrate the viral 
and epidemiological models, providing a unified picture of the mechanisms at 
work in norm transmission from the macro level of the population right down to 
the micro level of the organism.  Such a unified theory is  a promising direction for 
future research.
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2 See s. 2.3 in Chapter 1.
Third, I confirmed the important role that metaphors and models play in 
generating explanations about legal phenomena.  I set out to show that explana-
tory metaphors may be systematized into models by mapping concepts from an-
other domain onto the domain of law.  The construction of the epidemiological 
model is an example of this process of systematization.  Thus, quite apart from its 
role in explaining the phenomenon under investigation, the construction of the 
epidemiological model served as an exercise to demonstrate the validity of the 
theoretical approach.
The model building methodology also has an important critical role.  In 
building the model, I did explicitly what many theorists do implicitly.  The method-
ology I deployed requires a candid exposition and explicit defence of the concepts 
that are mobilized.  Having gone through this process  we are more alert to the fact 
that choices are made, not only in modelling, but in all theory construction.  Conse-
quently, we are in better equipped to evaluate the choices  –!often tacit!– made in 
other theories.  In the particular case of modelling, which is  the undeclared meth-
odology of much interdisciplinary research, recognizing the metaphor at the root 
of a model is  the first step in mounting a critique.  Having done so, we can ask 
relevant questions about the choice of primary and secondary domains and the 
choice of  mapping functions between their analogous concepts.
*                  *                  *
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The transplant metaphor is  concerned with how a legal system acquires new 
norms.  The harmonization metaphor is  concerned with how existing norms can 
be transformed.  In both cases, the metaphor serves as a framework that allows us 
attempt to explain legal change.  The epidemiological model derived from the vi-
ral metaphor is another such framework.
I do not intend for the epidemiological model to supplant the transplant 
and harmonization metaphors (and their derivatives) in explaining legal change. 
For one, it is  possible that each of these metaphors could be extended into a 
model, and thus the modelling methodology is not in itself an advantage of the 
epidemiological approach vis-à-vis other approaches.3   Moreover, the epidemiol-
ogical model is particularly well-suited to cases of transmission in the absence of 
legislative action.  The transplant and harmonization accounts  remain compelling 
frameworks for understanding instances of  explicit and intentional legal change.
Certainly the epidemiological model can be applied elsewhere.  Other cases 
of unintentional norm transmission across jurisdictions may lend themselves to 
such an analysis.  Areas  of law in which constructing large citation networks with 
existing tools is feasible and in which a newly appearing norm is expressed in a ca-
nonical formulation would be especially well-suited.  I do not think, however, that 
the value of the model or of its contribution to understanding legal phenomena 
can be reduced to its capacity for transposition and reapplication.
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3 The resulting models would undoubtedly suffer from the same kinds of limits as the epidemiological 
model.  Some concepts would translate less well between primary and secondary domains and certainly 
much richness would be lost in favour of  a kind of  precision that introduces its own set of  challenges.
Finally, I dare assert with some measure of conviction that in addition to 
the theoretical insights it contains, this thesis contributes to our understanding of 
the strange and circuitous paths that led to the current legal regime covering 
employment drug testing in Canada.  Canadian jurisprudence was struck by an 
epidemic, the precise measurement of which is  both difficult and revealing.  The 
norms governing employment drug testing were not transplanted to Canada, nor 
were they a consequence of  harmonization; they spread here.
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1. QuickLaw Data Sources
1.1. All Labour Arbitration Awards
Content summary:
All Labour Arbitration Awards is a group source which contains  collections of ar-
bitration awards (both full-text awards and digests) pertaining to collective agree-
ment grievances in unionized workplaces under federal jurisdiction (Canada La-
bour Code) and from all provinces and territories except Quebec and Nunavut.
Publisher:
LexisNexis Canada
Sources:
- Alberta Grievance Arbitration Awards
- Alberta Grievance Arbitration Awards Index
- British Columbia Collective Agreement Arbitration Awards
- Canada Labour Arbitration Decisions
- Labour Arbitration Xpress Case Summaries
- Manitoba Grievance Arbitration Awards
- New Brunswick Labour Adjudication Awards
- Newfoundland and Labrador Labour Arbitration Awards
- Northwest Territories Labour Arbitration Awards
- Nova Scotia Labour Arbitration Awards
- Ontario Grievance Settlement Board Decisions
- Ontario Labour Arbitration Awards
- Prince Edward Island Labour Arbitration Awards
- Saskatchewan Labour Arbitration Awards
- Yukon Labour Arbitration Awards
I-3
1.2. All Labour Relations Board Decisions
Content summary:
All Labour Relations Board Decisions is a group source which contains collections 
of labour relations  decisions (both full-text awards and digests) from federal and 
provincial authorities.
Publisher:
LexisNexis Canada
Sources:
- Alberta Labour Relations Board Decisions Index
- Alberta Labour Relations Board Reports
- British Columbia Labour Relations Board Decisions
- Canada Industrial Relations Board Decisions
- Canada Public Service Labour Relations Board Decisions
- Canadian Artists and Producers  Professional Relations Tribunal 
Decisions
- Décisions de la Commission des relations de travail dans la fonc-
tion publique du Canada
- Décisions de la Commission des relations du travail du Québec
- Décisions du Conseil canadien des relations industrielles
- Décisions du Tribunal canadien des relations professionnelles 
artistes-producteurs
- Décisions du Tribunal du travail du Québec
- Manitoba Labour Board Decisions
- New Brunswick Industrial Relations Board Decisions
- New Brunswick Labour and Employment Board Decisions
- New Brunswick Public Service Labour Relations Board Decisions
- Newfoundland and Labrador Labour Relations Board Decisions
- Nova Scotia Labour Relations Board Decisions
- Ontario Labour Relations Board Decisions
- Ontario Labour Relations Board Reports
- Prince Edward Island Labour Relations Board Decisions
- Saskatchewan Labour Relations Board Decisions
I-4
1.3. All Employment Law Tribunal Decisions
Content summary:
All Employment Law Tribunal Decisions includes  decisions relative to non-union 
employment matters from quasi-judicial tribunals. " It includes  the nature of the 
employment relationship, master and servant, employment contracts, vicarious 
liability of employers, duties of employees, remuneration for lost employment, 
damages  for loss of services, wrongful dismissal or termination, pay equity and 
workplace discrimination, non-unionized public and civil servants, and the author-
ity and jurisdiction of administrative bodies tasked with overseeing employment 
relationships.
Publisher:
LexisNexis Canada
Sources:
Quicklaw does not list the sources for this set.  At a minimum, given Quicklaw’s 
available sources, it can be assumed to include relevant decisions from the follow-
ing sources:
- British Columbia Employment Standards Tribunal Decisions
- Alberta Employment Standards Umpire DecisionsRemove
- Manitoba Labour Board Decisions
- Ontario Employment Standards Adjudication Decisions
- New Brunswick Employment Standards Tribunal Decisions
- Canada Public Service Staffing Tribunal Decisions
I-5
1.4. All Human Rights Tribunal Decisions
Content summary:
There is no pre-made aggregate source for this  in Quicklaw.  I constructed it using 
the combined sources  option and including all available English language human 
rights tribunal decisions and case reporters.
Publisher:
LexisNexis Canada
Sources:
- Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Decisions
- British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal Decisions
- Manitoba Human Rights Boards of  Adjudication Decisions
- Ontario Human Rights Tribunal Decisions
- New Brunswick Human Rights Board of  Inquiry Decisions
- Nova Scotia Human Rights Boards of  Inquiry Decisions
- Prince Edward Island Human Rights Panel Decisions
- Newfoundland and Labrador Human Rights  Boards of Inquiry 
Decisions
- Yukon Human Rights Boards of  Adjudication Decisions
- Canadian Human Rights Law Digest
I-6
1.5. Judgements of  all Courts of  General Jurisdiction
Content summary:
There is  no pre-made aggregate source for this in Quicklaw as the “All Canadian 
Court Cases” is  overbroad (including, for instance, Tax Court of Canada judgements 
and specialised reporters).  I constructed it using the combined sources option and 
including all available English language judgements of all provincial, federal and 
territorial courts of  general jurisdiction, including courts of  appeal.
Publisher:
LexisNexis Canada
Sources:
- British Columbia and Yukon Judgments
- Alberta Judgments
- Saskatchewan Judgments
- Manitoba Judgments
- Ontario Judgments
- New Brunswick Judgments
- Nova Scotia Judgments
- Prince Edward Island Judgments
- Newfoundland and Labrador Judgments
- Federal Court Judgments
- Northwest Territories Judgments
- Nunavut Judgments
- Supreme Court of  Canada Judgments
I-7
2. Azimut Data Sources
Content summary:
Since Azimut does not have the same sources options  as Quicklaw in its  full-text 
database, I individually added all of the sources containing decisions of general 
law, labour and employment, and human rights.
Publisher:
Société québécoise pour l’information juridique
Sources:
- Cour d'appel fédérale et Cour fédérale
- Cour d'appel du Québec
- Cour supérieure
- Cour du Québec - Chambre civile
- Cour du Québec - Division administrative et d'appel
- Cour du Québec - Division des petites créances
- Tribunal des droits de la personne
- Commissaire du travail
- Commission de la fonction publique
- Commission des relations du travail
- Conseil canadien des relations industrielles/Conseil canadien des 
relations du travail
- Conseil d'arbitrage de la construction
- Tribunal canadien des droits de la personne (1re instance et appel)
- Tribunal d'arbitrage
- Tribunal d'arbitrage (artistes)
- Tribunal de la dotation de la fonction publique
- Tribunal des professions
- Tribunal du travail
I-8
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1. Variables and Data Types
This section describes each of  the variables created in QDA Miner.
1.1. Case Name
Name:!! CASE_NAME
Description:" Name of the case as it appears in caselaw reporter.  Where 
there is  a difference between the full name of the case and the 
name under which it is indexed the “indexed as” name is 
used.
Data type:! String
Format:! None
Null value accepted:! No
1.2. Case Reporter Reference
Name:!! REF_PAPER
Description:! Reference for citation to a case reporter (if any).  If the case 
was  published in more than one case reporter the official re-
porter is  preferred followed by a sem-official or specialized 
reporter followed by a case summary reporter.
Data type:! String
Format:! None
Null value accepted:! Yes
1.3. Database Reference
Name:!! REF_ DATABA 
Description:! Reference for citation to an electronic database.  If the case 
was  made available in more than one database Quicklaw was 
used for English decisions  and Azimut for French decisions 
regardless of  jurisdiction.
Data type:! String
Format:! None
Null value accepted:! Yes
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1.4. Neutral Citation
Name:!! REF_NEUTRA 
Description:! Neutral citation reference if  available.
Data type:! String
Format:! None
Null value accepted:! Yes
1.5. Tribunal
Name:!! TRIBUNAL
Description:! Tribunal that rendered the decision
Data type:! Closed list
Format:! N/A
Null value accepted:! No
Accepted values:! Arbitration
! ! Labour Board
! ! Human Rights Tribunal
! ! Employment Adjudication Board
! ! Public Service Board
! ! Superior Court
! ! Court of  Appeal
1.6. Jurisdiction
Name:!! JURIS 
Description:! Jurisdiction of  the tribunal that rendered the decision
Data type:! Closed list
Format:! N/A
Null value accepted:! No
Accepted values:! Federal
! ! BC
! ! AB
! ! SK
! ! MB
! ! ON
! ! QC
! ! NB
! ! NS
! ! PEI
! ! NF
! ! YK
! ! NU
! ! NWT
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1.7. Author
Name:!! AUTHOR
Description:! Name of  the person who rendered the decision
Data type:! String
Null value accepted:! No
Format:! Last name Initials
1.8. Date of  Hearing
Name:!! HEARD
Description:! Date of hearing ( if indicated).  In the case of multiple hear-
ing dates the last date of hearing is  used.  In cases where it is 
indicated that therer were pleadings in writing or supplemen-
tal materials were filed by the parties  the date of receipt of 
these documents is used (if  indicated).
Data type:! Date
Null value accepted:! Yes
Format:! YYYY/MM/DD
1.9. Date Rendered
Name:!! RENDERED
Description:! Date that the decision was rendered.
Data type:! Date
Null value accepted:! No
Format:! YYYY/MM/DD
1.10. Industry
Name:!! INDUSTRY
Description:! Industry of the workplace from whence the litigation leading 
to the decision arose.
Data type:! Closed list
Format:! N/A
Null value accepted:! No
Accepted values:! CONSTRUCTION
! ! FORESTRY
! ! MANUFACTURING
! ! MINING
! ! OIL & GAS
! ! PUBLIC
! ! OTHER
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1.11. Reference to American Sources
Name:!! CITE_US1
Description:! Whether the case cites  an American source.  If the code U.S. 
> 0, then CITE_US1=true.
Data type:! Boolean
Default value:! False
Name:!! CITE_US2
Description:! Whether the case cites  a case that cites an American source.. 
If the case has a CITE_US1=false and cites a case that has a 
CITE_US1=true then it is CITE_US2=true.
Data type:! Boolean
Default value:! False
Name:!! CITE_US3
Description:! Whether the case cites a case that cites a case that cites an 
American source..  If the case has both CITE_US1=false and 
CITE_US2=false and cites a case that has a CITE_US2=true 
then it is CITE_US3=true.
Data type:! Boolean
Default value:! False
1.12. Citation to Picher Decisions
Name:!! PICHER_2
Description:! Whether the case cites  a decision rendered by Arbitrator 
Michel G. Picher.  If the decision is code Picher < 1 and it 
c i tes a decis ion that has code Picher >1, then 
PICHER_2=true.
Data type:! Boolean
Default value:! False
Name:!! PICHER_3
Description:! Whether the case cites a decision that cites a decision ren-
dered by Arbitrator Michel G. Picher.  If the decision has a 
code Picher < 1 and is Picher_2=false and it cites a decision 
that is PICHER_2=true, then Picher_3=true 
Data type:! Boolean
Default value:! False
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2. Codes
2.1. Norms
Code name: ! FOR_CAUSE
Description:! References to the norm authorizing an employer to require a urine 
drug test upon having cause to believe that the employee is impaired 
by drugs or alcohol at work. 
Associated Keywords:
FOR_CAUSE
REASONABLE_CAUSE
REASOABLE_GROUNDS,
PROBABLE_GROUNDS
GOOD_REASON
REASON_TO_BELIEVE
MOTIF
MOTIFS
MOTIF_RAISONNABLE
MOTIFS_RAISONNABLES
BONNES_RAISON
BONNE_RAISON
RAISON_VALABLE
Code name:! POST_ACCIDENT
Description:! References to the norm authorizing an employer to require a urine 
drug test following a workplace incident. 
Associated Keywords:
POST-ACCIDENT,
POST-INCIDENT,
SIGNIFICANT_ACCIDENT,
SIGNIFICANT_INCIDENT
NEAR_MISS
NEAR-MISS
WORKPLACE_ACCIDENT,
WORKPLACE_INCIDENT
ACCIDENT_DE_TRAVAIL
SUITE_D’UN_ACCIDENT
INCIDENT_LIÉ_AU_TRAVAIL
Code name: ! REINSTATEMENT
Description:! References to the norm authorizing an employer to require urine 
drug testing as a condition of reinstatement of an employee absent 
or subject to discipline because of  drug use.
Associated Keywords:
LAST_CHANCE_AGREEMENT
REINSTATEMENT_AGREEMENT 
REINTEGRATION_AGREEMENT, 
CONDITION_OF_REINSTATEMENT
ONGOING_MONITORING
ENTENTE_DE_DERNIÈRE_CHANCE
RÉINTÉGRATION
RETOUR_AU_TRAVAIL
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2.2. Reservoir & Vector
Code name: U.S.
Description:! References to or citations to sources from the United States.
Associated Keywords:
UNITED_STATES
UNITED-STATES 
ÉTATS-UNIS
ETATS-UNIS 
ÉTATS_UNIS
ETATS_UNIS 
U.S.
U.S
É.-U.
E.-U. 
AMERICAN
AMERICA
AMÉRICAIN
AMÉRICAINE
AMÉRICAINS
AMÉRICAINES
AMERICAIN
AMERICAINE
AMERICAINS
AMERICAINES
ALABAMA
ALASKA
ARIZONA
ARKANSAS
CALIFORNIA
CALIFORNIE
COLORADO 
CONNECTICUT
DELAWARE
DISTRICT_OFCOLUMBIA
D.C.
FLORIDA
FLORIDE
GEORGIA
GEORGIE
HAWAII
IDAHO
ILLINOIS
INDIANA 
IOWA
KANSAS
KENTUCKY 
LOUISIANA
LOUSIANE 
MAINE
MARYLAND
MASSACHUSETTS
MICHIGAN
MINNESOTA
MISSISSIPPI 
MISSOURI
MONTANA
NEBRASKA
NEVADA
NEW_HAMPSHIRE
NOUVELLE_HAMPSHIRE
NEW_JERSEY
NOUVELLE_JERSEY
NEW_MEXICO
NOUVELLE_MEXIQU
NEW_YORK
NORTH_CAROLINA
CAROLINE_DU_NORD
NORTH_DAKOTA
DAKOTA_DU_NORD
OHIO
OKLAHOMA
OREGON
PENNSYLVANIA
PENNSYILVANIE
RHODE_ISLAND
SOUTH_CAROLINA
CAROLINE_DU_SU
SOUTH_DAKOTA
DAKOTA_DU_SUD
TENNESSEE
TEXAS
UTAH
VERMONT
VIRGINIA
VIRGINIE
WASHINGTON
WEST VIRGINIA
VIRGINIE_DE_L'OUEST
WISCONSIN
WYOMING
 
Code name: Picher
Description:! References to or citations  from decisions rendered by Arbitrator 
Michel G. Picher.
Associated Keywords:
PICHER
CROA,
C.R.O.A.
RAILWAY_ARBITRATION
RAILROAD_ARBITRATION
6_L.A.C._(4TH)_381
11_L.A.C._(4TH)_364
22_L.A.C._(4TH)_164
75_L.A.C._(4TH)_300
95_L.A.C._(4TH)_341
111_L.A.C._(4TH)_328
138_L.A.C._(4TH)_122
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